Civil-Military Interaction in the EU’s Comprehensive Approach

Todor Tagarev
Valeri Ratchev
Civil-Military Interaction in the EU’s Comprehensive Approach

Todor Tagarev and Valeri Ratchev

Institute of Information and Communication Technologies
CSDM | Centre for Security and Defence Management
www.IT4Sec.org

Sofia, December 2011

*IT4Sec Reports 94* summarises the CSDM input to Focus working package 3.2. It examines the origins of contemporary civil-military interaction, the modalities of civil-military interaction in current EU policies and an approach to exploring the civil-military dimension of future EU roles in the implementation of the comprehensive approach. The report concludes that future security roles of the European Union will require ever closer interaction between civilian and military instruments to guarantee the coordination and cooperation of those involved in operations at national and international levels. With time, the interaction between civilians and military moved forward from coordination on an ad-hoc basis to a structured EU-wide process of development of military and civilian capabilities. This trend is likely to continue towards encompassing the early phases of defining future operational requirements and technology development, that would not only guarantee effective implementation of advanced concepts of operations and interoperability among military and main civilian actors, but may also lead to the creation of common civil-military assets owned in some form by the European Union.

*IT4Sec Reports 94* представя изследователските резултати на ЦМСО по работен пакет 3.2 на проект FOCUS. В доклада се описва произхода на съвременното гражданско-военно взаимодействие, съответните модалности в съвременните политики на Европейския съюз и подход към изследването на гражданско-военното измерение на бъдещите роли на ЕС в прилагането на всеобхватния подход. В заключението се подчертава, че бъдещите роли на ЕС в сферата на сигурността ще изискват все по-тясно взаимодействие между цивилни и военни инструменти за да се гарантира координацията между всички участници в операции на национално и международно ниво. С времето сътрудничеството между цивилни и военни ще се извежда от ад-хок координация към структуриран процес на развитие на военни и цивилни способности. Вероятно тази тенденция ще обхване ранните фази на определяне на бъдещи оперативни изисквания и технологично развитие, като по този начин не само гарантира ефективно прилагане на съвременни оперативни концепции и оперативна съвместимост между военни и цивилни, но може да доведе и до създаване на общи „цивило-военни” способности притежавани под някаква форма от Европейския съюз.


Valeri Ratchev is Chief of the Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria and Associate Senior Fellow of the Centre for Security and Defence Management, <www.IT4Sec.org/csdm>. He was Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Bulgaria to the Republic of Iraq (2005-2009) and served as Deputy Commandant of the “G.S. Rakovski” Defence and Staff College and Dean of its National Security and Defence Faculty (2000-2005).

Acknowledgement
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n° 261633. For more information visit the project website at http://www.focusproject.eu.

Original version, in English, 2011

**ISSN 1314-5614**
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 4

ORIGINS OF CONTEMPORARY CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION ................................................................. 5
  Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) ........................................................................................................ 5
  Civil-Military Coordination (CM COORD) .......................................................................................... 6

CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION IN CURRENT EU POLICIES ........................................................................ 7
  Interfaces among EU policies .............................................................................................................. 7
  Evolution of EU Military and Civilian Capabilities ............................................................................. 8
  Continuum of Actors .......................................................................................................................... 8
  The Civil-Military Perspective in EU-NATO Operational Arrangements ........................................... 10

THE CIVIL-MILITARY DIMENSION OF FUTURE EU ROLES
IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH ....................................................... 11
  Nature of conflict, future operations and civil-military interaction .................................................. 11
  The Solidarity Clause ...................................................................................................................... 12
  Towards common ownership of civil-military capabilities .............................................................. 13

REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................................. 14
Our analysis within FOCUS working package 3.1 identified and recommended the use of five dimensions in describing potential future EU roles in the implementation of the comprehensive approach: (1) actors, (2) instruments, (3) goals and objectives, (4) strategies, and (5) mission roles. This report examines plausible developments along a key interaction in the first dimension – that between civilians and military players in the implementation of the comprehensive approach. Towards this purpose it turns first to the origins of contemporary civil-military interaction in operations and presents the two main concepts of civil-military cooperation, or CIMIC, and civil-military coordination. Secondly, it presents current EU policies with major impact on the development and use of civilian and military assets in EU operations, including the interfaces between EU and NATO. The third and final section examines the civil-military dimension of future EU roles in the implementation of the comprehensive approach. It looks at potential developments in civil-military interaction in ‘external’ and ‘internal’ roles and identifies plausible EU roles in developing ‘mixed’ civil-military capabilities.

1 The main results were presented in Todor Tagarev, Valeri Ratchev and Petya Ivanova, Framework for Analysis of Potential EU Roles in the Comprehensive Approach, IT4Sec Reports 88 (September 2011), <www.IT4Sec.org>.
ORIGINS OF CONTEMPORARY CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION

While currently both civilian and defence authorities recognise the need for civil-military interaction in the provision of security, respective concepts and implementation approaches continue to evolve. To understand the prospects in that regard, one has to acknowledge the origin of main current concepts and civil-military arrangements that could be grouped under two headings: Civil-Military Cooperation, or CIMIC, and Civil-Military Coordination.

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC)

Military operations after World War Two, such as the British experience during the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960, put forward the questions of how armed forces have to be organised and trained to work with civil authorities, how roles of political and military leaders are defined, and how operations of military and security forces are organised (Hamby, 2002). The respective doctrinal aspects were developed under the heading of military operations other than war, or MOOTW (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995) and continue to evolve with consideration of irregular warfare, stabilisation and reconstruction, counterinsurgency operations, etc.

These operations, just like any other military operation, are driven by political considerations. However, MOOTW “are more sensitive to such considerations due to the overriding goal to prevent, preempt, or limit potential hostilities. In MOOTW, political considerations permeate all levels and the military may not be the primary player” (Ibid: I-1). One of the consequences is that these operations do not always follow well understood principles of war, e.g. having much more restrictive rules of engagement, just like in the full spectrum of peace operations, and serve as a testbed for interagency cooperation.

Having emerged ad-hoc in demanding circumstances, by now CIMIC is a well established military concept, codified in doctrinal document. One of the available definitions refers to CIMIC as the “co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies” (cf. Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection, 2008; Tosun, Yildiran & Ozer, 2009).^2

The concept of CIMIC facilitates the establishment and maintenance of effective co-operation of the commander and the civilian authorities, organisations, agencies in theatre, local administration, businesses, community leader and population within a commander’s area of operations in order to allow him/her to fulfil the assigned mission. This may also include direct support to the implementation of CIMIC activities.

^2 NATO defines CIMIC in identical manner: “The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies” (NATO Standardization Agency, 2003; Military Committee, 2001).
CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION (CM COORD)

The concept of Civil Military Coordination emerged on the civilian side. Dealing with complex emergencies, increased operational challenges, greater risks and threats, the humanitarian community often had to rely on support by the military. With the experience of utilising various forms of civil-military coordination, the humanitarian community felt it necessary to examine the broad spectrum of issues arising from the interaction between civilians and military. Thus it came up with specific guidelines on the use of military and civil defence assets (MCDA) in natural disasters and complex emergencies (Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection, 2008). That includes the so-called Oslo Guidelines of foreign military and civil defence assets in natural disasters (OCHA, 2007) and MCDA Guidelines for complex emergencies, as well as the reference papers and guidelines on civil military relationship in complex emergencies and on the use of military or armed escorts prepared by the UN/OCHA Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC, 2008). In addition, the NGO-Military Contact Group (NMCG)—a forum in the UK chaired by the British Red Cross—facilitates information sharing, learning, and dialogue on relevant policy, technical, and operational issues of civil-military interaction in humanitarian response and reports on new developments in the field (NMCG, 2011).

In sum, CIMIC is a concept of supporting a military commander in certain operations, while civil-military coordination is clearly a humanitarian concept. The remaining part of this report will examine how these separate concepts have and continue to evolve.

---

3 For updates and mission/country specific guidelines visit http://reliefweb.int/updates?search=mcda+guidelines.
CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION IN CURRENT EU POLICIES

INTERFACES AMONG EU POLICIES

Humanitarian and rescue missions, just as peacekeeping and peacemaking operations were part of the so called Petersberg tasks, and thus of the European Security and Defence Policy. The Lisbon Treaty defined it as a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), coming under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, adding to the original Petersberg tasks, among others, stabilisation in post-conflict situations and support to third countries in combating terrorism that also assume close civil-military interaction.

At the same time, the Lisbon Treaty elevated humanitarian aid as a separate policy of the EU (TFEU, Article 214). The magnitude and number of natural and man-made disasters have increased in the last decade, while the international context in which humanitarian aid takes place has become increasingly challenging. Respective operations are becoming more complex and protracted and often accompanied by blatant violations of the international humanitarian law and threats to the security of humanitarian workers (Caprilé & Hakala, 2010). In this environment, a European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid between the European Parliament, Council and Commission, signed in December 2007, confirmed the use of armed forces, albeit as a last resort in meeting critical humanitarian needs.

EuropeAid ⁴ is another policy that calls for close coordination of various EU policies. Development and cooperation require promotion of a coherent and effective “Whole of EU” approach to crisis and fragile situations, for EU instruments and policies in synergy with CSDP, the European External Action Service (EEAS), Member States, and cooperation with outside bodies such as the United Nations and regional organizations. Further, EU development and cooperation bodies support interventions in fragile countries and crisis situations facilitating coordination with the Humanitarian Office of the European Commission, the Foreign Policy Instrument, and EEAS, including Crisis Management and Planning Department, Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, EU Military Staff, Joint Situation Centre, CSDP actions, etc. Likewise, they support the organization of prevention and preparedness strategies as well as Response and Recovery, including Transition (DEVCO, 2011).

EU development programmes also support the establishment of democratic governance in recipient countries, including in the area of justice and security.

And finally, the security-development nexus involves coordination in a number of thematic policies, such as Counter-terrorism, Mine Action, Small Arms, Border co-operation, Organised Crime, Weapons of Mass Destruction/Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (WMD/CBRN) and related initiatives, as well as in Security Sector Reform, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration (Ibid:58).

⁴ See the website of Development and Cooperation-EuropeAid at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/who/about/index_en.htm.
EVOLUTION OF EU MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CAPABILITIES

In 1999 the European Council mandated the Helsinki Headline Goal, calling for the designation and preparation of military forces of up to 15 brigades (50–60,000 personnel) capable of implementing the full range of the original Petersberg task and the creation of respective planning and decision making bodies. In 2004 that goal was extended to 2010, adding also the creation of battlegroups and the maintenance of two of them at high level of readiness for deployment.

In parallel, the Brussels European Council in December 2004 approved the “Civilian Headline Goal 2008.” The ambition of the EU is to be able to deploy integrated civilian crisis management packages in ESDP concurrent civilian crisis management missions, at short notice and different levels of engagement, including in ‘in a non-benign environment.’ Six priority sectors of civil crisis management were identified:

- police;
- rule of law;
- civil administration;
- civil protection;
- monitoring missions;
- support for EU special representatives.

Civilian capability packages can be deployed autonomously, jointly or in close cooperation with military operations. The Council mandated that close cooperation and co-ordination with the military efforts have to be ensured throughout all phases of the operation (Council of the European Union, 2004).

In April 2010 Poland, France and Germany launched the so-called “Weimar Initiative” to strengthen CSDP. It is focused on establishing permanent civil-military planning and command structures for EU operations. This integrated civil-military focus reflects the growing importance of the civilian dimension of EU operations and the desire to implement a comprehensive approach to crisis management. Practical steps such as the creation of Crisis Management and Planning Directorate in 2009 in EEAS from the merger of two former directorates—Defence Aspects and Civilian Crisis Management—do support this endeavour. The initiative may lead in time to the creation of appropriate internal EU structures allowing the Union to perform complex civil-military tasks in crisis management (Major, 2010).

CONTINUUM OF ACTORS

Civil and military players consistently act alongside in crisis management operations. On the other hand, with time new actors become involved in such operations, often in new forms of partnership between public and private organizations. While police and civil protection personnel form the backbone of Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) and rapidly-deployable police elements, additional players can also make a substantial contribution. Among them are:

- a variety of non-governmental organizations (NGOs);
volunteers, in particular through the forthcoming establishment of a European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps (TFEU, Article 214.5) and the systemic approach to identification and selection of volunteers, their training according to common standards and, possibly, modules, and deployment (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 2010);

private sector companies, with the so-called Private Security Companies (PSCs) featuring prominently among them;

representatives from the affected communities, etc.

A number of new forms emerge on the continuum between public and private actors. A recent study by Ekström (2010) identified a number of public private business models that come in between the two extremes of public provision and outright privatization of security services. That includes public private partnership (PPP) models such as:

- Design and Construct (D&C);
- Sale and leaseback;
- Operate and Maintain (O&M);
- Operate, Maintain and Manage (OM&M);
- Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO);
- Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT);
- Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT);
- Build-Lease-Transfer-Maintain (BLTM);
- Build-Own-Operate-Remove (BOOR);
- Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT);
- Lease-Renovate-Operate-Transfer (LROT);
- Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO);
- Design-Construct-Manage-Finance (DCMF);
- Design-Build-Finance-Operate-Manage (DBFOM); and
- Build-Own-Operate (BOO).

In addition to PPPs, the Swedish concept of Public Private Cooperation (PPC) includes outsourcing, contracting, franchising, concessions, and joint ventures. While most of these forms have been tried in national settings only, experience and empirical evidence (Hodge, Greve & Boardman, 2011; Georgiev, 2007) is of use in the consideration of future EU roles in CSDP and humanitarian aid operations.

In view of the current and foreseeable security environment, there is a considerable interest in “light military/heavy police” type of capabilities that do not readily fit into the civil-military dichotomy. Capabilities of this type are provided traditionally by national paramilitary organizations, such as the Dutch Royal Marechaussee, the French National Gendarmerie, the Italian Carabinieri, the Portuguese Guarda Nacional Republicana and the Spanish Guardia Civil (Shalamanov, Tagarev & Angelov, 2006). The presence of specialised police forces already facilitated the
building of capacity for CSDP mission. The analysis of experience in implementing such capabilities in EU operations, albeit limited so far, also provides for a glimpse at future modes of civil-military interaction (Rodt, 2011).

**THE CIVIL-MILITARY PERSPECTIVE IN EU-NATO OPERATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS**

The European Union has a significant number of partners in its operations, including international and regional organisations, nations, and NGOs. But of special significance are its relations with NATO both in operations and in the development of civil and military capabilities. In a number of CSDP operations EU has utilised NATO assets on the basis of the 2004 Berlin Plus agreement. Since the NATO Lisbon Summit in 2010 there is reciprocal arrangement in place which allows NATO access to EU capabilities.

Both EU and NATO are in the process of enhancing organisational structures and decision-making to implement successfully the comprehensive approach to conflict resolution, stabilisation and reconstruction. To this end, it has been suggested that nations establish and maintain an interconnected web of governmental agencies—law enforcement, border protection services, judiciaries and public health, etc.—complemented by a “NATO-EU framework for comprehensive planning and liaison with civilian actors, especially humanitarian relief organisations and NGOs” (ACT, 2009:61).

The EU has already well established mechanisms for calling on military assets, as well as for cooperating with NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EARDCC). That includes, among others, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and the 24/7 functioning of its Monitoring and Information Centre (Mazzara, 2011).

NATO on its side also invests in concepts, e.g. NEC/Web-2, that can enable interoperability between NATO and EU and facilitate integration and cost-effective use of their capabilities (Gabel-lone, in press).

And finally, the two organisations formally coordinate capability development through the NATO-EU Capability Group, meeting approximately every four to six weeks alternating between NATO HQ and EU Council Justus Lipsius in Brussels (Ibid.).

It can be stated as an interim conclusion that the understanding of civilian led, combined civil-military operations has been soundly established in EU security thinking, and the enhancement of related institutions proceeds in a practical manner, with two distinct tracks of capability development respectively for civilian and military capabilities. The next section examines how the civil-military interaction could evolve in next decades.
THE CIVIL-MILITARY DIMENSION OF FUTURE EU ROLES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Future modes of civil-military interaction in the implementation of the comprehensive approach by the EU will evolve depending on a number of major developments, including:

1. choices on EU roles as a global security actor;\(^5\)
2. the evolving nature of violent conflict and the respective crisis management operations, e.g. vis-à-vis emerging threats;
3. conceptual developments and decisions on the implementation of the solidarity clause (Article 222 of the Lisbon Treaty), in particular as related to prevention of terrorist threats in Member States’ territory and the protection of democratic institutions from any terrorist attack;
4. the evolving balance between the Commission, in particular the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the Member States in influencing CSDP decisions that may lead, or not, to elements of supranational decision-making and the creation of commonly owned European capabilities \(^6\);
5. resource constraints;
6. rapid evolution of civilian capabilities of a comprehensive nature;
7. growing preference of using police and paramilitary forces instead of traditional military in order to reduce collateral damage and facilitate post-conflict reconstruction.

The remainder of this report examines potential evolution of civil-military interaction in view of the second, third and the common ownership aspect of the fourth of the listed factors.

NATURE OF CONFLICT, FUTURE OPERATIONS AND CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION

Conflict in the coming decades will continue to be fraught with uncertainty, involving state and non-state actors combining conventional, irregular and asymmetric methods. It will go beyond traditional domains to encompass space and cyberspace. Shaping the opinion of a network-enabled audience will be just as important as targeting the opponent (Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2010:13). Problems related to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will persist. Cyber threats will also proliferate and, possibly, opponents will acquire capabilities to organise a high-consequence attack against European critical infrastructures. Likewise, non-state and hybrid actors will continue to seek capabilities to stage major terrorist attacks on the territories of Member States.

\(^5\) FOCUS working package 6 is dedicated to exploration of such future roles.

\(^6\) For example, through increased coherence in the development of some capabilities in the Capability Development Plan, \(<www.eda.europa.eu/Capabilitiespriorities>\), leading to cases of future acquisition by the EU similar to the project for the Galileo satellite navigation system. The EU ISS report (2004:116-124) compares this and other forms of filling in EU capability gaps.
The European Union, along with its partners, is likely to respond to such (and other) threats in a comprehensive manner that includes prevention, crisis management, stabilization, development assistance and so on. A decision to become involved in such conflicts would entail complex operations with close interaction of military and numerous civilian actors. These actors will not be part of strict hierarchical command arrangements; rather, they will act in a networked manner implementing advanced concepts of network-enabled (or ‘network-based’) operations. In addition, they will seek the achievement of operational objectives with the application of tailored effects, minimising kinetic impact when possible. That will also require coherency of efforts of numerous actors within a concept like Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO).

Novel threats and resource constraint capability development frameworks will likely lead to the development of assets, such as satellite-based surveillance and communications and cyber security capabilities that, by design, are shared by civilian and military actors. To further complicate the issue, it is possible that some of these assets and capabilities are acquired in one or another form of public private cooperation.

Another plausible case is the development of “heavy police/ light military” type of forces designated to deal with high-end asymmetric threats, posed for example by hybrid armies. Thus, it may be anticipated that the boundaries between what constitutes ‘civil’ and what ‘military’ will become increasingly obscure.

**THE SOLIDARITY CLAUSE**

The assistance to Member States in natural disasters, the prevention and protection from terrorist acts in line with the TFEU Solidarity Clause is also likely to impact future civil-military interaction. At current, there are many national specifics on the use of military forces for internal security purposes in EU member states. Hence, it is likely that the ‘horizontal dimension’ of the comprehensive approach will remain in the prerogatives of Member States.

On the other hand, it is hard to imagine a scenario with the magnitude of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in the spring of 2011 on the territory of a Member State when specialized military capabilities, provided for example by CBRN units of other EU member states would not get involved in protecting the population and consequence management.

In addition to the use of both civilian and military assets in large scale natural disasters and industrial catastrophes, it is possible to envision the use of military assets under EU mandate in preventive and other operations of a Member State territory. There have been cases of using the military in international operations to secure VIP events and protect the population during mass events. Well known are the examples of using NATO assets, including the AWACS fleet, during the Olympic Games in Athens and the European Championship Football in Portugal, both in 2004, and the 2006 World Cup Football Championship. The use of this air surveillance and control capability has been requested also during meetings of Alliance heads of state, governmental and non-governmental meetings and NATO summits, as well as important meetings held by other international organisations (NATO Topics, 2011).

---

7 See FOCUS deliverable 3.1, Problem Space Report, p. 7.
TOWARDS COMMON OWNERSHIP OF CIVIL-MILITARY CAPABILITIES

The European Union is still in its infancy in terms of commonly owned capabilities, with major acquisitions still to come given an adequate level on internal EU cohesion is maintained. Still further into the future is the possibility for acquiring capabilities that do not clearly fit into the civil-military dichotomy. Among such capabilities under certain security and technological developments might be those for provision of cyber security/cyber defence, capabilities utilising space-based assets, capabilities for counter proliferation and CBRN protection, paramilitary capabilities, specialized capabilities for protection of energy supplies, etc.

In the search of efficiency, some of these capabilities may be developed in a form of partnership between EU bodies and private actors.

In such cases the focus of civil-military interaction will move from the coordination of operational roles, procedures, supporting equipment and interoperability issues to the early stages of requirements definition and the development of technologies and concepts of operation.

Once such ‘mixed’ civil-military capabilities are developed, the European Union might consider the creation of a pool of such capabilities in complementing what currently are the military and the civilian headline goals.

* * *

In sum, future security roles of the European Union will require ever closer interaction between civilian and military instruments to guarantee the coordination and cooperation of those involved in operations at national and international levels. With time, the interaction between civilians and military moved forward from coordination on an ad-hoc basis to a structured EU-wide process of development of military and civilian capabilities. This trend is likely to continue towards encompassing the early phases of defining future operational requirements and technology development, that would not only guarantee effective implementation of advanced concepts of operations and interoperability among military and main civilian actors, but may also lead to the creation of common civil-military assets owned in some form by the European Union.

---

8 See the example with the satellite navigation system above.
REFERENCES


