After the Re-election of President Bush:

An Outlook on Transatlantic Relations from a German Perspective; or, Why German–U.S. Relations Still Matter to the Transatlantic Alliance

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INTRODUCTION

During a security conference in Munich in early 2005, the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder surprised Germany’s NATO allies with a proposal to reform the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).¹ The German Defense Minister, Peter Struck, who has argued that NATO as an organization had not adjusted well enough to a changed geopolitical landscape and had outlived its purpose as the main organization facilitating transatlantic dialogue, presented Schröder’s new vision.² The remarks were not well received within the Alliance, and succeeded in upsetting Germany’s opposition parties as well.³ NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer declared that NATO was fully capable, both militarily and politically, to meet all current challenges, and emphasized that NATO was still the body where major transatlantic consultations took place. Javier Solana, the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union, also stressed that NATO had not lost its relevance. The remarks by the German Chancellor came only a few days after the spring 2005 visit by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Europe—a visit that had been generally well received by the European press.⁴ After her talks in Berlin, for example, Rice obtained a pledge from Schröder to do more to help in Iraq.⁵ The Chancellor highlighted the Iraqi need for democracy and stability and stated that Germany, which had begun training Iraqi police officers in the United Arab Emirates, was ready to offer help if the Iraqi government asked for it. Schröder’s surprising NATO declaration also came after NATO had agreed to expand its mission in Afghanistan during a February meeting in Nice,⁶ and after the Chancellor had told Rice that
Germany would “accept a new command structure for peacekeeping and anti-terror operations in Afghanistan, under the condition that the two missions remained separate.”

At the same time, backed by the Alliance’s Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld obviously pushed every NATO member to contribute to a NATO training mission in Iraq. NATO members by late 2004 had agreed to either send troops to Baghdad, to train Iraqi officers outside the country, or to donate to a trust fund financing the mission. Why the German Chancellor chose to make his surprising comments one week before the visit of President George W. Bush to Europe, in spring 2005, remains unclear. Was the Chancellor looking for a way to put his proposal on the table before both a national and an international audience? During President Bush’s visit to Europe, French President Jacques Chirac expressed his support for the Schröder “plan.” Could the statement by the German Chancellor also have been aimed at a domestic audience, possibly to deflect attention from growing economic and other problems? In any case, at a previous security conference, held in Munich 2002, the Chancellor chose to surprise Germany’s NATO allies when he made the suggestion that Germany and the Netherlands could assume the leadership for peacekeeping in Afghanistan—a proposal that had not yet been heard of in The Hague.

With regard to Germany’s domestic economic problems, a recent article on “Germany’s Dismal Future” identifies three main reasons for why the country is now facing an unprecedented level of unemployment, a level that is unprecedented since the end of World War II and that arguably resembles Weimar conditions. The article discusses domestic problems Germany currently faces:

The power wielded by its old-fashioned trade unions, German unions insist on short hours, high wages, immense so-
cial security benefits and conditions of work that make productivity increases virtually impossible… The input of the EU bureaucracy in Brussels: The EU imposes endless rules, whose net effect is to stifle enterprise and squelch innovation. The push toward a European superstate has proved an unmitigated disaster for Germany, which, despite its relative economic decline, is still the biggest net contributor to EU funds. Germany thus ends up financing programs such as the Common Agricultural Policy that work against its interest. Germany pays the EU piper, while France calls all the tunes. Indeed, Germany’s subservience to France is one of the most astonishing and inexplicable features of today’s world. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder seems content to play the poodle to President Jacques Chirac in the most humiliating and groveling way, following tamely in courses that demonstrably work against Germany both at home and abroad. When Germany looked to U.S. leadership between 1950 and the early 1970s, it prospered. Since Germany submitted to French direction, the country has plunged relentlessly into the pit. Eventually, the German people are going to grasp the salient truth; when they do, the consequences for Europe will be dramatic… Germany’s acute sense of failure and unhappiness. This is a collective psychological depression that effectively prevents Germany from taking action to remedy its ills. The Germans agree they’re in a mess, and many see the obvious way out. The country needs to make the kinds of structural changes in its economy that Prime Minister Thatcher carried out in Britain 20 years ago, changes that have completely transformed the performance and expectations of the British people. But, though most Germans know this, they lack the will—and, of course, the leadership—to carry it out.…

In contrast, in January 2005 Chancellor Schröder made a case for national sovereignty, and this in the only area where the European Union had arguably successfully managed to transfer sovereignty to the transnational level: the economy.
Schröder “demanded that the EU’s near-defunct stability and growth pact be relaxed by exempting swaths of public spending from its budget-deficit ceilings. He added in a Financial Times article that ‘intervention by European institutions in the budgetary sovereignty of national parliaments [should be] permitted only under very limited conditions.’” 12

In his sudden expression of support for national sovereignty with regard to fiscal and budgetary policy, the Chancellor seemed to intend to bypass decisions made recently by the German Bundestag to not lift the sanctions and the arms embargo against China. His goal in this was to thus enable the European Commission to go ahead with the lifting of the embargo. Schröder’s policy approach in supporting the lifting of the arms embargo must be seen in the light of strong national economic interests and Germany’s growing export dependency, a situation that has put more stress on Germany’s economy. 13 The issue of lifting the EU weapons embargo against China was discussed during President Bush’s spring 2005 visit to Europe, and promises to remain on top of the agenda with regard to future transatlantic disputes. 14 It seems that growing economic tensions and rivalries between some European countries (such as Germany) and the United States might be at the center of future transatlantic problems. 15

On the other hand, whatever differences may have existed between the United States and some of its old allies on foreign policy issues ranging from Afghanistan, Iraq, and China to NATO and the common European foreign and security policy, President Bush’s trip to Europe seems to have highlighted the still crucial alliance between Europe and the United States. 16 He made sure to visit both international organizations that have emerged as the main actors with regard to the transatlantic and intra-European security dialogue: the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. President Bush emphasized the importance of a strong and united Europe, and char-
acterized NATO as the “most successful alliance in the history of the world.”

Following his visit, an article appeared in *The Economist* of 26 February 2005 titled “Are NATO and the European Union partners or rivals?” It argued that the European split over military operations in Iraq had gone “far beyond the merits of deposing Saddam Hussein. It showed that there are two broad approaches to security within the EU.” The dispute about Iraq emerged within the European Union, and between old and new European NATO member-states by late 2002, and continued throughout 2003. As this paper will argue, the so-called intra-European splits and divisions seem to have been one of the main fall-outs of the war in Iraq, along with the broader transatlantic tensions that were exposed in the run-up to the war.

The troubled nature of German-U.S. relations has had a particularly negative impact: first, they adversely affected the process that has been dubbed NATO transformation; second, they have had a deleterious impact on intra-European relations.

Two years after the declared end of major military operations in Iraq in 2003, it seems that U.S. foreign policy has been vindicated to some degree for a short period of time given the successful Iraqi elections held in late January 2005. The events of the past two months, which have seen dramatic increases in the number and intensity of insurgent attacks in Iraq—particularly those directed at Iraqi civilians— are not undoing this political success, but show how fragile the whole situation still is. Nevertheless, the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction and peace- or nation-building in Iraq were obviously underestimated by the Bush Administration, and will continue to place demands on the U.S. government and its allies in both NATO and the EU.

An analysis of transatlantic relations (with particular attention to the issue of Iraq) over the past several years will be a helpful step toward understanding on how willing U.S. allies
may prove to be in the upcoming months to support U.S. policy in the larger Middle East, as well as in the continued project of nation-building in Iraq. To understand where transatlantic relations may be headed after the re-election of President Bush in November 2004, two years after the beginning of the war in Iraq, and more than three years after the events of September 11, 2001, the following issues need to be discussed and taken into consideration: the core challenges for the process of NATO transformation; how different EU member states conceptualize the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP); and how these different views of what the transatlantic Alliance should be about have affected, among others, intra-European relations and Germany’s recent foreign policy. These issues in question are even more important given the last round of NATO and EU enlargement in 2004, a process that increased the number of countries that will be members of both organizations. These new member states are perhaps more likely to continue to be more supportive of a strong U.S. leadership role, both globally and within Europe.

Given this background, what have transatlantic relations been like after the U.S. presidential election in November 2004 and President Bush’s inauguration in early 2005? In addition, what will be the likely long-term impact of the national elections in Iraq in late January 2005 with regard to both the larger Middle East as a region, and on the future peacekeeping role or potential of the transatlantic alliance? This paper will attempt to reassess the challenges that currently confront the state of transatlantic relations, particularly between the two dominant actors in the theater: the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The transatlantic alliance will be of enormous relevance in the twenty-first century, in the realms of security, human rights, and the economy. The following sections will discuss and analyze previous transatlantic tensions between the allies on both sides of the Atlantic, while provid-
ing a special focus on the bilateral relationship between Germany and the United States.\textsuperscript{24}
NATO Transformation, the ESDP, and Soft- and Hard-power Challenges within the Transatlantic Alliance

In remarks on 22 February 2005, following a meeting with President Bush at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, NATO Secretary-General de Hoop Scheffer articulated the importance of a strong and close partnership between NATO and the EU. While he generally embraced the argument that it might be necessary for NATO to take on a more prominent political role—a remark that could be interpreted as an acknowledgement of Chancellor Schröder’s call for NATO reform—de Hoop Scheffer also emphasized the following:

European integration, including in security and defense matters, is important, but in that area, it’s of the utmost importance that that process also takes place in complementarity with NATO and without duplication. That’s important for NATO, it’s important for the European Union. That’s why I want this wide NATO-EU agenda that’s relevant. European integration is a great process, and I always say I’m an Atlanticist and I’m European. But here is the point. Where we are now standing in NATO Headquarters, where we see the primary forum for transatlantic security cooperation, and we’ll do that at 26, and not at 24 plus two, or 25 plus one.25

During his speech at NATO Headquarters on 22 February 2005, President Bush confirmed that the process of NATO transformation was well underway.26 On the previous day, the
president described the situation confronting the transatlantic alliance at the beginning of the twenty-first century in the following way:

Today, America and Europe face a moment of consequence and opportunity. Together, we can once again set history on a hopeful course—away from poverty and despair, toward development and the dignity of self-rule; away from resentment and violence, and toward justice and the peaceful settlements of differences. Seizing this moment requires idealism: We must see in every person the right and the capacity to live in freedom. Seizing this moment requires realism: We must act wisely and deliberately in the face of complex challenges. And seizing this moment also requires cooperation, because when Europe and America stand together, no problem can stand against us. As past debates fade, as great duties become clear, let us begin a new area of transatlantic unity.27

Approximately two years earlier, a so-called declaration regarding NATO transformation—dated 6 October 2002—stated that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization needed to be “capable of taking action whenever the security of its members was threatened, upon the basis of the United Nations Charter. By making it clear that there is no safe haven for those who would threaten our societies or for those who would harbor such people,”28 the deterrent element of the Alliance’s strategy would be strengthened. According to this declaration, the North Atlantic Council should decide actions on a case-by-case basis. Where NATO as a whole was not engaged, allies willing to take action should be able to make use of NATO assets, procedures, and practices. The declaration stressed a set of high-priority goals held to be essential to the full range of Alliance missions, including the fight against terrorism. This new initiative was to be based on firm national commitments with spe-
specific target dates. National commitments were to be made transparent for parliamentary monitoring and oversight.

The document stressed that priority should be given to projects maximizing multi-nationality, and which had the potential to become common NATO assets. NATO and European Union capabilities needed to be mutually reinforced and thoroughly harmonized through permanent coordination mechanisms and procedures in a spirit of openness. NATO was encouraged to redouble its efforts to reduce the fragmentation of defense procurement efforts through the pooling of military capabilities, the cooperative acquisition of equipment, and common funding. It was also prompted to reduce to a minimum the obstacles to the sharing of technology. The Alliance had to be able to act wherever NATO’s interests were threatened, creating coalitions under NATO’s own mandate, as well as contributing to mission-based coalitions, concerning both old and new threats. As examples of such situations, the NATO Secretary-General at the time, Lord Robertson, referred to NATO’s experience with post-conflict stabilization, in cases such as Kosovo and Macedonia.

On 8 October 2002, Lord Robertson declared that an enormous number of security issues on the Euro-Atlantic agenda required the highest possible level of communication and coordination between Europeans and North Americans. In his words, the November 2002 Prague Summit should and would be a transforming event for the Alliance. It ended up covering a wide range of issues, from terrorism, to NATO’s military command arrangements and headquarters structure, to further development of the partnership among the NATO allies. The most prominent issues addressed at the summit dealt with the enlargement and improvement of NATO’s military capabilities.

The question of capabilities in particular concerned the countries that are members of both NATO and the European
Union. Because each nation has only one set of military forces, it is necessary to make the best use possible of the scarce resources, avoiding duplication and overlaps. The resulting message was very clear: the European Capabilities Action Plan and NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment needed to be coherent. Work in full transparency on capabilities issues was imperative if the EU–NATO impasse on missions of peace and security was to be avoided or ended.  

^32
TWO YEARS AFTER THE WAR IN IRAQ: MISSION STILL UN-ACCOMPLISHED?

Disagreements over How to Stabilize Iraq and How to Win the War against Global Terrorism

As I will argue, the various national approaches to the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in Europe have been remarkably different. Germany has promoted ESDP as soft-power alternative to NATO. The British government has lobbied for a strong link between ESDP and NATO. Paris has hoped that the ESDP would create counter-balancing (hard power) structures independent from NATO. The French position does not, however, seem new. When Paris proposed the creation of a European Defense Community (EDC) in the early 1950s, it arguably was an attempt to avoid German rearmament within the framework of NATO. The French leadership hoped for a strong European defense pillar that was substantially independent from NATO. When the EDC was defeated in the French Assembly in 1954, the United States proceeded with rearming Western Germany. Western integration within Europe was thus—as it has been ever since—intrinsically linked to a strong transatlantic relationship.

With regard to recent developments, the following conclusion can be drawn: Transatlantic disagreements and disputes within Europe about how to deal with Iraq and U.S. foreign policy in the aftermath of 9/11 seem to reflect a deeper struggle about security-related agenda-setting. The question seems to be, Who should be in charge of designing both the transatlantic and the European security agendas? Should Europeans contrib-
ute more to the European pillar within NATO, and increase their defense budgets to prepare the Alliance for the challenges of the twenty-first century? Or should European states focus on strengthening their own, common (and possibly fully independent from NATO) European Security and Defense Policy, including the establishment of their own army headquarters?

Nothing highlighted these profound underlying questions more clearly than the rift, based in fundamental differences, which appeared in the transatlantic alliance over the issue of war in Iraq in 2002 and 2003. While the French reaction to the U.S.-led war in Iraq were probably not that surprising (although the degree of diplomatic ‘warfare’ might not have been anticipated in Washington), what was clearly new was Germany’s course and position. It can be concluded that, in the end, Germany’s alliance with France on this issue—openly opposing U.S. interests—represented a profound foreign policy shift, and an about-face from its Cold War and post-Cold War foreign policy positions throughout the 1990s. This “change in attitude and policy” completely changed the intra-European dynamic, and had a substantial impact on overall transatlantic relations.

In 1960, former French President Charles De Gaulle proposed to former German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer that Germany and France should increase their level of bilateral cooperation on all political, economic, cultural, and defense issues, thus weakening U.S. leadership in NATO. When faced with the ultimate decision between Washington and Paris, Adenauer opted for protection from Washington. In 2003, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder seemingly chose otherwise, in the end prioritizing close bilateral cooperation with France on so-called European integration over a strong transatlantic relationship. This is a novelty in post-World War II Germany. When it comes to Germany’s future foreign policy
or diplomatic options, it is not yet possible to foresee the long-
term consequences of this decision.

Was the shift of German foreign policy based on a con-
scious decision? Or did the German government stumble onto
this new path because of unfortunate rhetoric that was em-
ployed during the election campaign in summer 2002—a fed-
eral election campaign where the government decided to play
the anti-American card when polls taken early in the summer
indicated a likely loss for the ruling coalition government of
Social-Democrats and the Green Party.

However, as the following analysis will show, German-
American problems did not end with the rhetoric of the cam-
paign. Still, in April 2003, at a so-called “mini-summit” of only
four European allies and EU member states, Germany, France,
Belgium, and Luxembourg announced their plan to launch a
European defense policy and army that was to be fully inde-
pendent of NATO. While the war in Iraq was still going on, the
four heads of state were obviously prepared to risk not just
further divisions in NATO, but also the rise of what has been
labeled a “two-speed Europe.” And, while the announcement
was met with considerable resistance both in NATO and in the
EU, an old question was raised again—namely how this Euro-
pean Union army should be financed, especially given the lack
of British support and participation. New NATO and EU mem-
ber states from Eastern and Central Europe have been particu-
larly unhappy about frictions between the EU and NATO. They
do not wish to be put into a position where they have to decide
between the United States on the one hand, and an assortment
of continental European countries on the other. Having good
relations with both the United States and Western Europe is in
their best interests, both in economic and security terms.

How Europeans and the European Union as a regional or-
ganization will shape their security structures will have an im-
portant effect on the NATO allies’ capability to fight the war
against global terrorism, as well as on how the Alliance will adapt to the security challenges of the coming century. These challenges are (for example) outlined in the U.S. National Security Strategy of September 2002, NATO’s transformation declaration of fall 2002, and the European Security Agenda of December 2003.42

Plans for EU military and defense structures that are independent from NATO, however, seem to have suffered two setbacks in December 2003. First, at a meeting of NATO foreign and defense ministers in early December, the decision was made not to include a defense clause in the draft constitution of the EU, and not to create a separate EU military headquarters.43 Second, on 13 December 2003, the EU failed to agree on the constitutional draft, mainly because of Spanish and Polish resistance. However, other smaller (future) EU member states both in the East and West expressed their reservations as well, such as the Netherlands, Denmark, and the Czech Republic.44 Even though the European Union finally agreed on the draft constitution in 2004, the question remains of how many of its member states—both old and new—will actually ratify it in 2005.45 The stakes for European integrationists seem to have become even higher with the increasing likelihood that France will vote “Non.” In such a case, however, a “two-speed Europe” might become an option, which would be troubling for further European enlargement.46

With regard to intra-European or intra-EU relations, the dynamics seem to have changed after 11 March 2004, a day that witnessed Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on commuter trains in Madrid, events that prompted the fall of the Aznar government. Before 3/11, the strongest bilateral relations between Washington and individual European allies were with Great Britain to the north of Germany, Italy to the south, Spain to the west, and Poland to the east, thus forming a circle around France and Germany. After Spain was removed from the picture, given the
election of a new socialist government in Madrid, the parameters of both transatlantic and intra-EU relations were altered yet again.47

How important are such changing dynamics of alternating sub-alliances within the transatlantic alliance? U.S. Senator John Kerry in spring 2004, for example, referred to “foreign leaders” who wished him to win the U.S. presidential election in November 2004, because the world needed “a new policy.”48 While the dynamics of these so-called sub-alliances within Europe seem to change frequently (whenever a new government assumes power, on either side of the Atlantic), a better understanding of the implications of these shifts may provide indicators for shifts in national policy or for the prospects of a common allied foreign policy.

In spring 2004, events within the EU and NATO community produced a number of new developments. Germany seemed to have realized that being the “junior partner of France” instead of the “junior partner of the United States” might actually have hurt its own national interests. Consequently, Chancellor Schröder tried to convince some of Germany’s neighbors that France and Germany were not intent on dominating the European Union, though Germany’s bilateral relations with France were a driving force for further EU integration. Corresponding visits by the German chancellor to both Poland and the Netherlands, for instance, aimed at putting an end to the deadlock regarding the EU constitution.49 The then still new government in Spain reversed its opposition to the EU constitution; without Spain at its side, Poland followed suit and announced its own support for the constitution.50 Prime Minister Blair declared in April 2004 that he would initiate a referendum on the European constitution in Great Britain. German opposition parties welcomed such a move.51

France on the other hand, with its strong ties to Italy, Britain, and Spain interrupted, did not necessarily depend on Ger-
many any longer, and thus could theoretically have afforded to move closer to both the United States and Great Britain. A common peacekeeping mission with the United States in Haiti in 2004, plus the visit of President Bush to Normandy to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of D-Day in June 2004, provided opportunities in this regard. An article in *The Economist* entitled “Of Entente, Understanding, and Verständnis,” stated accordingly: “Meanwhile the French realize that, in a EU of 25, the Franco-German motor is not going to be enough to preserve their influence.”

Earlier in the year, *The Economist* described a joint summit of President Chirac, Chancellor Schröder, and Prime Minister Blair in Berlin in mid-February 2004 as a “ménage à trois.” It raised the question of whether Great Britain had tried hard—and, in fact, whether it needed—to make certain that its own interests were added to the Franco-German agenda. Given the fact that Germany’s Chancellor Schröder and French President Chirac met on a bilateral level many times in 2003 and 2004, nobody should be surprised that other EU member states and neighbors were wondering what the two “big ones” might have been up to.

With regard to a common European foreign and security policy, the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 arguably added a sense of urgency in Europe. Islamist terror had finally “hit home,” and was now of direct concern to European nations as well—whether simply due to their position as allies of the United States or otherwise. France, for example, though not a partner in the war in Iraq, nevertheless may feel uneasy given its own immigration problems and its fractious relationship with radical Islam. A law banning all religious symbols (most notably the headscarves worn by Muslim women) in public places, such as schools, along with the revival of anti-Semitism, seems to highlight this.
In spring of 2004, the European Union agreed on further anti-terror measures.\textsuperscript{56} A “Bin Laden tape” addressed to Europeans in April 2004 and the murder of an Italian hostage in Iraq\textsuperscript{57} might actually have provided an incentive for Europeans to unite, instead of widening the split between the close allies of the U.S. and those countries that did not originally support the war in Iraq.\textsuperscript{58} In late 2004, the murder of Dutch film director Theo Van Gogh spurred further awareness of the potential for terror within Europe, and inflamed anti-Muslim sentiment in the generally liberal and open-minded society of the Netherlands, as well as more widely within Europe.\textsuperscript{59} With regard to the challenges of the nation-building effort in Iraq, while some countries announced that they would withdraw or reduce their peacekeeping troops deployed in Iraq after the January 2005 elections, others reaffirmed their commitment to stay.\textsuperscript{60}

Given the latest and largest enlargement round in both the EU (ten countries joined on 1 May 2004) and NATO (seven countries became new members on 29 March 2004), both structures seem to be moving closer together, at least conceptually.\textsuperscript{61} This trend—no matter what tensions between the United States and some of its European allies may occasionally arise—was arguably highlighted by the fact that, during his visit to Europe in February 2005, President Bush was the first president in American history to visit both NATO and the European Union in Brussels. So, should this kind of a trend ultimately prove so disturbing to Paris and Berlin (or at least to their respective current governments)?

As argued before, French Gaullist ambivalence with regard to NATO is nothing new, and France has for that reason seen the ESDP as an alternative to NATO, which they feel to be a tool of so-called U.S. hegemony or unilateralism. With regard to Berlin, the German Foreign Minister argued that, after military action against Serbia could not be avoided in 1999 over
the Kosovo situation, the only logical consequence of this kind of military intervention was further European integration and thus the creation of a common European foreign and/or security and defense policy. The important distinction in policy between Paris and Berlin, however, is (or has been) that, while the Germans in the aftermath of World War II have portrayed themselves as abdicating power—particularly military power—and “Europeanizing” their own national foreign policy, the same cannot be said of French foreign policy. France is still a nuclear power, with a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, and has one of the most capable militaries in Europe (or the world), deployable to multiple crisis zones, such as in Africa. To summarize, France—like the United States—embraces its hard-power military capability and national sovereignty in the area of security and defense, while Germany’s current government has been promoting soft power and the “Petersberg tasks” that embrace civil crisis management and a somewhat more robust type of peacekeeping.62

With regard to the new members of NATO and the EU, five countries—three Baltic states, plus Slovenia and Slovakia—joined both the EU and NATO in 2004. Six of the seven new NATO countries, with the exception of Slovenia, supported the initial coalition effort in Iraq;63 in total, twenty of the twenty-six member states of NATO were already involved in Iraq before NATO decided in early 2005 to provide peacekeeping training as an organization, either having supported the Polish contingent or having made individual contributions.64 While NATO took over the leadership of the International Stabilization Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2003,65 NATO also supported the Polish contingent in Iraq in 2003 and 2004. But the question remained of whether NATO as an organization would assume a larger peacekeeping role in Iraq. Did the NATO Summit in Istanbul in late June 2004 provide a definitive answer to this question?66
While Senator John Kerry came out in support of a NATO role in post-war Iraq on 30 April 2004, President Bush outlined his vision for Iraq on 24 May 2004, foreseeing both a UN mandate and NATO involvement. A range of security-related problems in post-war Iraq has pointed attention at the important question of whether the Bush Administration planned sufficiently for the post-conflict transition process. The challenges confronting the coalition in Iraq concern, for instance, the civil-military interface, which NATO and the European-U.S. allies seem to have managed better in the aftermath of the conflict in Kosovo in 1999. Before the election of President Bush in November 2000, supporters of and advisors to the (not yet elected) president expressed that the main aim of the U.S. military was to win wars, not to keep the peace or “accompany Bosnian children to the kindergarten.”

Was this to mean that the Americans were to win the wars, while their European allies would focus on “cleaning up” afterwards? Can such an important dichotomy be sufficiently reflected in the contrast between “hard power” and “soft power”? Is the distinction or division of labor in absolute terms even helpful? On the contrary, should not the intrinsic and necessary link between soft-power-related security and hard-power-related security, or the link between structural and operational security policy, be emphasized? In other words, security is the core challenge when nations or the international community try to protect and safeguard a long-term political transition process. Without enforcement of the rule of law and security, there is no lasting peace; without investing in education and cultural-political transformation, there will be no long-term security.

After September 11, 2001, it seemed impossible that the United States and any U.S. administration would ever again be able to ignore what have been described as the “soft-power-related” elements of security policy—such as nation- and peace-
building—when trying to transform former hostile regimes into peaceful societies. Back in 1999, John McDonald stated, “The exit strategy the U.S. military keeps talking about will work when the departing U.S. troops leave behind peaceful societies.” Correspondingly, Susan Woodward identifies security as the top priority in any nation-building process. In a model designed to prevent the re-emergence of violence, Jane Holl identifies the establishment of security, economic well-being, and justice as the core challenges in any post-conflict situation; all of these challenges demand long-term commitment.
ON PEACE- AND NATION-BUILDING CHALLENGES IN THE AFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

In the aftermath of 9/11, Europeans asked themselves, “Are we all Americans?” What would happen to the foreign and security policy issues that formerly led to misunderstandings between some European countries and the United States? Would European/EU–U.S. relations be strengthened by the response to the events of September 11? What can European allies and the European Union contribute to a coalition against terrorism and to related multinational peace operations? How would the concept or policy of so-called coercive conflict prevention take shape? Would Europe have to shift even further from soft toward hard power? For many Europeans, like the Germans, one challenge seemed to be clear: They had to acknowledge and shoulder greater responsibility for hard-power tasks. Following September 11, Americans acknowledged that they needed the support of their allies, and ever since then the United States leadership has been expressing the wish for creating new alliances and strengthening old ones, as articulated in the United States National Security Strategy published in September 2002.

Another critical question has been whether the events of September 11 would strengthen European commitment to NATO, or to a common European foreign and security policy. The fact that Turkey officially took over the leadership of ISAF peacekeeping troops in Afghanistan from the United Kingdom, followed by NATO’s assumption of organizational control of ISAF, arguably were evidence of the strengthening
of NATO. As the transatlantic dispute over the war in Iraq demonstrated, these questions never lost their relevance after 9/11, and they recently were highlighted again during President Bush’s visit to Europe in early 2005.

Based on research from 2000 to the present, the following conclusions can be drawn with regard to American leadership and Germany’s role as an ally and partner. During the pre-9/11 Bush period—to be specified more fully below—the U.S. administration was generally in favor of nation-building in Bosnia and Kosovo. Germany, on the other hand, still displayed a relatively strong antiwar attitude. Still, during the Kosovo intervention, Germany’s Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer struggled to balance the two principles of “no more war” and “no more genocide.” During the Bush era, the still new Bush Administration in 2000 claimed to be against nation-building, and in early September 2001—just before the terror attacks on New York and Washington—even threatened to vote against the prolongation of NATO’s mandate in Macedonia. Germany showed a relatively strong pro-interventionist attitude toward the crisis in Macedonia, even though Britain and France clearly took the lead within the European Union in that case.

In the post-9/11 Bush era, the U.S. may not be able to avoid nation-building in its global war against terrorism. For Germany’s part, Gerhard Schröder offered military support to the United States in its war in Afghanistan (although, as is known, not in Iraq). The question of to what extent Europe—and particularly Germany—would prove to remain on the American side, especially if the war was extended to other countries or lingered on, promised to be an interesting and open question early on, and has remained so throughout the post-9/11 phase of the Bush Administration. The serious transatlantic tensions and rifts over U.S. policy concerning Iraq seemed to have more than confirmed this assumption, which will be documented in more detail below.
The post-conflict peace- and nation-building challenges outlined above specifically refer to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, especially since it agreed to provide for joint peacekeeping training in Iraq in early 2005. In a world characterized by globalization, the transatlantic community arguably faces an ever-increasing number of global and transnational threats, such as international terrorism, weapons proliferation, ethnic violence, intra-state instability, hunger, and the spread of diseases such as AIDS. The Atlantic Community, made up by members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union plus non-members, such as those Eastern European nation-states that have not yet joined either NATO or the EU, plus Russia, will have to deal with the global challenges presented by countries such as Iraq, Iran, the larger Middle East, China, or North Korea.80

General Klaus Naumann, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, emphasized the necessity to outline a new transatlantic vision that would link elements of collective de-
fense with collective security. A renewed NATO vision needed to include the preventive elements developed in the 1990s, but also deterrent aspects stemming from the Cold War period. Allies on both sides of the Atlantic shared more than values, and the long-term stabilization (and democratization) of the Middle East was in the national interest of allies in both North America and Europe. The 2002 NATO Summit in Prague provided a cornerstone for deliberations concerning the future of NATO. It was questionable, however, whether Istanbul would provide a definite answer about the role of NATO as an organization in post-war Iraq.

While the German government repeatedly stressed their reservations about an expanded role for NATO in Iraq throughout 2004, the German Chancellor and Foreign Minister also emphasized they would not veto such a NATO mandate. After the United Nations had agreed unanimously on a post-war resolution for Iraq, this important decision arguably provided the Iraqi interim government with more legitimacy, and thus gave the country a better chance for developing a successful political process, which was strengthened by the late January 2005 Iraqi national elections. In September 2004, NATO agreed to expand its role in Iraq and to create a military training academy, expanding the NATO staff of 40 to 300 instructors. France, Germany, Belgium, and Spain still insisted they would not contribute personnel for the project, and also asked for assurances that the other members of the alliance would shoulder the bulk of the training costs. This meant that probably only twenty to twenty-two of NATO’s twenty-six member countries would contribute.

The decision-making process within NATO, however, continued to be fraught with difficulty throughout 2004, since some NATO members—such as Germany and France—kept opposing the expansion of NATO’s role in Iraq. It was particularly the policy not to contribute to the NATO-led
peacekeeping and training efforts in Iraq, which both France and Germany pursued in 2003 and 2004, which weakened the Alliance. Given this fact, any critical analysis is left with the question of why Chancellor Schröder recently criticized NATO for not having sufficiently adapted to the twenty-first century and for no longer being the main channel through which the transatlantic dialogue or transatlantic relations were facilitated.

It is my conclusion that Germany should do everything in its power to support a long-term transformation or transition process for NATO—whether in Afghanistan or in Iraq—precisely because of its own post-World War II experience under Allied protection.\textsuperscript{84} The D-Day celebrations in June 2004 marking the sixtieth anniversary of the Allied invasion of Normandy may have served as strong reminder of the following\textsuperscript{85}:

While the argument can be made that Western Germany in the aftermath of World War II benefited from a complex political and economic reconstruction process, it also seems fair to point out that this process had to be safeguarded militarily, arguably for four decades. Altogether, this allowed West Germany to transform its political culture or system from dictatorship to democracy. Given such first hand historical experience, Germany in fact does have the potential and does face the challenge to contribute more to complex reconstruction and peace(building) processes. However, the contributions in question should not and cannot exclusively focus on economic and political dimensions. They also need to focus on the military dimension, which guarantees safety during and in the aftermath of interventions, as well as throughout the long-term peace process. It is precisely the history of Germany which enables it to play a constructive and active role together with its Allies and in the context of NATO and other regional organizations!\textsuperscript{86}
**METHODOLOGY**

This paper is based on research concerning tensions that have occurred in recent years between the allies on both sides of the Atlantic, while highlighting in particular German–U.S. relations. Overall, the goal has been to examine manifestations of conflict over various foreign policy and other issues of mutual interest to both Europeans and Americans. Such policy issues, for example, included sharing the peacekeeping burden in the Balkans, American plans for missile defense, and the Kyoto Protocol. While studying German–U.S. or European–U.S. relations in recent years, the following three periods can be identified: the so-called pre-Bush era, the Bush era, and the post-9/11 Bush era.

**The pre-Bush era** dealt with the issues of long-term stabilization in the Balkans and the prospects for a common European security and defense policy. The following exemplary questions were addressed: How “common” can the foreign and security policy of the European Union actually get? Does the United States want Germany to play a stronger role in the EU and NATO? How are these expectations perceived in Germany?

**The Bush era** lasted from the election of George W. Bush in November 2000 to September 11, 2001, including President Bush’s first two visits to Europe in early summer 2001. The main issues under discussion on these visits were missile defense and NATO enlargement. Before the president’s trips to Europe in 2001, I had anticipated that the Bush Administration might need Germany in the EU and NATO because of Germany’s partnership with France and its good relations with President Vladimir Putin of Russia. However, in the summer of
2001, the Bush cavalcade entered Europe via Spain and Italy, were warmly welcomed, and Britain—once saddened about the end of the former “Clinton-Blair axis”—had already experienced a shift in attitude as well. Furthermore, the sudden rapprochement between Putin and Bush on NATO enlargement and missile defense seemed to come as a surprise to German political elites. Having “charmed” Britain, Spain and Italy, my core assumption during this research phase needed to be adapted, as follows: The Bush Administration could probably bypass Germany and France—within the transatlantic relationship more broadly, and in both NATO and the EU more specifically. The continuing flare-up of “anti-Bush-anti-Americanism” within the German media seemed to put Germany on a confrontation course with its biggest ally already in July and August of 2001.

This assessment served as the basis for further research in the aftermath of 9/11. How would transatlantic relations—and,
specifically, German–U.S. relations—develop in the long term if the war against global terror lingered on or was carried to other countries, such as Iraq?

*The post-9/11 Bush era* began on September 11, 2001—a day that arguably forever changed the parameters defining transatlantic relations. Policy issues that had caused tensions between the allies from day to day during the Bush era, such as the Kyoto Protocol, missile defense, or burden sharing, no longer topped the transatlantic agenda. Germany declared its post-World War II era over; for its part, NATO, when confronted with the new threat of transnational terrorism, invoked Article V of the North Atlantic Charter for the first time in its existence.

Therefore, by autumn of 2001, the NATO alliance—one lastingly transformed—had become the major focus of the research project.\textsuperscript{87} In September 2002, NATO ambassadors meeting in Poland discussed enlargement and how to streamline their capabilities. NATO’s “Transformation Declaration”
of 6 October 2002 stated that NATO would go anywhere on the globe where a threat existed (also based on UN resolutions). The U.S. proposition to create a NATO reaction force, which was accepted at NATO’s November summit in Prague, could and would in all likelihood have a lasting and possibly weakening impact on the development of the European Union’s rapid reaction forces. ⁸⁸

Germany has arguably been more displeased by these developments than most nations. While Great Britain has obviously always perceived the common European security and defense policy as being incorporated within the NATO framework, Germany’s current government has regarded the ESDP as the ultimate soft-power alternative to NATO. France, as discussed above, has been suspicious about the United States’ leadership role in NATO for many years, and seems to have hoped that the ESDP would create hard-power alternatives to NATO. ⁸⁹

Now, how should Europe—its nation-states individually and the European Union as a regional organization—contribute to a coalition against terrorism and to multinational peacekeeping forces, based for example in Afghanistan, but also possibly in the future in Iraq? Which domestic constraints might be placed on Germany’s current governing coalition’s ability to deploy more troops to either Afghanistan or other countries? Would the events of September 11 strengthen the European commitment to NATO or to a common European foreign and security policy? These were some of the main questions addressed during the post-9/11 Bush era.

Some of the core findings of my research conducted during the last three to four years outline the following developments. Two years after the end of major combat operations in Iraq in spring 2003, one unfortunate effect of troubled German–U.S. relations seems to concern the “European theatre” itself. What does this mean? Strong German–U.S. relations (even as late as
the 1990s) seem to have contributed to intra-European stability in the past. In their absence, France began complaining about what it felt was an excessively strong British influence in the transatlantic theatre, suggesting that the European Union could formulate its own common policy on Iraq, which would then isolate Great Britain. On the other hand, after Chancellor Schröder did not succeed in London in late September 2002 in getting Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair to help him restore damaged U.S.–German relations, Schröder’s focus obviously shifted across the Rhine, to get France to join ranks to counter U.S.–U.K. policy on Iraq.

My current and future research will focus on the following questions: Where do transatlantic and intra-European relations stand in 2005, more than three years after the attacks of 9/11? Where are we—the Atlantic community—now, given the recent re-election of President George W. Bush in November 2004 and the national elections in Iraq in January 2005? The following additional phases need to be considered. First, what I call the “Iraq-phases” (pre-war, the war proper, and the post-war/reconstruction phase/post-2005-Iraqi-election phase); second, the so-called second post-9/11 Bush era, following President Bush’s re-election in November 2004. To address and explore these phases, the following core hypotheses are currently being examined. First, allies on both sides of the Atlantic share more than common values. They share many common interests, most of all the long-term stabilization of the Middle East and the implementation of a reasonably comprehensive response to the threat of global terrorism. Second, a division of labor between soft and hard power—with the United States focusing on winning the war and European allies possibly focusing on winning the peace—would neither be beneficial to any post-conflict peace-building or reconstruction process, nor to the Alliance as a whole. Third, the members of both NATO and the EU form ideal partners in a (possibly) more relevant
than ever Atlantic security community that will need to meet all the security challenges—both soft and hard power—that will confront the Alliance in the twenty-first century. Based on the questions and hypotheses outlined before, the major research question I am currently grappling with is, How will recent tensions within the Atlantic community affect the ability of the Western world to address the important challenges of post-conflict nation- and peace-building (in regions such as the Middle East, Iraq, and Afghanistan), which can be seen as one core element of tackling the threat of global terrorism?90

Why is this topic of particular relevance? The analysis of German foreign policy on the issue of Iraq within the specific context of post-conflict nation-building might actually provide a perspective on how to make nation- and peace-building work. There are lessons the transatlantic community can learn from the case study of post-World War II Germany.91 Assessing what Germany’s specific contribution should look like—fifteen years after gaining full sovereignty with reunification, and sixty years after losing World War II and having been liberated by Western allies from a horrendous dictatorship and tyrannical regime itself—can offer insights on how nations, from Iraq to Afghanistan to (perhaps eventually) North Korea, can emerge from conflict, knit themselves together, and become part of the global community.
The following section discusses the challenges Germany will face as an evolving regional player and as a power in the center of Europe. Will Germany be willing and able to play a constructive role to help streamline, for example, the necessary processes facilitating EU–NATO cooperation? Or might the country continue to use its influence on the European Union (working together with France) to attempt to counter-balance the United States?92

In my analysis, the impact of troubled U.S.–German relations—particularly, though not exclusively, on the issue of Iraq93—has been felt in two main areas. First, this tension has added to divisions within the intra-European theatre and within the European Union. Second, they continue to hamper the process of NATO transformation. As a key regional player, Germany needs to assist with the transformation of NATO, instead of encouraging division within the Atlantic community and its international or regional organizations. This means that Germany should actively promote the streamlining of capabilities and the closest possible cooperation between the EU and NATO in peacemaking and (post-conflict) peacekeeping.

Furthermore, the processes of NATO and EU enlargement make the challenges ahead for the German government more obvious and crucial, as enlargement will in all likelihood enhance the number of member countries of each organization who are well-disposed toward the United States. A European
Union that aims—whether indirectly or not—at duplicating or decoupling from NATO will find itself almost by definition on a collision course with the United States. Such policy will not only harm the capability of the Alliance to meet the soft and hard power-related security challenges of the twenty-first century, but also diminish the prospect of a functioning and well integrated common European foreign and security policy. To contribute accordingly to NATO or to strengthen the common European foreign and security policy cannot be a question of either/or, as contributions by European and EU countries will matter in how the Alliance adapts to a new security environment, and whether NATO stays relevant.

A German foreign policy that is both constructive and responsible needs to take these inter-dependent factors and variables into account. By contrast, the diplomatic “stunts” the world witnessed in 2003 seem to have reinvented Germany as a problematic partner in the Alliance, and to have handicapped its role as the second-most important partner to the United States, next to Great Britain. It is clear that such an outcome cannot be and is not in Germany’s own national interest. It looks as if the current German government within a few months gave up on the fundamental principles that had characterized German foreign policy ever since the end of the World War II and throughout most of the 1990s. Such principles were: Never go it alone; never make the ultimate decision between Paris and Washington; and never get into a geo-political “two-front war” between Paris and Moscow (without other strong diplomatic ties with London and Washington). While to a large degree supporting French plans and policy on how to reform the institutions of the European Union, Germany furthermore seems to have abandoned its role of protecting the interests of smaller EU countries within the Commission.

Holding on to such principles ever since the 1950s had allowed Germany to continuously mature into its growing role as
a partner in EU and NATO, under U.S. leadership and U.S. protection throughout and in the aftermath of the Cold War. The French–German partnership was initiated by the United States, and German reunification was possible only with the strong support of the United States. If the calls of the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder for Germany to become a “normal” country mean the termination of a foreign policy that had functioned ever since the end of World War II, such “normalcy” misses what is truly at stake for democratic Germany as the largest country in the EU. While Germany’s theoretically evolving role and potential—more than a decade after reaching full-fledged sovereignty—will be further discussed and highlighted below, the general challenges facing Germany can be characterized as burden-sharing and playing an integrating and organizing role as a central power.96

So, has the German government in fact pursued a policy that is likely to divide the transatlantic community? Does Germany hide behind Europe, while Europeanizing its foreign policy?97 Does it promote the concept of further European integration—in the form of a federal super-state—to use the EU for its own national purposes, sometimes together with France, sometimes alone? Would such a perception by its neighbors not be very problematic and alarming? In contrast to a more nationalistic France, which pursues its foreign policy quite openly, is the soft-power oriented German coalition government trying to avoid the hard-power responsibilities and burden-sharing duties that are the foremost obligations of NATO membership? Why should such a policy be able to empower the EU after all? The answer is, it cannot and it will not—if Germany, which is geographically the largest EU member, is at risk of not meeting the security challenges of the twenty-first century as a sovereign member of the Atlantic community, this should concern both the EU and NATO as a whole.98 The Atlantic alliance, with the EU and NATO at its core, could not help but be weakened by
Berlin’s unwillingness to fully support NATO transformation. An interview I conducted at the American Enterprise Institute on 3 June 2003 pointed at the core problem with the help of a metaphor: “A French driver is driving a German vehicle. On the backseat are cowering smaller Western and Eastern European countries, while the French driver heads the German car full speed towards an American tank.”

In light of Germany’s de facto contributions to special-forces operations, to ISAF in Afghanistan, and to other crisis regions in recent years, the Allied perception described above seems generally unnecessary, and becomes all the more unfortunate. Must it be seen and explained in the context of Schröder’s 2002 election rhetoric? In any case, it seems to point at two concrete challenges that the current German leadership faces: first, to reassure Germany’s allies that its foreign policy is still based on both a strong transatlantic link and European integration; second, encouraging a public debate within Germany about its national interests and its role in the world.

The fact that France and Germany could be perceived as unreliable allies within the EU and NATO had an impact on NATO’s transformation and the challenges outlined in its declaration of 6 October 2002. This impact can be seen particularly in discussions concerning softer and harder security policy, including how to deal with threats like internal conflicts and global terrorism. It furthermore had an impact on the process of EU enlargement, the constitutional challenges the EU currently faces, and how the EU (both the Commission and the Office of the High Representative of the Council of Ministers) deals with crisis and conflict prevention and other security threats of the coming century. In particular, the success of NATO (and EU) enlargement, the streamlining of capabilities, and the creation of a NATO reaction force—to intervene in or out of area—will also depend on Germany, positioned at the
heart of Europe, between East and West. Zbigniew Brzezinski identified Germany and the United States as the main proponents of NATO enlargement, and raised the question of what an ever-closer relationship between a reunified Germany and the United States would probably mean to France, which would be geo-strategically weakened by an eastward shift of Europe’s center.104

U.S. leadership can still be regarded as a prerequisite for several European nations—particularly Germany—to continue maturing into their expanded roles on the global stage without being plagued by the so-called “Croatia effect” of the early 90s, which saw Germany’s allies feeling nervous about its waxing economic and political might.105 Germans today are faced with the question of whether its current government is seriously prepared to change its underlying foreign policy of setting EU integration in opposition to a strong transatlantic link.106

In addition is the question of which role the current coalition partners will play in the future when it comes to sending German troops out of area, in cases where Germany participates as a NATO member in a coalition of the willing.107 While Germany may continue not to live up to its theoretical and potential role in the Alliance (just as it may also continue to keep its public misinformed), new and future members of NATO in Eastern and Central Europe—such as Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria—have already stepped up to the plate to provide help in streamlining NATO capabilities. On the U.S. side, the decision seems to have already been made: the processes of restructuring NATO’s command and headquarters, as well as NATO enlargement, might best be matched by NATO structures physically moving eastwards as well. U.S. troops in Germany will be partially redeployed from the former West Germany to Poland and South-Eastern Europe.108 When Donald Rumsfeld invited France and Germany in June 2003 to con-
tribute peacekeepers to a post-conflict Iraq, this clearly was meant as a signal that the window of opportunity was still open for Germany to be (or become once again) part of the new Atlantic agenda.
GERMAN–U.S. RELATIONS IN THE POST-9/11 BUSH ERA, WITH A FOCUS ON IRAQ

The following section will focus on the long-term aftermath of 9/11 and the growing disagreements between the Bush Administration and the German government over the issue of Iraq.

The aftermath of 9/11

As indicated above, after 9/11 the German government ultimately acknowledged the need to shoulder more responsibility for hard-power tasks, with regard to both new and old security threats. While research in the pre-Bush and Bush eras showed that tensions between the United States and some of its European Allies (particularly Germany) persisted on varying issues up to September 11, 2001, the issue of how misunderstandings and tensions on a range of potential topics would develop over time in the post-9/11 world raised interesting questions for the later period. Therefore, we have to take a deeper look at how German–U.S. relations developed in the aftermath of September 11, and ever since. The following arguments will try to provide an answer, while highlighting the particular issue of Iraq.

On 11 December 2001, the German Ambassador to the United States, Wolfgang Ischinger, characterized U.S.–German relations as follows: “I cannot remember a time, when that relation was better.” On his first arrival in Washington in July 2001, the relationship had not been nearly so positive. As Ischinger put it, “Your president was not given such [a] good description in [the] European media. We were faced with many
problems, like the Kyoto Protocol. After 9/11, I am faced with second-rate problems.”

Ambassador Ischinger had the following suggestion for the Bush Administration: “Being a world power brings many blessings. The question is not, how can you avoid to be hated, but how can you soften things? Whenever you intervene, you will hurt somebody’s interest. You cannot avoid that. The recipe—from a German perspective—is what you did in the post-Second World War era in Germany and Japan. The UN was your creation. Use them! Set good examples. You will get maximum respect, and maybe some love.”

The previously described developments concerned the ultimate aftermath of September 11. It seems important to stress that while Ambassador Ischinger was making these positive comments, the German government throughout December 2001 was already providing contradictory signals. The Social-Democratic and Green governing coalition in Germany refused to take over leadership of the multinational peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. Berlin thereby frustrated not only Washington, but also London.

The year 2002 and growing U.S.–German disagreement over Iraq

In early January 2002, the German media were preoccupied by the resignation of former Italian Foreign Minister Romano Ruggiero, which according to German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer represented a considerable setback to the process of European integration. In contrast, the then Prime Minister of Spain, José Mariá Aznar, supported the move of Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. By late January 2002, the inhumane treatment of U.S. captives in Guantanamo dominated the German headlines. It was suggested that the “shock of terror” had rendered the United States blind to the rule of law. Also in January 2002, Joschka Fischer declared, with regard to U.S.
policy on Iraq: “We won’t be treated as satellites.” During an interview I conducted with the desk officer for European Union affairs at the German Embassy in Washington in March 2002, he expressed the following: “When it comes to Iraq, we are just not playing as the U.S. wishes us to do.” In interviews at the Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik (a German think tank in Berlin) in mid-April 2002, experts on the United States shared the view that “Global terrorism concerns the U.S., not Germany and not Europe.”

Overall, Iraq and the “peace process” in the Middle East seemed to have emerged as the primary conflict issues between the Bush Administration and the current German government in the spring and summer of 2002. Josef Joffe, a German journalist and an expert on German politics, provided the following diagnosis in an article in the German weekly Die Zeit: “Europe mobilizes against the U.S.; Germany’s Joschka Fischer and his colleague, Rezzo Schlauch, hold the Americans responsible for their own—the Germans’—feeling of helplessness. Doing so, they reaffirm what they want to fend off.”

It is fair to conclude that perceptions of threat in Germany and the United States are different. The political leadership in Germany has not articulated the sense that Germany or Europe is at war or in a warlike situation. However, given the considerable number of troops that contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom off the Somali coast, the troops that have been part of ISAF, and the German Amber Fox forces deployed in Eastern Afghanistan, this perspective has been problematic from the early stages of the war on terror, and it still is.

President Bush’s speech to the German parliament in Berlin on 23 May 2002 was arguably an attempt to bridge the gap between the American and German political elites on Iraq and the Middle East as a whole. In non-provocative, clear language, the President’s message was basic: the terrorists were on the European map as well. The fact that the German government
praised the speech might have been an early indicator that Bush was trying to help prepare the ground for Germany’s center-left government—one with a strong pacifist tradition—to sell the global war against terrorism, not only to the German public, but also to the bases of their own parties. Following that logic, Joschka Fischer commented on the speech, saying, “If Bush really connects development aid [as a tool of soft power security] with military force, then his speech truly was historic.”

During his visit in Berlin in 2002, Bush clearly promised not to put Iraq at the top of his foreign policy agenda before the German federal elections in September 2002, and was given Schröder’s assurance that Germany would not openly oppose U.S. policy toward Iraq. Obviously, this promise was later broken for domestic political reasons during Schröder’s reelection campaign.

What followed, in the summer of 2002, was Schröder arguing that Germany would not be pulled into “American adventures” in Iraq or “click heels.” He highlighted the necessity of a German path in this regard. This not only caused irritation in Washington; it also—and this can probably not be stressed enough—made other European allies wonder about Germany’s overall reliability as an ally, friend, and partner in Europe and within the transatlantic community. The uproar that Schröder’s stand on Iraq caused in the U.S. could have served as an indication to the world that the United States values the opinions and support of its allies. No matter what opinion individual allies or member states in the European Union or NATO may have held with regard to Iraq, one observation shall be allowed at this point: German foreign policy can best be described as reactive to global developments, rather than proactive. In that sense, it could be characterized as Vogelstrauß-Politik (“ostrich policy”). Correspondingly, an article in Die Welt on 27 September 2002 stated, “NATO’s Secretary-General, Lord Robertson, worries about the relations between
Berlin and Washington. To stay away from the classified briefing by the U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld at the NATO [Ambassador] meeting in Poland, as German Defense Minister Struck did, and then to express that there was no new proof available [with regard to Iraq], does not show that the Germans take the situation seriously enough."\(^{124}\)

**Diplomatic wrangling in 2003 – the Iraq ‘war clout’**

In the end, the German government kept to its ultimate opposition to any use of force, whether based on a UN mandate or a “coalition of the willing” forming a multinational force. For example, after a meeting between Lord Robertson and Joschka Fischer in early September 2002, the German Foreign Minister declared, “One should not expect any change of policy on Iraq by the German government. Schröder and I have already made up our minds.”\(^{125}\) This attitude prevailed in the end. Before the UN weapons inspectors made their report to the UN Security Council on 27 January 2003, the German government (together with France) strongly opposed any “war with Iraq” and stressed that the inspectors needed more time.\(^{126}\) On 5 February 2003, before the presentation made by the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to the Security Council, Schröder insisted publicly on his absolute “no” against war.

In late January and throughout February 2003, U.S. diplomatic efforts for a short while seemed to be aimed at pulling Germany away from France. However, the joint French-German-Russian memorandum on U.S. and British policy in Iraq sealed Germany’s diplomatic and foreign policy options, or ultimately bound them to French national interests.

It is important to stress that not every representative of Germany’s governing parties supported the government’s course on Iraq. Hans Ulrich Klose, a foreign policy expert with the Social Democrats, declared in the *Hamburger Tagblatt* in July 2002 that, “Attack on Iraq: Bundeswehr will be present.”
He was convinced that the German army would participate in an attack on Iraq, and that such an attack would not even need another UN mandate. In February and March 2003, Germany’s opposition parties started to come out against Chancellor Schröder’s anti-American course. Angela Merkel, head of the largest opposition party, the Christian Democrats, argued in early February 2003 that she would have signed the letter of the eight European countries in support of the United States.\textsuperscript{127} It is arguably tragic that the “generation of 1968”—of all generations—missed a historic opportunity to help end a dictatorship.\textsuperscript{128} Whether and to what degree Germany would be involved in the post-conflict reconstruction and in the long-term transformation of Iraq into a stable and democratic society remained an open question, and still is.\textsuperscript{129}

What did these problematic developments in German–U.S. relations mean for the transatlantic community as a whole in 2003, and to a lesser degree in 2004? As has been observed above, increased tension in German–U.S. relations seems to have had a negative impact in two regards: for NATO transformation, and for the further integration of the EU and the common European foreign and security policy.
CONCLUSIONS

The Implications of Troubled German–U.S. Relations for NATO Transformation

As I have argued above, the events of September 11, 2001 changed the parameters that define transatlantic relations. On 7 May 2002, Lord Robertson argued that the main, logical consequences of September 11 would be NATO enlargement and the rise of the NATO-Russia Council. NATO as a diplomatic platform was transforming itself to meet new challenges.130

The United States’ National Security Strategy of 2002 cites “strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends” as one important part of its international strategy “to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.”131 According to this document, while the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, it will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise its right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against its citizens and its territory. In leading the campaign against terrorism, the strategy states that the United States will attempt to forge new, productive international relationships and redefine existing ones in ways that meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.

The U.S. proposition to create a NATO reaction force was accepted at NATO’s summit in Prague in November 2002.132 Throughout the Prague Summit, the German media focused on the question of whether Bush and Schröder would shake hands. “Mr. Bush assailed nations that are ‘inward-looking or isolated
by indifference,’ clearly a reference to Chancellor Schröder’s use of his opposition to the American campaign against Saddam Hussein as a centerpiece of his recent re-election campaign,” wrote Serge Schmemann in the *New York Times*. “From John F. Kennedy’s ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ speech, to Ronald Reagan’s controversial visit to the Bitburg cemetery, postwar American presidents have emphasized reconciliation and unity when speaking of Germany, not memories of war. This time, however, Mr. Bush seemed to be reminding Germans that Europe today stood shoulder to shoulder with America despite them, not because of them.”

Particularly troubling was NATO’s blockage of shipments of defensive weapons to Turkey shortly before the commencement of hostilities in Iraq in spring 2003. While NATO finally managed to overcome this deadlock, continued tensions between the Bush Administration and some NATO members on the post-conflict transformation in Iraq still seem to point toward more trouble on the Atlantic horizon. Concerning the question of which organization(s) should provide security for the European sphere, an article in *NATO Review* in the wake of Iraq accordingly reads:

Yet it is also true that, for the United Kingdom and others, especially the recently oppressed peoples of ‘new Europe,’ the United States’ new mission is an Atlantic mission. They wish to keep the United States fully engaged in Europe. They are wary of a European Union dominated by France and Germany. And they are increasingly willing to be engaged elsewhere in the world together with the United States. Now enjoying their first taste of the U.S.-led liberal international order, the *Pax Americana*, they have no interest in creating a European ‘counterweight.’
The Implications of Troubled German–U.S. Relations for Europe and the European Union

Another unfortunate side effect of the fractious state of German–U.S. relations concerns Europe as such. As explained above, a strong relationship between Germany and the United States has traditionally contributed to intra-European stability. In the absence of this relationship, France has become increasingly worried about Britain’s strong influence in the transatlantic arena. This may have reinforced French policy throughout early spring of 2003 to get the EU to formulate its own common policy on Iraq, which would then have served to isolate Great Britain. On the other hand, after Chancellor Schröder did not succeed in London at the end of September 2002 to get British Prime Minister Tony Blair to help him restore U.S.–German relations, Schröder’s focus shifted across the Rhine, looking toward France to join ranks with Germany to counter U.S. and British policy on Iraq within the UN Security Council.

These are in my judgment some of the underlying dynamics of the diplomatic rifts and “drama” that the transatlantic community experienced on the issue of Iraq in the spring months of 2003, within the EU, NATO, and the UN. Time provided the following analysis in this regard:

The administration missed what was happening in Europe. In the summer 2002, to save his skin in federal elections, Schröder came out against military action in Iraq under any circumstances. He and Chirac had long had chilly relations, but last fall the French and German governments began to work toward a set of common positions on a variety of issues. For the French, this was vital. With Germany set to take a seat on the Security Council in January, Paris would no longer be facing the Americans alone.137
When France and Germany came out against any military action on the basis of UN resolution 1441, one week before the UN weapons inspectors reported to the Security Council, this did not necessarily represent the common European policy on Iraq. By contrast, it made the splits within the EU, Europe as such, NATO, and the UN Security Council even more obvious. During an emergency EU summit on 17 February 2003, Chirac threatened Central and Eastern European countries that they would risk their future EU membership if they supported the United States on Iraq.

Such an experience might induce smaller Western and Eastern European countries to wonder whether France and Germany should be allowed to impose their concepts of further European integration on the EU as a whole. A letter issued by eight European countries—some in the EU, some not—had obviously infuriated Paris, precisely because it highlighted the intra-European and intra-EU splits on Iraq, but also on other transatlantic issues. Such a divide was further illustrated when a summit of four NATO members decided on a purely EU-based defense structure. Two years after the end of major combat operations in Iraq, the long-term consequences of these intra-European rifts cannot possibly be overestimated. Is it possible that they may loom larger, and for a longer time, than tensions within the transatlantic alliance or NATO as such? The upcoming referenda on the European constitution will provide some indicators in this regard. Another issue that bears watching is how European member states (in the European Commission and individually) will decide on the lifting of the EU weapons embargo imposed on China. Is it possible that strong export and trade relations with China will become the first foreign policy issue where the EU will have no problem speaking with a truly common voice? Or will some countries—such as Poland, Denmark, and Sweden—still oppose the lifting on human rights grounds? One thing is for sure: the issues of trans-
atlantic relations and the relations of the United States with its allies in Europe promise to remain interesting.
NOTES


3 “Stoiber: Kanzler schoß schlimmes diplomatisches Eigentor,” Die Welt, 15 February 2005; “Unionspolitiker mahnen bessere Zusammenarbeit zur USA an. Merkel und Schäuble plädieren für einen Neuanfang,” Welt.de, 21 January 2005. In late January 2005, Germany’s largest opposition party called for better cooperation with the U.S.; See also “Die Grünen bemängeln Schröders UNO-Offensive,” Die Welt, 11 December 2004: “Die EU sollte versuchen, einen gemeinsamen Sitz im Sicherheitsrat zu bekommen. Sollte dies nicht gelingen, und Deutschland im Rahmen der UN-Reform einen Sitz erhalten, sind wir für die generelle Abschaffung des Veto-Rechts.” The support by Germany’s Green Party for a common permanent seat for the EU on the UN Security Council may stem from the realization that Germany will not likely obtain the necessary support for its own permanent Security Council seat (among the reasons for this are recent tensions with the U.S. and the lack of support from other European countries, such as Italy). “German FM regrets Italy’s Opposition to its UN Council Bid,” Agence France Presse, 25 September 2004; “Germany Pushes for Permanent UN Security Council Seat,” Agence France Presse, 23 September 2004; “Brazil, Germany Bullish on UN Security Council Seats,” Agence France Presse, 18 November 2004.


“Rice Seeks to Defuse Dispute on China Arms,” *Financial Times London*, 10 February 2005: “The German move to accept a double-hatted command would go much of the way to meeting Washington’s demands to integrate the 8,000-strong NATO peacekeeping mission and the 18,000 soldiers of the US-led force in the country.”
Ibid.: “But Paris is unlikely to play along. French officials say any financial commitment will be made on a bilateral basis. France’s offer to help set up an Iraqi Gendarmerie, with a training site in Qatar, will similarly be outside NATO’s auspices. The stickiest issue, however, is likely to be France’s refusal to allow its senior officers assigned to NATO to participate in the Iraq mission….” See also, “Die Geschichte wird Berlin und Paris widerlegen,” Welt.de, 19 February 2005 (Interview with Richard Perle): “Sie irrten sich schon, als Reagan den Kalten Krieg überwand, und sie täuschen sich auch in Bush, meint der Amerikanische Vordenker Perle.” “Launige Worte von Old Rumsfeld,” Welt.de, 13 February 2005; “Rumsfeld Safe from German Inquiry,” BBC News, 10 February 2005.


13 Stephen Bierling, “Nur wer mitspielt, kann gewinnen,” *Die Welt*, 21 January 2005: “Magnetschwebefbahnen zu verkaufen, VW-Produktionsstätten zu eröffnen sind keine Antwort.” The author critically discusses Germany’s position concerning China’s threat to Taiwan and concerning strategic resources, such as oil. “Simply to focus on the export of magnetic trains, to open up VW production sites, or to lift weapons embargos was neither a sufficient foreign policy, nor acceptable.” “Germany Backs End to EU Ban on Arms to China; Hopes for Airbus Deal – Sources,” *AFX.com*, 3 December 2004; “EU-China: EU Trade Commissioner to Visit China, 23–26 February 2005,” Brussels, 23 February 2005; available at www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade: “…Europe is China’s largest trade partner and China is Europe’s second largest trade partner….,” “German Foreign Minister for Critical Dialogue with Russia,” *Financial Times Information*, 4 October 2004.

14 “‘Merci y’all (But Why the Heck Are You Selling Arms to China?)’ *The Economist*, 26 February 2005. “Chirac Defies Bush on China Arms,” *BBC News*, 22 February 2005, states: “US President George W. Bush has voiced ‘deep concern’ about European plans to lift an arms embargo on China—putting him at odds with the French president. Jacques Chirac said it was ‘no longer justified’ but Europe and the US should agree on conditions for lifting it. Earlier, Mr. Bush warned that arms transfers to Beijing would ‘change the balance’ of China-Taiwan relations.” See also Richard Fisher, Jr., “How May Europe Strengthen

Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Geostrategic Triad,” CSIS Significant Issues Series (Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, December 2001): “Global stability in the early twenty-first century will be conditioned largely on how the United States handles its relations with China, Europe and Russia—the geo-strategic triad… Thus, the United States needs a well-defined strategy to manage to two ‘Eurasian power triangles’….”


“Charlemagne: Let’s Talk–But Where? Are NATO and the European Union partners or rivals?” The Economist, 26 February 2005: “One group of countries believes that their security ultimately depends on the United States…. Another group, which includes France, Belgium and (in certain moods, and under certain governments) Germany, wants an autonomous European defense identity, as a key to achieving the ‘multipolar world’ that Mr. Chirac so often praises.”


21 The new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe still vividly remember the experience of living under Nazi and Soviet rule; they see their national security as being best guaranteed by NATO membership, and are somewhat hesitant to give up their recently regained sovereignty as part of the process of European integration.


27 Ibid.


29 To achieve this, the following steps were held to be necessary. First, expansion of NATO’s membership to those democratic nations willing and able to share the burden of defending and advancing NATO’s common interests. Second, ensuring that the military forces of NATO’s member states were able to make appropriate combat contributions in situations of coalition warfare. Third, development of planning processes to enable those contributions to become effective multinational fighting forces.

30 Lord Robertson, *Fox News*, 1 August 2003: From August 11th, NATO would take over the command of ISAF in Afghanistan. With regard to Iraq, eleven NATO members had already pledged troops for the post-conflict stabilization and transition process. From August 2003, NATO nations, like Poland and Spain, with
the logistical support of NATO, would be on the ground in Iraq to share the burden. What Allies in the EU and NATO needed to do in general, was to learn more about how to deal with conflict in pre- and post-settlement situations. NATO was used to deal with the sharp edges of the killing fields of the Balkans. The Alliance faced the challenge of how to address post-conflict situations.


32 Such an impasse may concern peacekeeping efforts, such as in the Balkans; out-of-area peacekeeping missions for NATO, such as in Afghanistan; or providing aid for reconstruction or police training, for example, in Iraq. See “Transforming the Alliance,” *NATO Review* (Summer 2002).


35 An interesting question regarding the French-German duo seems to be, who uses whom more in the end: France–Germany, or Germany–France? Joachim Bitterlich, a former foreign policy advisor to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, argued that, given recent French diplomacy in the EU, UN, and NATO, France had achieved its goal of reclaiming its position as “country number one” in Europe: “Frankreich, die Nummer eins,” *Welt.de*, 18 February 2003.


38 Helga Haftendorn, Deutsche Aussenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001), 73.

39 It has to be pointed out that concepts and policy regarding further European integration vary enormously within the Union as well. Disagreements about the nature of the European Constitution point at that challenge. While Joschka Fischer has argued since 1999 that the EU needed to develop into a full-fledged federation, polls in France in spring 2005 seem to indicate declining support for the constitution in France.

40 Michaela C. Hertkorn, “The Relevance of Perceptions in Foreign Policy: A German–US Perspective,” World Affairs (Fall 2001), p. 65: During interviews in Berlin in January 2001, a representative of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, one of Germany’s political party foundations complained “that if he wanted to put together a workshop on current security policy issues, he would have a hard time finding twenty qualified people if he were to exclude representatives of the foreign and defense ministry and relied on scholars and representatives of the very few think tanks.” The same representative also expressed his view that the main foreign policy focus of the Schröder government lay in pursuing further European integration. In a speech at Georgetown University in September 1999, Germany’s Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, stated that the only logical consequence of NATO having
had to intervene militarily in Kosovo was further European integration.


46 “France’s EU Referendum. That Damned, Elusive Constitution,” *The Economist*, 30 April 2005. “Now that We Are All Bundled Inside, Let’s Shut the Door” (*The Economist*, 30 April 2005), stated: “A year after the new boys entered the European Union, the mood is a mite surly, and definitely unwelcoming.”


63 Information obtained at a Transatlantic Security Relations Seminar, Center for European Studies, New York University (Presentation by the Ambassador of the Republic of Estonia to the United States of America), 16 April 2004.

64 The number in question takes into account the withdrawal of Spanish troops in spring 2004. The author is in the process of contacting the defense ministries of all NATO member states to find out whether the individual governments have been or are going to support NATO or the Polish contingent in Iraq, either before or after the transition of power in Iraq by the end of June 2004. Post-transition, the potential contributions of individual NATO member states specifically concern the training of police and border control officers as requested by the Iraqi interim government.


70 Elsewhere, I have written: “The critical question seems to be whether a common European security and defense policy can become more than a reflection of European concern in the aftermath of Kosovo. Is the creation of ESDP—as formulated at the Cologne EU summit of July 1999 and the Nice summit of December 2000—an attempt to counterbalance US power, while theoretically facing the challenge of coercive prevention? Dobriansky and Rivkin state that the ‘United States can and must maintain a first-rate military establishment capable of fighting and winning wars. President Bush articulated this fundamental truth in stating that the core US strategic mission is to deter war by preparing to win swiftly and decisively.’” Hertkorn, “The Relevance of Perceptions in Foreign Policy: A German–US Perspective,” *World Affairs* (Fall 2001), 63.


72 Michaela C. Hertkorn (2002), *Why Conflict Prevention Does not Exclude the Use of Force* (Berlin: Mensch und Buch Verlag,


77 Ibid., 31: “The Prague Summit of November 2002 seemed to have strengthened NATO even further. The agreed-upon creation of a NATO reaction force could lead to more European or EU contributions to NATO.”

78 Ibid., 32.

79 Ibid., 32.


83 At a December 2004 NATO meeting, the departing U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, criticized six NATO partners—France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, and Greece—for
not contributing to NATO’s future role in Iraq, charging that by doing so they risked weakening the alliance. *CNN and Fox News*, 9 December 2004.

Concerning the EU’s ability to act together, the example of the International Criminal Court may illustrate how rapidly EU cohesion gives way to bilateral relations. When the EU Commission threatened Eastern European countries that they would endanger their future prospects for EU membership if they supported U.S. demands to provide ICC exemptions for its peacekeepers, Central and Eastern European countries chose NATO membership and good relations with the U.S. over possible EU membership. Also, Western European countries like Great Britain, Spain, and Italy granted the U.S. these exemptions, thereby breaking ranks with Germany.


The following is a comment complementing the long quote referred to in the previous footnote. Precisely because of the experiences the young Federal Republic of Germany made as an occupied country under the Marshall Plan, Germany today may be in a strong position to contribute considerably to complex peace and reconstruction processes. The Marshall Plan allowed Germany to transform from a dictatorship into a democratic and stable country, while being safeguarded militarily. Ideally, a peace process tries to establish security, well-being, and justice through military, political, and economic measures.

Why did this happen? All former case studies could be subsumed under NATO’s role in peacemaking and peacekeeping, like in the Balkans. NATO would be of relevance for further rapprochement with Russia and the war against global terrorism.

“Diplomatic warfare breaks out in NATO after a call by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg for the creation of headquarters and planning staff from which a purely European Union based defense might emerge,” *BBC News Online*, 30 April 2003, available at www.bbc.co.uk.


In January 2001, Karsten Voigt argued at the Auswärtige Amt in Berlin that NATO always had been about collective defense. ESDP would enable the Europeans to build capacities “next to the Americans.” He stressed the Petersberg tasks. Most crises within
European interest, such as the Balkans, needed just such focus as a stress on the Petersberg tasks would have provided. He could not necessarily imagine a potential conflict in Europe where more so-called hard-power security was necessary, where peacekeeping developed into peacemaking or full war. (Personal interview with Karsten Voigt, Coordinator for German-American Cooperation in the German Foreign Office, Berlin, 5 January 2001).

Conflicts between the U.S. and Germany manifested themselves on a variety of alternating issues, from the Kyoto Protocol and missile defense to the ICC. See Michaela Hertkorn, “The Impact of September 11th on ESDP and Coercive Prevention: The German Perspective,” *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* (Winter/Spring 2003).

When contemplating what might concern the U.S. leadership, four scenarios can be envisioned. First, the U.S. does not lead, and the EU is unwilling or incapable to act. This was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 90s. Second, the U.S. leads, and the EU is not capable of doing it alone or to contribute a major share. This arguably was the case during the Kosovo intervention. Third, the U.S. assumes and claims its leadership role, and the EU develops its own security and defense capabilities. This may be the intention of the ESDP, as promoted by the British, who have stressed the need for the ESDP to not decouple from NATO. Such an arrangement would likely strengthen NATO and see the transatlantic relationship inter-related with further European integration. Fourth, the U.S. does not lead, and the EU continues to develop its own security and defense policy. This carries the risk of the ESDP being perceived, at least by some European countries, as independent from NATO. This may lead to a sustainable division of labor between NATO and the EU. France has aimed at developing European hard-power capabilities, separately from NATO. Germany—with its strong taboo against militarism as a domestic constraint—may have been tempted to regard ESDP and its Petersberg tasks as providing the ultimate soft-power alternative to NATO’s hard-power collective defense regime. How would these scenarios play out in the aftermath of 9/11 and


96 Germany needs to become aware of the problematic impact the recent trouble in German–U.S. relations has had. The United States’ development of close relationships with nations in Europe that effectively surround Germany (Great Britain, Spain, Italy, and Poland) may illustrate the following: Germany has been out of the picture as a regionally integrating power at the geographic center of Europe, and therefore cannot help but miss its role as an integrating central power.

97 The aftermath of Kosovo could be characterized by European uneasiness about U.S. dominance, in contrast to U.S. uneasiness about European unwillingness or incapability to act without the U.S. in the Balkans.

98 Michaela C. Hertkorn, in: Albrecht Schnabel and David Carment, page 36: “In summary, recent splits (and eventual failure) in the EU, NATO, and the UN with response to crisis prevention in Iraq seemed to have weakened the ability of the international community to successfully use the threat of force as a means of crisis and conflict prevention. The fact that individual members in the transatlantic community—within EU and NATO, or not—have not been able to streamline their policy on Iraq did not increase the chances for preventive diplomacy”.

99 Personal interview with a representative of the New Atlantic Agenda project, American Enterprise Institute, Washington DC, 3 June 2003.

100 For statistics on missions abroad, see “Die Bundeswehr in Zahlen” and “Auslandeinsätze—aktuelle Zahlen der im Ausland
eingesetzten Deutschen Soldaten,” both available at www.bundeswerh.de/forces/einsatzzahlen.php.


102 The fact that in early 2003 the supply of defensive weaponry to Turkey was blocked—even though Turkey had requested the assistance in its status as a NATO member—proved to be most problematic.


105 This response left Germany isolated in Europe after its recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence. With regard to the post-9/11 world, see “Rot-Grün will Wehrpflicht überprüfen,” tagesschau.de, 7 October 2002; “Rumsfeld geht auf Distanz bei NATO-Treffen—Struck glaubt an Normalisierung,” DPA, 24 September 2002. While German contributions to Afghanistan led to a vote of confidence in Germany’s parliament in late 2001, Schröder’s anti-American rhetoric concerning military action against Iraq in summer 2002 would do well to consider the following. The Social Democratic-Green coalition government might not have survived had it expressed support for another military intervention. Schröder’s decision, however, to sacrifice relations with the U.S. will come at a high price in the long term regarding the maneuverability of German foreign policy. How was NATO to be seriously expected to decide upon a German-Dutch ISAF command in Afghanistan when the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the German Defense Minister did not even talk with
each other at NATO’s Ambassador meeting in Poland in September 2002, and Germany seemed to have forgotten to inform the Dutch government about its proposition? Still, during the Kosovo intervention, Germany’s Foreign Minister struggled to draw a line between the principles “no more war” and “no more genocide.” After 9/11, Schröder offered military support to the United States. How solid his “unconditional support” would prove, if the war against terrorism lingered on or stretched to other countries, already promised to be something worth watching, even as early as the end of 2001.


107 Other questions are: What should be Germany’s real contribution to helping NATO deal with regional conflicts and terrorist threats, given its limited defense budget? What can Germany—with the largest population in the EU—do to deliver on closing the capabilities gap? Maintaining the ability to work and fight together as Allies requires NATO member states to take the necessary steps to modernize their national forces. This is a particular challenge for Germany.


109 Global terrorism could be regarded as a new threat. Intra-state conflicts, such as those in the Balkans, could be perceived as either old or new security threats, depending on one’s point of view and focus of analysis. The classical security threat refers to the bipolar international system during the Cold War.


111 Ibid.

2002; “Germany’s government: Still edgy,” *The Economist*, 24 November 2001. While the German contribution to ISAF led to a vote of confidence in the German parliament, called for by Schröder to assure the majority within his own coalition, Germany later offered to assume the leadership of ISAF together with the Netherlands during the NATO Ambassador meeting in Poland in September 2002. This seems to have come as some form of recompense for German opposition to U.S. policy in Iraq.


115 Ibid., 33.

116 Personal interview with a representative of the Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin, April 2002.


122 The following are remarks by the author: By late summer/early fall of 2002, the rhetoric had escalated; Germany’s then justice
minister compared Bush’s methods with Hitler’s. In the U.S., Senator Helms called for U.S. troops to be removed from Germany in case of Schröder’s federal election victory, the U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld refused to meet his German counterpart, to whom he referred as “this person” during a NATO meeting; and former National Security Advisor Rice called German–U.S. relations “poisoned.” “US condemns poisoned relations with Berlin,” CNN, 20 September 2002, www.cnn.com.

123 Jacque Chirac’s proposal in early September 2002 to attempt to bridge the gap between the European allies and the U.S. on Iraq (and the strong support it received from Tony Blair) could have alarmed Schröder and Fischer of the following possibility: the U.S. might have proof of Iraq having weapons of mass destruction, or evidence linking the Hussein regime somehow to Al Qaeda. Another warning sign of Germany’s potential move toward isolation in the EU and NATO (although it would later arguably be joined by France) could have been Italy, Spain, and Poland’s rapid turn to declaring support for the U.S. intervention in Iraq.


126 Even though both nations had endorsed serious consequences for Iraq for weapons violations in Security Council Resolution 1441.

127 Angela Merkel introduced a plan to reshape, reformulate, and refocus German foreign policy, which needed to be based on six foreign policy issues of central importance to German foreign policy (speech in the German parliament, 3 April 2003; available at www.cdu.de). Wolfgang Schäuble, a foreign policy expert of the Christian Democrats, expressed his sense that a confrontational course against the U.S.—together with France, or led by
France—was not in the German national interest (presentation at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Paris, 7 April 2003), available at www.kas.de.

128 Was it not the 1968 generation in the Federal Republic of Germany that had confronted their parents with the question, “Where were you during Hitler’s regime? Did you support or oppose Nazi tyranny?” At the beginning of the twenty-first century, this generation of former rebels against (untested) authority (arguably of dictators) missed a chance to demonstrate that they had learned the lessons of history and meant what they said, by applying it to real life. Helga Haftendorn, an expert on German foreign policy, expressed her distress about the anti-Americanism displayed by the Schröder government. She gave some credit to Joschka Fischer (Presentation at the German General Consulate, New York, 8 April 2003). See “The many faces of Joschka Fischer,” BBC News Online, 8 April 2003: [Fischer is] “the most determined opponent of the Anglo-American project—before Jacques Chirac.”


130 Presentation by NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson at the 20th Manfred-Wörner-Seminar for German-American-Understanding, Brussels, 7 May 2002.


132 Secretary Rumsfeld, while en route to a meeting of NATO ambassadors in Poland on 22 September 2002, outlined several initiatives for NATO. First, the Alliance should work at improving the capabilities that the NATO countries had already agreed on. Second, a NATO response force needed to be developed. NATO’s mixed capabilities needed to get together so that in the event of a problem, in or out of the NATO area, NATO would have a responsive capability that was real and functioned together. This was a good way to assure NATO’s continued relevance. The third issue involved NATO’s command structure and headquarters. While the U.S. proposition for a NATO response
force was initially welcomed by Spain and Italy, German Defense Minister Struck announced that he needed to examine the initiative carefully, with France highlighting the need for corresponding UN resolutions. See Michaela Hertkorn, “German–U.S. Relations from Pre-Bush to post-9/11-Bush,” *International Journal for Politics and Ethics* 2, no. 4 (2002), 327 – 356.


