HOMELAND SECURITY: GENERAL TEMPLATES AND OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

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Abstract: Homeland Security (HLS) encompasses the combined efforts of government agencies, non-government organizations, and the private sector to protect a nation-state, either offensively or defensively, against violent attacks. If attempts at protection fail, HLS then focuses on the management of and the response to such attacks. This generic, two-part definition of Homeland Security may be accurate enough, but it should not obscure a contradictory truth – HLS strategies invariably fluctuate by country and by region even though the era of exclusively national defense in Greater Europe is over, as is the era of narrowly designed national defense strategies themselves. Slowly but inevitably, all security strategies in the area, including Homeland Security strategies, will have to become “layered” if they are to account for the growing security roles of multiple actors operating on multiple levels. One user-friendly example of layering is the Pyramid Model of Strategy. This model attempts to be as reality-inclusive as possible by working from the bottom up – i.e., by working through 5 successively specific rungs (or types) of strategy. By adapting to and reflecting the influence of the first four rungs, the top-most national HLS strategy can maximize its potential for success in ways that otherwise might not be possible.


Introduction and General Framework

To most observers, Homeland Security (HLS) encompasses the combined efforts of government agencies, non-government organizations, and the private sector to protect a nation-state against violent attacks. If attempts at protection fail, HLS then focuses on the management of and the response to such attacks. This generic, two-part definition of Homeland Security may be accurate enough, but it should not obscure an additional truth – definitions of HLS invariably fluctuate by country and by region.

In Eastern and Southeastern Europe, those who try to define HLS inevitably confront a series of difficult questions. How narrowly should one define Homeland Security?
Should it remain the primary responsibility of Ministries of Defense? Within those ministries and/or others, what level of influence and oversight should civilians have over their uniformed colleagues? And perhaps most importantly, should security establishments attempt to provide a “full menu” of HLS capabilities, even if the attempt itself dilutes (and perhaps even dooms) their effectiveness? These are not trivial questions in a part of the world where significant portions of the military establishment continue to insist on preserving their institutional autonomy from the “interference” of what they see as civilian “amateurs.”

The interrelated reasons for this backwards-looking and military-dominated attitude towards security include the following.

- 19th and 20th century concepts of military professionalism, which encouraged officers to believe that national defense is the exclusive responsibility of “scientific” experts.
- A less philosophically supportable desire to preserve institutional freedoms and prerogatives, if not outright bureaucratic self-survival.
- A lingering suspicion of post-Cold War security sector reforms (and Western-driven reforms in particular), which appear to demand that military leaders jettison the doctrines and practices that once defined their professional lives.
- An unwillingness to commodify military thought – i.e., an unwillingness to treat strategy and doctrine development as an entrepreneurial activity where different concepts collide and compete with each other in a free marketplace of ideas, and thereby help determine which options are best suited for the future.

The above reactions, although understandably human, remain Sisyphus-like in their futility. The great “No” they represent provides only a meager defense against what is the overarching theme of this article – the era of exclusively national defense in Greater Europe is over, as is the era of narrowly designed national defense strategies. Slowly but inevitably, all security strategies in the area, including Homeland Security strategies, will have to become “layered” if they are to account for the growing security roles of multiple actors operating on multiple levels. Figure 1 not only represents what this strategic layering means in practical terms, it also provides a user-friendly template for future Homeland Security strategy development at the national level.

If strategy developers decide to use the Pyramid Model presented in Figure 1 to create HLS-centered security strategies that are as reality-inclusive as possible, they will first have to start from the bottom up – i.e., they will have to work from the broad to the specific. Additionally, they will have to assume that only a minority of security strategies will be strictly military in the future. The majority of them, including HLS
strategies, will actually involve a combination of military and non-military means, but to a degree that is historically unprecedented. (See the discussion of Combination Strategies later in this article.)

Second, the Pyramid Model requires planners to craft strategies that at least minimally account for America’s security interests in their part of the world. No devotee of a robust European Security and Defense Policy can ignore the following existential facts – 1) for the foreseeable future the United States will remain a military colossus unequaled by any other military power, alliance, or union in the world; 2) this unipolar military power has growing strategic interests in NATO’s rimlands, including the Wider Black Sea Area, and 3) virtually all of NATO’s newest members are loath to spurn the security protections provided by the United States for those promised, at some theoretical point in the future, by politically motivated European Union (EU) members (especially France) who want to curtail America’s security role in a Greater Europe. Given these facts, national and HLS-level strategies must account for local American interests, even if cursorily, if they are to be effective.

They must also account for a third level of strategic activity – a multi-organizational level that will only grow in importance over time. If the UN will not bring added “hard” power to the security table anytime soon, its “soft” power capabilities will
certainly remain in place, as will those of the OSCE. NATO and the EU, in turn, will continue to add to their hard and soft power capabilities, and will almost certainly attempt to “proliferate” them through other organizational means – for example, through a revitalized Maghreb Arab Union, or the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council, or a Wider Black Sea Security Cooperation Group, etc. The exact composition of these transnational overlays is not the issue here. What is the issue is that neither organizations like NATO nor individual states like Bulgaria can rely solely on inward-looking strategy development processes in the future. These processes will have to adapt to hybrid civil-military strategies, they will have to consider the interests of a dominant unipolar military power, and they will have to reconcile themselves with security strategies developed (and operating) across inter-organizational lines. In short, Homeland Security strategies created at the national level cannot ignore this layered or Pyramidal approach if they hope to be effective. The attention they pay to each level of the Strategy Pyramid may wax and wane depending on the circumstances, but strategic incoherence will be the price they pay for ignoring any rung along the way.

The fourth and next rung of the Strategy Pyramid requires planners not only to consider the mutual impact of regional inter-organizational strategies on their work, but also the impact of intra-organizational strategies. In terms of HLS, this unavoidable step means accounting for intra-NATO and intra-EU concepts of operations, organizational schemes, capabilities, etc. With a firm grasp of Alliance and Union-level crisis management practices in hand, for example, the local strategist can finally climb to the top of the Strategy Pyramid and develop national-level and/or HLS-centered strategies that rest on the firm conceptual foundations provided by the four rungs below them.

In closing this section, it is appropriate to restate that Figure 1 is nothing if not a multi-dimensional template for developing security strategies now and in the future. It provides a comprehensive approach that begins by deliberately orchestrating civilian and military security practices together, and then focuses on increasingly narrow multi-regional, inter-organizational, and intra-organizational strategies. These increasingly narrow foci then shape the final creation of Homeland Security strategies that are not “tone deaf” at the nation-state level. In order to illustrate just how this approach works, this article will now turn to highlighting several rungs of the Strategic Pyramid in greater detail.

The First Rung of Strategy – Civil-Military Combination Strategies

To describe this foundational level of strategy development properly, it is important to accomplish two tasks – 1) trace briefly how the global strategic environment has changed, and thereby explain why civil-military combination strategies are necessary;
and 2) provide an example of this type of strategy that planners might want to use in their development of specific HLS options.

**A Paradigm Shift in the Strategic Environment**

When discussing broad strategic environments, there is the “then” of the Cold War and the early-to-mid-1990s, and the “now” of today. Changing demographic and migration patterns, ethnic and religious tensions, environmental degradation, the instability exported by failing or failed states, and increased weapons proliferation are only a few of the problems that have exacerbated the differences between “then and now” security, as has post-9/11 transnational terrorism. But since “now” security has readily identifiable features, it permits the development of general axioms. And since these axioms provide the conceptual foundations for all forms of strategy development (including HLS strategies), it is worthwhile to highlight some of them here.

- **First:** Globalization is both a boundary broadening and boundary weakening process. In other words, internal and external threats are increasingly becoming indistinguishable from each other and interchangeable with each other.

- **Second:** We live in a unipolar world militarily (dominated by the United States), a multipolar world economically (dominated by the US, Europe, Japan, and increasingly China and India), and a transnational world (dominated by international/regional organizations, non-government actors, and multinational corporations that increasingly limit what nation-states can do in terms of their own security.) These parallel and yet overlapping worlds represent a “variable geometry” that all HLS planners must account for in their work.

- **Third:** The concepts of transnational and human security have seriously trumped traditional concepts of national defense, especially in Western Europe. Consequently, what was once seen as the narrow and exclusive domain of Ministries of Defense is now seen as the responsibility of multiple organizations and agencies, both official and unofficial. This broadening of security as a concept and as a responsibility is not necessarily a bad thing – it represents its “debelicization” and therefore provides an opportunity for more sophisticated and multifaceted responses to today’s threats (see below).

- **Fourth:** The sources of conflict today are “rational” and “irrational” – i.e., they involve traditional political cost/risk calculations and emotional acts of negation. Given this duality, HLS strategies must concentrate both on prevention and consequence management in order to be effective.

- **Fifth:** Nation-states have forever lost their monopoly on generating and using mass-effects violence. In other words, politically motivated violence has been
“privatized” into the hands of sub-state or non-state actors. As a result, this type of violence is appearing in human domains historically protected (at least partially) from the ravages of armed attacks.

- **Sixth:** Given the above trends, one can say that security institutions today have to cope with a security space that is everywhere and yet nowhere. Their opponent is now an abstraction (the “spectrum of conflict”) rather than a specific, readily identifiable foe. And the “combatants” they face, many of whom are civilians, are networked, modular, borderless, transnational, ephemeral, and asymmetrical.

- **Seventh:** As a result of the above changes, using balanced or symmetrical means against others can now be inherently self-defeating. Instead, it is better to use flexible civil-military strategies (including their hybrid means) to obtain desired effects. But what would one of these types of strategies look like, especially given their importance in the first rung of the Strategy Pyramid?

**Civil-Military Combination Strategies – One Possible Example**

Because they emphasize the interconnectedness of threats (from terrorism, to civil wars, to extreme poverty), civil-military combination strategies are naturally broad and comprehensive in their approach. For these strategies to work effectively, however, the institutions that use them must overcome their own parochialism and learn to work *across* broad organizational and conceptual lines. They must also understand that when they speak of using *all* available sources of national power, particularly for homeland security, they should not mean just using political, economic, military, and informational forms of power, which is usually the case. As Figure 2 illustrates, in civil-military combination strategies there are at least 27 forms of power one can use, either offensively or defensively, on an interchangeable or “horizontal” basis. It is these numerous forms of power (and more) that should provide the foundation for today’s Homeland Security strategies and not the limited options used in the past.

The forms of power in Figure 2 may or may not be already familiar, but what is certainly new is the potential ability of HLS planners, while working with multiple agencies and/or organizations, to mix and match them in unprecedented ways. But how does the above template actually work, one might ask? Basically, it works through bundling – i.e., to defeat or de-fang shadowy or traditional threats, those who practice civil-military combination strategies should mix and match the listed forms of power as necessary. The latter are basically “LEGO pieces” that planners can use to construct any type of HLS strategy that they see fit. Additionally, the level of emphasis given to each LEGO piece could (and should) change as circumstances demand. A particular combination of pieces may be vital in a counter- or anti-terror campaign for X amount of time, but their importance may wane given new circumstances. There-
A Security–Centered, Non–Compartmentalized Combination Strategy

You have political, economic, military, and informational forms of power that you can use, but you should use additional forms of power as well.

Grand Strategic Forms of Power
- Cultural
- Ideological
- Psychological
- Nature/natural resources
- Social networks
- Technological
- Rumor control and/or disinformation
- Agricultural
- Black/gray markets

Military Forms of Power
- Nuclear
- Conventional
- Bio/chemical
- Ecological
- Space
- Electronic/ISR/information control
- Asymmetric/special operations activities
- Exclusion Zones
- Peacekeeping and peacemaking

Non-Military Forms of Power
- Diplomatic
- Economic/economic aid or policy
- Financial markets
- Trade (especially energy control)
- Assorted sanctions
- Legal/moral
- Religious/ethnic
- Media/propaganda/Internet
- Population shifts/migrations

“A better means used alone will not prevail over multiple means used together”

Figure 2: Forms of Power in Civil-Military Combination Strategies.

Therefore, as the situation changes, so should the pieces of the “jigsaw puzzle” or “mosaic” that make up civil-military combination strategies, and so should the relative weight of the pieces themselves. This approach would go far beyond current notions of integrated planning and use national strengths much more precisely, widely, and economically. In fact, by adopting civil-military combination strategies, security-minded nations would be able to 1) encourage inter-agency cooperation, 2) rely on a variety of pre-existing strengths, 3) avoid having to maintain full-service militaries (the bundling of different forms of power would obviate the need for that), 4) improve their security sectors in potentially low technology ways, and 5) save money (because of the efficiencies provided by the first four options).

But what about working within the 27 forms of power themselves? What HLS-friendly templates might be useful there? As illustrated in Figure 3, one possible approach is to develop assorted prevention, protection, and response options against non-state international adversaries, nation-state adversaries, and domestic foes. With this template in hand, the HLS planner would not only have a civil-military combination strategy to shape his or her planning, but also a methodical way to develop different forms of individual power. The planner’s ability to operate within the first rung of the Pyramid of Strategy would thus be complete.
**HLS—Working Within the Forms of Power**

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<tr>
<th>Homeland Security Threat Environment</th>
<th>Non-state International Adversaries</th>
<th>Nation-State Adversaries</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
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<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>Drug Trafficking</td>
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<td>Border Control</td>
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<td>Intelligence Collection, Analysis and Dissemination</td>
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<td>Diplomacy/Shaping</td>
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<td>Prevention</td>
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<td>Cooperative Engagement with Domestic Law Enforcement Agencies</td>
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<td>Anti-drug Programs</td>
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<td>Cooperative Engagement with Domestic Law Enforcement Agencies</td>
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<td>Countering Foreign Intelligence Collection</td>
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<td>Critical Infrastructure Protection</td>
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<td>Cyber Security/Computer Network Defense</td>
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<td>Consequence Management</td>
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<td>Support to Continuity of Government Operations</td>
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<td>Crisis Management</td>
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<td>Cooperative Engagement with Domestic Law Enforcement Agencies</td>
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Figure 3: HLS – Working within the Forms of Power.

**The Second Rung of Strategy – Accounting for a Global US Strategy in the Wider Black Sea Area**

If we assume that 1) today’s external and internal threats are increasingly interchangeable, and 2) American security interests will continue to grow in the Wider Black Sea Area rather than diminish, then the HLS strategies developed in that part of the world should not be exclusively local in character. Instead, the strategies must account for the interests and preferences of outside actors, even if only cursorily. In practical terms, this means the United States and regional political-military organizations like NATO and the EU. In the case of the US, there are two major points HLS planners need to remember.

**First:** Unlike NATO or the EU, the US has global interests rather than broadly regional ones. These wider interests might inspire it to make what appear to be eccentric or abrupt decisions, at least when seen from a regional or sub-regional perspective. What if, for example, the US chooses to take the following steps in the future?

- Redoubles its efforts to transform the Middle East and tie it to the global economy.
• Actively attempts to reunify Korea and promote internal Iranian reforms.
• Rejects (or accepts) the emergence of China as a geopolitical equal.
• Attempts to create other “NATOs” in other parts of the world.
• Attempts to link these “NATOs” together into a wider security network.
• Significantly expands its geopolitical and economic activities in Central Asia, Africa, etc.
• Formally federates itself with other states in the Western Hemisphere and/or elsewhere.
• Attempts to develop an alternative or parallel organization to the UN (made up of democratic nations, for example).

The above possibilities are admittedly speculative and even fanciful. However, they illustrate that the logic of a global actor is distinctly different from the logic of a regional one. And if that actor has interests in a Greater Black Sea, no local HLS strategy can ignore the potentially helpful or disruptive effects of that actor’s policies and/or behavior. That is why effective HLS strategies need to account for and build upon the first two rungs of the Strategy Pyramid.

Second: Nations in the Wider Black Sea Area may have to factor in US preferences into their HLS strategies, but 1) they are part of greater Europe, 2) a number of them aspire to NATO and/or EU membership, and 3) a militant minority in the EU want to substitute their security umbrella for that provided by the US (and they want to do it sooner than later). Whether the latter desire is politically mature or not is not what matters here. What does matter is that HLS planners must premeditatedly (and therefore effectively) balance the security imperatives represented by the second rung of the Strategy Pyramid with the imperatives represented by the third and primarily fourth rungs. More specifically, the planners should account for at least six security-related stress points between the US and specific NATO-EU members at this time.

• The role of morality in foreign policy – When compared to their European counterparts, American administrations are more comfortable with the need for and the possibility of moral judgment in world affairs. As far as the Americans are concerned, different circumstances may require different methods, but they do not justify different morals. In turn, conflict is not merely attributable to miscommunication, inadequate education, or justified rebellion against unjust circumstances, as transatlantic progressives have long argued. It is also attributable to the very structure of the international system and to diseased political cultures that should be condemned for what they are. Because of their tragic common history, European governments often disagree with this doctrinaire moral view (as they see it).
The role of universal values – American leaders rightfully tout the importance of human dignity and democratic values. However, they also assume that these values, as expressed by the US, are universal and transportable – i.e., that they can work everywhere and that they should be spread as far as possible. Once again, European elites are less sanguine about universal values – they doubt their actual universality, their transportability, and their naturally assumed connection with democratic politics.

Thwarting peer competitors – The current American National Security Strategy argues that the US needs to prevent the rise of a peer military competitor. The unselfconscious assumption behind this belief is that America uses its hard power benignly and in balanced ways. In other words, by maintaining its national selfishness and selflessness in rough equilibrium, it blends power and principle together. Critics quarrel with these beliefs, which they argue lead to ambiguous reactions to ESDP and other beneficial forms of European burden sharing.

The War on Terror – The current American government believes that they are at war with international terrorists and the largely theological program they represent. The terrorists are therefore not criminals. They are 1) shadow warriors, 2) irregular troops warring against perceived apostates and infidels, and 3) indifferent to enhancing their power within the existing international system (they actually want to replace the system outright). In contrast, there are transatlantic critics who claim that the war against terror is a self-perpetuating fiction. To characterize ongoing counter- and anti-terror activities as a war runs the risk of 1) needlessly militarizing anyone’s foreign and domestic policies, 2) fixating on the symptoms of terror rather than on its sources, and 3) undervaluing alternative legal or law enforcement options that are still appropriate and available.

The roots of terror – What causes international terrorism? According to the current American National Security Strategy, anti-Western terror is not necessarily a product of poverty or even injustice. Instead, it is a product of political oppression – of authoritarianism and despotism. If you want to solve this particular problem then, you need to solve it through democratization. Critics may or may not agree with this particular solution for terrorism, but they do agree that it is insufficient. Terrorism has multiple causes, they argue, including the very ones the National Security Strategy rejects.

The need for proactive/anticipatory defense (including preemption) – Since it believes time is not on the side of those who merely react to catastrophic attacks, the current US administration claims the historical right to anticipatory or proactive self-defense. In doing so, however, it has mixed the traditional
definition of prevention with a nontraditional definition of preemption, which now claims that a history of hostile behavior, the ownership of certain capabilities, and the pursuit of destabilizing objectives can constitute an “imminent” threat by others. This looser, with-doubts standard for proactive defense is at odds with those who want to preserve the traditional (and stricter) one, which they consider far less destabilizing.

To summarize then, there are still a myriad number of commonalities between the US and its European allies on security matters. But as the above examples illustrate, there are also points of friction that planners in the Wider Black Sea Area (and elsewhere) need to consider. Furthermore, they need to de-conflict these points of friction as much as possible, especially when they build pyramidal HLS strategies that account for America’s singular global power on the one hand and alternative regional models on the other (including ESDP).

The Fourth Rung – Regional Security Strategies

It is appropriate to skip over a discussion of multi-organizational strategies here (the third rung of the Pyramid of Strategy) because of their conceptual immaturity and lack of definition at this point in history. When speaking of the fourth rung, however, there are two brief but important points to make.

First: When HLS planners in Europe attempt to harmonize regional security strategies with local strategy-building processes, they are basically trying to harmonize their efforts with NATO and EU strategies. However, since ESDP remains a work in progress, the primary strategy-building requirement vis-à-vis the EU is studied vigilance. In the case of NATO, however, the requirement is to remember that it is no longer just a mutual defense alliance. Instead, through a relentless process of role diffusion over the last 10-15 years, NATO is now a collective security organization, a political alliance, a preventive diplomacy instrument, a builder of civil societies, a democratization tool, a protector and partner for non-ethnically-based governments in the Balkans, an intervention tool, a “housekeeping device” for a largely stable continent, a counter- and anti-terrorism tool, a regional organization with an increasing area of responsibility, an important part of growing transnational “interlocking dimensions,” a laboratory for military transformation, and so much more. Any attempt to accommodate local HLS strategies with NATO’s Strategic Concept and Strategic Vision must note just what a “multi-foliace rose” the Alliance has actually become.

Second: This article has repeatedly referred to a Wider Black Sea Area (WBSA), but this admittedly artificial geopolitical construct is a work in progress (and an immature one at that). HLS planners in Southeast Europe must not only take note of it, they perhaps need to help define and institutionalize it too. Otherwise, alternative regional
and sub-regional geopolitical models might compete with the WBSA as a concept, crowd it out, and leave local planners with follow-on regional strategies that are difficult to reconcile with their own. Some of these alternative models include Sir Halford Mackinder’s indestructible Heartland Model, political Islam’s Transnational Caliphate Model, the Greater Danube Basin Concept, a New Hapsburg League Concept, the Greater Middle East Concept, and more. Again, since none of these alternatives may be better than the Wider Black Sea Area Concept itself, the fourth rung of the Strategy Pyramid is one place where Southeast European planners may not merely adapt, orchestrate, and/or reconcile different strategies with each other, but proactively shape the regional context for the fifth and final rung of the Pyramid – National (HLS) strategies.

The Fifth Rung – National Security Strategies (with an Emphasis on HLS)

As Figure 4 illustrates, Homeland Security is indeed an amorphous challenge. It has international and domestic components, it focuses on broader security and narrower defense issues, and it includes specific problems that traverse all boundaries.

HLS’s intrinsic amorphousness also means that one-size-fits-all Homeland Security strategies are not realistic. Local conditions demand local strategies (influenced and adjusted by the above four rungs, however). Having said that, there are generic preparatory steps that all HLS planners can take to populate their national HLS strategies properly. These steps would naturally involve a multi-agency process (remember our discussion in the first rung) and could include the following:

- Conduct vulnerability analyses.
- Develop remedial plans.
- Create warning centers.
- Develop a response system.
- Develop a reconstitution system.
- Develop education and awareness programs.
- Pursue research and development.
- Enhance intelligence collection and analysis activities.
- Pursue international cooperation.
- And establish legislative and budgetary requirements.

With these broad preparatory steps accomplished, the local HLS planner could then focus on specific Ministry of Defense-oriented activities in order to populate their HLS strategies even further. These activities could include the following.
HLS: An Amorphous Challenge

Figure 4: Homeland Security as an Amorphous Challenge.

- Detection, surveillance, and intelligence.
- Plans, training, exercises, evaluation.
- Law enforcement and investigation.
- Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) consequence management.
- Key asset, border, territorial waters, and airspace security.
- Domestic transportation security.
- Research and development.
- Medical and public health preparedness.
- Domestic threat response and incident management.
- Economic consequence management (cost sharing).
- Public affairs.

The above basic steps may be generic, but they are also widely applicable. They also close the conceptual loop of this article. After all, the fundamental point of the article is that for HLS strategies to be successful they cannot be insular – i.e., in terms of strategy, they have to work from the broad to the specific; they have to rely on LEGO-like civil-military combination strategies; they have to account for the poten-
tially helpful or disruptive military power of the United States; they then have to ac-
count for the strategic orientations found between and within transnational organiza-
tions; and they need to do all this while remaining responsive at the national level. In
short, HLS strategies need to be three-dimensional, which is why a Pyramidal ap-
proach to strategy may be an HLS planner’s best friend.

Notes:

1 The views expressed by the author of this article are solely his own and should not be
attributed to any governmental institution or political entity.
2 For a military-centric discussion of this concept, see James Callard and Peter Faber, “An
Emerging Synthesis for a New Way of War: Combination Warfare and Future Innovation,”

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