Long-Term Possibilities for NATO-Russia Naval Security Cooperation

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I would like to extend especially warm words of gratitude to my research mentor and editor, Colonel Peter Faber, United States Air Force, who helped me in my labors.

In closing, I hope that this work will, in its own small way, help to more closely cement NATO-Russia cooperation, as part of the larger effort toward creating greater international security and stability.

Col. Igor Tarasenko
Rome, December 2004

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AVANT PROPOS

En intégrant pendant quatre mois au deuxième semestre 2004, le colonel Igor Tarasenko dans l’équipe multinationale de chercheurs du collège de défense de l’OTAN, notre équipe académique a bénéficié de la présence d’un officier de marine expérimenté de la flotte russe de la Baltique. Un officier héritier d’une longue tradition maritime, celle des marins de la Baltique qui se sont illustrés de hauts faits depuis l’animation des circuits marchands de la Hanse jusqu’aux batailles qui ont opposé Danois, Polonais, alliés aux Russes contre les Suédois; un officier porteur d’une longue tradition scientifique, celle qui, de Nicolas Copernic au 15ème siècle à Pierre le Grand au 18ème siècle, a su prendre la mesure du progrès nécessaire pour construire les instruments utiles au développement maîtrisé des espaces; un marin, homme des espaces fluides, pour qui la mer est d’abord la zone commune où, depuis Grotius, une autre célébrité régionale du 16ème siècle qui la qualifia de res nullius, l’action peut s’exercer librement hors contraintes.

Faut-il voir dans ces trois filiations les principales sources d’inspiration d’une recherche inventive sur les modes de coopération maritime entre les pays membres de l’OTAN et la Russie au 21ème siècle?

Marin comme lui, j’ai été marqué par cette liberté que procure l’espace maritime, qu’aucune frontière ne compartimente, où l’aventure commence tout près, just derrière l’horizon, et où l’on ne croise que ses semblables, “ni vivants, ni morts” selon la légende, des marins décidés à résister à toutes les formes d’adversité, habitués à faire le gros dos contre les éléments qui les dépassent, mais solidaires face aux dangers. Lisez Igor Tarasenko, qui ouvre de nouvelles portes à la coopération maritime militaire du 21ème siècle.

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INTRODUCTION

No analysis is value-free. Imbedded in even the most empirically rigorous works are assumptions, beliefs, or working propositions. They certainly exist in this paper. I believe, for example, that the Russian Federation and NATO members are not political, economic, or military adversaries. I also believe that a common security space—characterized by peace, prosperity, and stability—is possible in Eurasia. I assume, however, that this space will not be achieved without NATO-Russia cooperation in coping with a variety of common threats and challenges. I also believe that genuine progress has been made in NATO-Russia security cooperation, especially since the inception of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002. At the same time, I presume that more needs to be done—i.e., that the existing structures and mechanisms of NATO-Russia security cooperation need to evolve to the next level. But just what should this next level look like? To answer this question, the fundamental working proposition of this paper is that the next stage of security cooperation should be practical; that it should provide a menu of options, a list of possibilities, or a series of prescriptions for joint NATO-Russia action in the area of security. Some of these recommendations might be immediately actionable, while others might be achieved over time. In all cases, however, they need to reinforce the notion that cooperation often relies on the “art of the possible” when it comes to creating a shared security space that is both peaceful and prosperous.

To pursue these recommendations, this paper works from the broad to the specific. The introductory chapter has a threefold task. It first seeks to define, from a Russian perspective, the current security context of the Euro-Atlantic area (in terms of the general and specific
factors that shape it, the potential negative developments that might alter it, and the particular threats that mark it). A shared perception of these threats and factors—and a desire to deal with them effectively—led NATO and Russia to begin cooperating on security issues in the early 1990s. The history of that cooperation has gone through six phases, however, as the second part of the chapter shows. Finally, Chapter One clarifies the initial expectations and activities associated with the NATO-Russia Council, which represents the most ambitious attempt at NATO-Russia security cooperation to date.

With the overall security context having been outlined in the first chapter, Chapter Two examines the NATO-Russia Council proper, especially since it is the premier vehicle for NATO-Russia security cooperation today. The chapter identifies twelve areas where NRC cooperation has either been initiated or is under review; it stresses four “big picture” problems that, if left unattended, might hinder current and future NRC cooperation; and, most importantly, it identifies forty-three possible “next-step” options that NRC members and their partners might want to pursue, organized under thirteen general areas.

The third and final chapter identifies specific opportunities for enhanced NATO-Russia naval cooperation. The reasons for placing particular emphasis on this area are numerous:

- Over 70 percent of the Earth’s surface is water, and over 80 percent of all goods transit on its waterways. The growing numbers of asymmetric threats in littoral zones and on the high seas demand a coordinated response by NATO and Russia.

- Naval cooperation is one of the most highly developed areas of NRC cooperation, in terms of actual programs and initiatives. By building on its momentum, those committed to the NRC can help develop it further, both as a consensus-based multinational political forum and as a vehicle for improved security cooperation.
• Coordinated naval activities provide two benefits: they provide maximum freedom of action while enhancing interoperability and solidarity. Such flexibility in combination with cohesion creates ideal conditions under which to pursue the political “art of the possible” in manageable steps.

• NATO navies will benefit from Russian naval expertise in particular areas, and vice versa.

• Because of on-going NATO counter-terrorism activities in the Mediterranean, the Alliance has a high level of interest in naval cooperation at this time.

For these and other reasons, Chapter Three analyzes naval cooperation as a significant way to promote the political and security ties that bind NATO and Russia. However, for the collaboration to succeed, the following developments must take place:

• New framework documents, including a Political-Military Framework for NATO-Russia Navy Operations; a NATO-Russian Navies Action Plan; an overarching, day-to-day Support Agreement, which could include a cluster of accords on status-of-forces, host nation support, and security; a NATO-Russia Navies Funding Agreement; and clearly defined Maritime Maneuvering and Tactical Procedures.

• Organizational Reforms, including a body of chief naval representatives to the NATO-Russia Council; a Joint NATO-Russia Naval Task Force Command that directs Joint NATO-Russia Naval Task Forces; a Joint NATO-Russia Naval Logistics Command; Joint NATO-Russia Submarine Escape and Rescue Forces; a Joint NATO-Russia Naval Auxiliary Chemical-Toxin Protection Group; a Joint NATO-Russia Naval Task Force Training Center; and Military Liaison Missions embedded in national-level navy staffs.

• Enhanced cooperation in nine functional areas:
  o Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems;
• Combating terrorism, piracy, and other illicit activities at sea;
• Decommissioning Soviet and Russian nuclear-powered submarines;
• Protecting against chemical weapons released into the Baltic Sea after World War II;
• Performing joint peace support missions;
• Pursuing cooperation in mine countermeasures;
• Integrating logistics and sealift activities;
• Joining Russian Baltic Fleet marine units with the Danish-German-Polish Multinational Corps;
• Performing joint submarine rescue and escape operations.

Chapter Three closes with a discussion of the above functional areas in detail, and provides recommendations on how to collaborate in particular areas at the next level. Why does the paper conclude with specific recommendations? Because of the assumptions, beliefs, and working propositions discussed at the beginning of this introduction. With this overall design in mind, let us turn now to the historical context for NATO-Russia collaboration.
The Military and Political Situation in the Euro-Atlantic Area – A Russian View of the New Challenges and Threats to Peace

According to the Russian Federation’s official Military Doctrine (approved by presidential decree on 21 April 2000), today’s overall military-political situation is defined by: 1) a qualitative improvement in the means, forms, and methods of military conflict; 2) the increased reach of military power and the severity of its consequences; and 3) the spread of military power into new domains of human activity. Additionally, the possibility of achieving military-political goals through indirect and long-range operations now “predetermines” the particular dangers of modern armed conflict for peoples and states, as well as the prospects (or risks) for preserving international stability and peace. Given this enhanced reach of organized violence, it is obviously preferable to prevent it and to achieve peaceful settlements of differences whenever and as early as possible. If the above broad shifts define today’s military-political situation, so do the following specific factors.

- The declining threat of large-scale wars, including nuclear war;
- The rise and increased strength of regional power centers;
- The spread of national, ethnic, and religious extremism;
- The growth of separatism as a key political impulse;
The spread of local wars and armed conflicts (fueled by different types of regional arms races);

- The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems;

- The growing potential for information-centered confrontations (i.e., cyber-wars).

But if the above realities shape both the overall and particular nature of today’s conflicts, what factors can distort them in clearly negative ways? Official Russian doctrine casts a critical eye on the following factors:

- Attempts to weaken (or ignore) established mechanisms that are designed to safeguard international security (primarily the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe);

- The use of military force in humanitarian interventions without either securing UN Security Council approval, or following generally accepted principles and norms of international law;

- Violations of international treaties and agreements in the sphere of arms control and disarmament;

- The use of information technology and other asymmetric means for aggressive purposes, especially by extremist nationalist, religious, separatist, and terrorist movements, organizations, and structures;

- Cooperation between transnational crime syndicates and terrorist organizations (including weapons trading and drug trafficking).

If the above factors are potentially destabilizing, what about the shared and specific threats that NATO and Russia collectively face? According to the Russian Federation’s Minister of Defense, Sergey Ivanov, they include the following:

- International terrorism;

- The proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems;
• Growing demographic problems and ethnic instability;
• The illicit activities of radical religious communities and groups;
• Illegal drug trafficking;
• Organized crime;
• The “centrifugal” disorders associated with failed states (i.e., political oppression, economic distress, and absent institutions, which then lead to illegal migration; trafficking in drugs, weapons, and people; and harboring terrorists). In today’s imperfectly globalized world, such disorders tend not to remain in their places of origin, but spread into neighboring states;
• The transnational migration of thousands of violent and well-trained religious-political militants who have refused to adapt to the conditions of peaceful life. Some were involved in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, others in Chechnya, and others still in Afghanistan and Central Asia, where they are still combating government forces today. (What will happen, one wonders, when they eventually return to their countries of origin, including those in Europe?)

Any of the above threats could lead to crises or armed conflicts affecting Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian stability. Since the ability of individual states to cope with these interrelated problems is waning, “international cooperation between power agencies, including special services and armed forces,” is imperative. It is because of this necessity that NATO and Russia have taken joint actions to strengthen security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Before recommending ways to enhance and extend these actions, it is helpful to describe how this cooperation first came about.

The Post-Cold War Evolution of NATO-Russia Relations

Since 1991, the evolution of the NATO-Russia partnership can be divided into six phases.

Phase 1: December 1991 to late 1993—An idealistic honeymoon. In this initial phase, President Boris Yeltsin made achieving positive
relations with NATO his first major foreign policy goal. A letter to NATO members declaring that “today we are raising the question of Russia’s membership in NATO as a long-term political aim”\(^6\) and an apparent endorsement of possible Polish membership in the Alliance added to this early honeymoon atmosphere in NATO-Russia relations.\(^7\) NATO members reciprocated in kind by cooperating with Russia in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which was created on 20 December 1991.

**Phase 2: 1994 to early 1997—Cooperation and a new realism.** Russian attitudes towards NATO became more guarded during this second phase, for three reasons:

1. A growing belief that Russia had been duped about the true nature and aims of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program,\(^8\) which NATO unveiled in January 1994;
2. The use of NATO airpower against Serbian forces in Bosnia, notably in August–September 1995;
3. The growing suspicion that NATO intended to pursue a policy of enlargement.

Despite these concerns, however, Russia did not scrap its efforts to cooperate with the Alliance. It signed the Partnership for Peace Framework Document in June 1994 and, at a special meeting of NATO-Russia foreign ministers in Noordwijk on 31 May 1995, it approved a PfP Individual Partnership Program with the Alliance. The meetings that followed at the ministerial, ambassadorial, and expert levels then led to the exchange of useful information on issues of common interest, including peace-keeping, ecological security, and science.

Close cooperation between Russia and NATO on implementing the military aspects of the 1995 peace agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina added yet another dimension to the evolving security partnership. The participation of Russian troops in the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and in the follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR) demonstrated that NATO and Russia could collaborate effectively in the construction of cooperative security in Europe.
The concrete collaboration exhibited in Bosnia-Herzegovina was then followed by an additional series of joint agreements. In March 1996, for example, NATO and the Russian Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies, and the Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters (EMERCOM) signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Civil Emergency Planning and Disaster Preparedness. The Secretary-General of NATO, heads of NATO member states, and the Russian president then signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security in Paris on 27 May 1997. This event ushered in the third phase of NATO-Russia cooperation.

Phase 3: Spring 1997 to spring 1999—A new “special relationship.” The Founding Act reassured Russia that the Alliance sought to include it in the Euro-Atlantic security community. It also served as a “test bed” for Russia to demonstrate its willingness to be part of a democratic European security system with NATO as an equal partner. Within this context, the parties agreed that they no longer considered each other adversaries, and they pledged to “build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security.” The main sections of the Founding Act outlined the principles and mechanisms that were expected to govern the evolving partnership between NATO and Russia. Section I spelled out the guiding principles of the partnership. Section II created a new forum for consultation and cooperation, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. (The PJC was to be a Council of “NATO-plus-one.”) Meetings at the level of heads of state and government would occur “as appropriate” under its auspices, as would monthly meetings at the ambassadorial level and twice yearly meetings at the level of foreign ministers and defense ministers. Section III outlined specific areas for consultation and cooperation, while Section IV covered political-military issues, including a pledge by NATO members that they had “no intention, no plan, and no reason” to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of prospective members.

Basically, the Founding Act established a “special relationship” between Russia and NATO, granting Russia rights of consultation
with the Alliance that were certainly greater than those accorded to other non-member states. Representatives from both sides, at least formally, sat in the PJC on equal terms, and in the years of its existence (1997–2002), the PJC addressed a wide range of issues, including the following representative sample:

- Events in the former Yugoslavia;
- Measures to promote cooperation, transparency, and confidence-building between NATO and Russia;
- NATO-Russia contributions, via the PJC, to the security architecture of the Euro-Atlantic region;
- Political and security efforts against WMD proliferation;
- Nuclear weapons issues;
- Potential NATO-Russia strategies and doctrines;
- Peacekeeping;
- Disarmament and arms control;
- Search and rescue at sea;
- Retraining of military officers;
- Defense-related scientific cooperation;
- Defense-related environmental problems;
- Civil emergency planning and disaster relief.

As noteworthy as the above steps were, however, the Kosovo crisis soon posed the greatest threat to NATO-Russia relations since the Cold War.

**Phase 4: Spring 1999 to summer 1999—A low point: Kosovo and its aftermath.** The Russian government’s response to NATO’s air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was to reduce its structural links with the Alliance. It withdrew some of the Russian personnel from its mission to NATO headquarters in Brussels, closed the NATO documentation center in Moscow, and suspended dialogue in the PJC. What was most significant was what the Russian government did not do: it did not terminate its military presence in
Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the ongoing NATO-led Stabilization Force, and it continued to maintain normal relations with all NATO states, including the United States. By the summer of 1999, it was clear that NATO-Russia relations were going to survive the Kosovo crisis essentially intact, although they certainly were in questionable health. With the 23 July 1999 Permanent Joint Council meeting (the first one held since before the initiation of the Kosovo air campaign in March 1999), the fifth phase of the NATO-Russia relationship began.

Phase 5: Summer 1999 to fall 2001—A cautious return to normalcy. By February 2000, all the parties involved in the construction of closer ties between NATO and Russia were ready to resume their previous level of dialogue in the Permanent Joint Council. The new Russian president, Vladimir Putin, signaled that he might be willing to go further as well. When asked by a British interviewer if Russia might possibly join NATO, he replied, “Why not?” (NATO did not act upon this feeler, however, either because it was suffering from a “Kosovo hangover,” or perhaps because it doubted Putin’s words, or did not favor Russian membership.) Yet the ambivalence that marked former times existed in this phase too. In July 2001, for example, Putin mused that, while “we don’t consider NATO hostile … we don’t see any reason for its existence” either. Such public ambivalence quickly disappeared in the wake of the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001.

Phase 6: Fall 2001 to the present—Greater cooperation: 9/11 and its aftermath. The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington provided President Putin with an opportunity that he immediately seized upon—i.e., he grabbed the opportunity to join a budding international coalition against terrorism and, by extension, to persuade Alliance members to respond more dynamically than before to his motions toward enhanced NATO-Russia cooperation. NATO was quick to appreciate this gesture. According to Paul Fritch, head of the Russia and Ukraine relations section in the NATO international staff,

The need to engage Russia in the struggle against terrorism was obvious—intelligence capabilities, political influence in relevant
regions of the world, heightened sensitivity to the threat, even simple geography made Russia an indispensable partner in the campaign against Al Qaeda and its Taliban sponsor in Afghanistan. But the immediate crisis also unearthed a deeper truth. Even the most cursory look at the list of NATO’s most pressing “contemporary security challenges”—terrorism, proliferation, regional instability, trafficking in drugs, arms, and human beings—made clear that in most areas, any solution that did not include Russia as a cooperative partner was no solution at all. “Going it alone” was not likely to ensure Allied security.17

This realization inspired NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson to use a November 2001 visit to Russia to propose a successor forum to the PJC. In May 2002, the heads of state of Russia and the Alliance nations established today’s NATO-Russia Council (NRC).

The NATO-Russia Council – What Is It and What Does It Do?

The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington did more than just destroy buildings and kill thousands of people, including one hundred Russians. They also transformed international relations, especially relations between NATO and Russia. The 9/11 attacks made clear that today’s threats can come from anywhere, and that “spheres of influence” and other traditional notions of geographic security may not be as relevant as in the past.18 To build a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO and Russia would have to genuinely work together to build a qualitatively new relationship in a revised forum.

The general idea behind the NATO-Russia Council was to create a coordinating body where NATO member states and Russia could meet as equal partners to discuss and make decisions about topics of common interest, while also assuming the same rights and responsibilities for the implementation of NRC decisions.19 As President George Bush observed in his remarks at the ceremony inaugurating the council on 28 May 2002, the NRC offers “a way to strengthen our common security … [and give] the world a prospect of a more
hopeful century.”

Bush further described this new organization as an opportunity for NATO and Russia to take joint action in counter-terrorism and other areas, “such as missile defense and airspace control.”

As a successor to the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, the NRC was (and is) a new mechanism. It replaced the bilateral “NATO-plus-one” format used in the PJC with a working group of twenty-seven consensus-oriented equals. Here is how the declaration by the heads of the NATO member states and the Russian Federation officially describes the intended overall role of the NRC:

[It] will serve as the principal structure and venue for advancing the relationship between NATO and Russia. It will operate on the principle of consensus. It will work on the basis of a continuous political dialogue on security issues among its members with a view to early identification of emerging problems, determination of optimal common approaches, and the conduct of joint actions, as appropriate. The members of the NATO-Russia Council, acting in their national capacities and in a manner consistent with their respective collective commitments and obligations, will take joint decisions and will bear equal responsibility, individually and jointly, for their implementation. Each member may raise in the NATO-Russia Council issues related to the implementation of joint decisions.

Within this broad charter, the declaration further identified specific areas for cooperation, which sub-NRC working groups and committees have subsequently worked on. These areas include the following:

- **The struggle against terrorism.** This includes the preparation of joint assessments of the terrorist threat to the Euro-Atlantic area, including threats to NATO, Russian, and PfP forces, to civilian aircraft, and to critical infrastructure.

- **Crisis management.** This includes conducting regular exchanges of views and information on peacekeeping operations, including in the Balkans; promoting interoperability between national
peacekeeping contingents, including through joint and coordinated training initiatives; and developing a generic concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations.

- **WMD non-proliferation.** This involves performing joint assessments of global trends in the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and exploring opportunities for intensified practical cooperation in protecting against such weapons.

- **Arms control and confidence-building measures.** These include adopting the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) as a cornerstone of European security; working cooperatively towards the ratification and entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty for all parties involved; and continuing consultations between nuclear experts from NATO and Russia.

- **Theater missile defense.** This involves consulting more extensively on TMD concepts, terminology, systems, and system capabilities; analyzing and evaluating possible levels of interoperability among various TMD systems; and exploring opportunities for intensified practical cooperation, including joint training and exercises.

- **Search and rescue at sea.** This includes monitoring the implementation of the NATO-Russia Framework Document on Submarine Crew Rescue, and continuing to promote cooperation, transparency, and confidence-building between NATO and Russia in search and rescue efforts at sea.

- **Military-to-military cooperation and defense reform.** This involves pursuing enhanced joint training and exercises and joint demonstrations and tests; exploring the possibility of establishing an integrated NATO-Russia military training center for missions to address the challenges of the 21st century; and enhancing cooperation on defense reform and its economic aspects, including defense conversion.

- **Civil emergencies.** This features exchanging information on recent disasters and WMD consequence management.
• *New threats and challenges.* This includes exploring ways to deal with the new challenges and threats within the Euro-Atlantic region; initiating cooperation in civil and military airspace controls; and pursuing enhanced scientific cooperation.

**Summary**

The overall purpose of this introductory chapter was threefold: to define, from a Russian perspective, the current political-military context of the Euro-Atlantic region; to describe the six phases of NATO-Russia cooperation since 1991; and to clarify the initial expectations and activities associated with the NATO-Russia Council. With this basic context now in place, the next step is to consider the NRC proper—i.e., to highlight the progress it has made and the general types of cooperation its members might pursue in the future.
CHAPTER 2

NATO-RUSSIA COOPERATION: CURRENT REALITIES AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

The NATO-Russia Council – Some Results and Ongoing Requirements

The previous chapter described the NRC and its activities, as initially conceived by its creators. But has the reality matched expectations over the past two years? According to Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, “It can be stated today with some certainty, that we really managed to fulfill the ideas proclaimed in the Rome declaration with … concrete joint ventures.” At the same time, however, Ivanov has warned that, “It is very important that such practical actions should not be reduced to … actions undertaken for action’s sake only, but be made part and parcel of strategic relations.” These successful ventures have occurred in the following twelve areas: combating terrorism, WMD non-proliferation, arms control, theater missile defense, airspace management, military-to-military cooperation, crisis management, defense reform, logistics, civil emergencies, scientific cooperation, and the challenges posed by modern societies. To highlight the results of NRC-based cooperation, and to clarify its evolving status, these twelve areas must be reviewed in greater detail.

Combating terrorism. In this area, joint NATO-Russia assessments of specific terrorist threats in the Euro-Atlantic area are being developed and kept under review. To enhance these efforts, however, Oleg Chernov has suggested that the following eight additional steps need to be taken.
Igor Tarasenko

• Shut down “the financial fueling of terrorist organizations and formations, wherever in the world they are trying to operate.”
• Criminalize the deliberate collecting of funds or provisions for terrorists within the territory of any state.
• Freeze without delay the funds, financial assets, and economic resources of persons and other entities connected with terrorist activities.
• Demand that states put an end to any activities on their soil that involve the recruitment and material support of terrorists.
• Tighten border controls to prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups.
• Improve information sharing among all states to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks, and take cooperative action against the perpetrators of such acts.
• Secure the earliest possible accession of all states to the relevant international conventions and protocols that focus on terrorism (including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999), the full implementation of these conventions and protocols, and the full acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1368 (2001).
• Further examine the possible use of non-lethal weapons in future terrorist situations.

WMD non-proliferation. NATO and Russia are currently preparing a joint assessment of global trends in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This assessment comes in the wake of an NRC-related workshop that took place at Norton Manor, United Kingdom, on 10–12 September 2004. The workshop participants, who included high-level government and non-government opponents of WMD trafficking and other related smuggling activities, made a number of worthwhile recommendations, including the following:26
• Establish a NATO Advisory Group on Illicit Trafficking to provide the Alliance (and, indirectly, its partners) with an enhanced counter-trafficking support capability.

• Conduct a follow-up NATO Workshop on Counter-Trafficking to support the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Division of Radiation and Waste Safety.

• Establish an International Nuclear and Radiological Security Training Institute by tapping into NATO and partner states’ capabilities, including the Kurchatov Institute’s first-hand experience with nuclear and radiological crises.

• Adapt the U.S. Counter-Narcotics Joint Interagency Task Force model for wider counter-trafficking and counter-terrorism activities.

• Establish a Black Sea/Caucasus Regional Counter-Trafficking Intelligence Center.

• Include industry inputs in counter-trafficking planning and training packages.

• Improve information preparedness.

According to Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, an even more specific area of mutual concern is Pakistan’s role in the proliferation of nuclear materials and weapons components (as best illustrated by the infamous activities of Dr. A. Q. Khan, a national hero to many Pakistanis). Since what is known about these activities might be only the tip of the iceberg, NATO and Russia need to work together to bring Pakistan into the fold of the non-proliferation movement.27

Arms control and confidence-building measures. In the wake of the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security, as well as the 2002 Rome Declaration, NATO and Russia have continued to work cooperatively towards the implementation of the final act of the 1999 Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). They also continue to work towards the entry into force of the agreement of adaptation of
the CFE treaty, which would permit its accession by non-CFE states. Finally, both parties have taken practical steps to further implement the NATO-Russia Nuclear Experts Consultation Work Plan, with a particular emphasis on nuclear weapons safety and security.

**Theater missile defense.** Cooperation in this area has included: exploring the potential interoperability of anti-missile defense systems held by Russia and NATO member states; developing a common terminology and conceptual basis for TMD deployments (particularly in support of NATO-Russia crisis response operations); agreeing in principle to perform a detailed interoperability study on the technical requirements and possibilities associated with joint, combined TMD operations; and a TMD command post exercise held in March 2004 in Colorado Springs, Colorado, where NATO and Russian staffs used a computer simulation to exercise, examine, and test a jointly developed (and experimental) TMD concept of operations.

**Airspace management.** The Cooperative Airspace Initiative was one of the first major cooperation programs launched within the NRC framework. The fundamental objective of the initiative remains to foster cooperation on air-traffic management and air surveillance. Its underlying goals include enhancing air safety and transparency while seeking to counter the potential use of civilian aircraft for terrorist purposes, and developing ways to exchange situational data from various NATO systems while remaining in compliance with international standards.

**Military-to-military cooperation.** A key objective of NATO-Russia military cooperation remains improved interoperability, especially since modern militaries must be able to operate within multinational structures. Within this context, Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov has stated that he “would like to specially focus upon a renewed dialogue between NATO and Russia on the SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement). We believe that such agreement will lend an additional impetus to further cooperation in joint training and exercises, [and] to command-staff and troop field exercises to be held at training centers located upon national territories.”

Ivanov would also
like to build upon what the Russians see as an extremely important
document, the “Political Aspects of [the] Basic Concept for Russia-
NATO Joint Peace Support Operations,” which fixes the principles
of joint peacekeeping activity on a basis of equal rights. Finally,
Ivanov would like to sustain the current wide scope of military-to-
military cooperation, which involves the following ten steps, among
many others:

• Enhancing crisis regulation capabilities within the NRC.

• Generally elaborating on what is already the most dynamic of all
common activities—cooperation between the Russian and
NATO member navies. In 2004, for example, twenty of the over
one hundred agenda items on the Russia-NATO Council’s
docket dealt with naval problems, including developing subma-
rine crew search, rescue, and escape capabilities.

• Supporting NATO counter-terrorist maritime operations in the
Mediterranean (via Operation Active Endeavor).

• Making force protection assets as interoperable as possible.

• Establishing a NATO-Russia Joint Tactical Experiences Study
Group to analyze operational lessons learned from action in the
Balkans, including the tactics, techniques, and procedures used
in that region.

• Enhancing joint logistical support for peacekeeping operations.

• Accomplishing the activities scheduled for the joint exercise and
training program, including opportunities to exercise and assess
communications interoperability in maritime, air, and land envi-
ronments. (There were fifty-seven such activities in 2004 alone.)

• Staging joint military transport aviation maneuvers and perform-
ing related training tasks during peacekeeping operations.

• Ramping up the activities of the recently established (April
2004) Russian military liaison offices at NATO’s Operational
Command (in Mons, Belgium) and Transformation Command
(in Norfolk, Virginia), and of NATO’s existing military liaison
mission in Moscow, which will be strengthened with additional personnel.

- Building upon recently established educational exchanges, including those conducted by the NATO school at the Russian General Staff Academy and the Combined Force Academy. Russian educators, incidentally, will conduct reciprocal visits to the NATO school in 2005.

Because he is well aware of all of these activities, Minister Ivanov is right to observe that, “On the whole we [have] managed to start a practical dialogue between the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and NATO, obtain a considerable amount of information on the state of things in the sphere of operative compatibility, [and] draw up priority directions for future cooperation. In other words, we [have] reached a better understanding of each other; now we know in what direction we are moving.”

_Crisis Management._ As was briefly noted above, NATO and Russia are using their cooperative peacekeeping activities in the Balkans to conduct procedural exercises and build a generic concept for joint peacekeeping operations, which are intended to ensure smooth, constructive, and predictable efforts in the future.

_Defense Reform._ Since Russia and NATO both need armed forces that are appropriately sized, trained, and equipped to deal with a spectrum of 21st century threats and challenges, mutual cooperation has begun on specific aspects of defense reform, including the management of human and financial resources; macro-economic, financial, and social issues; and force planning. Exploratory work on how to improve the interoperability of Russian and NATO forces is also underway. However, a broader decision to develop cooperation on a general framework for defense reform is scheduled for 2005. Specific areas of concern within this framework include the evolution of military forces, and managing the consequences of defense reform for defense industries and military personnel.

_Logistics._ Given today’s reliance on mobile multinational operations, NATO and Russia need to coordinate and pool their resources wherever possible. NATO and Russia have therefore focused on de-
veloping mutual understanding in logistics, primarily by sharing information on doctrine, policies, structures, and lessons learned. The NRC’s Ad Hoc Working Group on Logistics, created in January 2004 and currently under joint civilian-military chairmanship, is also considering cooperative ventures in air transport and mid-air refueling.

Civil Emergencies. Cooperation between NATO and Russia on civil emergency planning dates back to the signing of a memorandum of understanding on civil emergency planning and disaster preparedness (1996), and to the subsequent establishment of a Russian-proposed Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (1998). Various seminars and disaster-relief exercises have followed these seminal events, including Bogorodsk 2002, Ferghana 2003 (hosted by Uzbekistan), and Kaliningrad 2004. In the last example, NATO, Russia, and partner countries tested their ability to respond jointly to a strategic-level disaster in an exercise and seminar held in Kaliningrad. The main aim of the exercise and seminar was to examine existing national, regional, and multi-national arrangements for consequence management following a mass casualty and environmentally disastrous terrorist attack.

Such exercises, according to Stephen Orosz, NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for Civil Emergency Planning and Exercises, are useful “not only to build confidence among all the participants, but to improve our ability to provide real practical help when needed.”30 They also create necessary momentum for further improvements, primarily concerning interoperability issues and the exchange of information and experience.

Science. More scientists from Russia have benefited from NATO science fellowships and grants than from any other partner country. This noteworthy level of cooperation began in 1998 with the signature of a memorandum of understanding on scientific and technological cooperation. Since then, the key focus areas within this category have revolved around terrorism—i.e., forecasting and/or preventing catastrophes; examining the social and psychological impact of terrorism; protecting against chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear attacks; and further improving explosives detection, cyber security, and transport security capabilities. Despite this level of activity, Russian Defense Minister Ivanov is impatient to proceed further.

He is also impatient to enhance the level of military and technical cooperation between NATO and Russia, which is still regrettably at a “fetal stage” of development. Promising avenues for cooperation in this area could include the following:

- Programs outlined as priorities in the Founding Act and the Rome Declaration, including TMD, ammunition disposal, and military hardware dismantlement;
- Upgrading and maintaining Soviet-made arms and military equipment currently in service with NATO states;
- Participation of Russian experts on a regular basis in activities organized by NATO technical agencies and committees.31

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Environmental protection is a prominent component of this category, including the development of a joint action plan that focuses on the prevention and elimination of ecosystem-level pollution by oil products, the environmentally friendly reclamation of former military lands, and conducting advanced training courses for military and civilian environmentalists on ecological protection and safety.

Four “Big Picture” Caveats to NRC-Led Cooperation in the Future

As the above survey shows, there has been undeniable progress in NATO-Russia cooperation under the auspices of the NRC. Either concrete action has already occurred in the twelve areas discussed, or it is being actively pursued. However, it would be both naïve and disingenuous not to acknowledge that broad philosophical differences may hamper cooperation in the future. In particular, an open dialogue over four unresolved issues needs to occur if NRC members (and partners) intend to move to the next level in their strategic-level cooperation.
First, Russia opposes the unilateral use of force, undertaken either by a state or a group of states, without a relevant UN Security Council mandate or outside the framework of commonly accepted international law, even in cases involving international terrorism. According to Defense Minister Ivanov, using “illegal techniques” is both wrong and, in practical terms, “next to impossible.”

Second, Russia remains seriously concerned about NATO operating in geographical zones it considers vitally important to its own national security. Ivanov expressed a common concern when he raised the following points: “We are told that the NATO infrastructures currently being set up in Eastern Europe are aimed at heightening … Alliance capabilities in the anti-terrorist fight. One could concede [that] some new facilities, say, in Romania or Bulgaria, might be utilized as ‘hopping bases’ for operations in the Near or Middle East. But who could kindly explain, to counter terrorism in what region [,] … the new NATO military facilities in Poland and the Baltics are planned for?”

Third, in Russia’s view there is a two-faced policy on the part of some NATO member states when it comes to distinguishing between Russia’s fight against terrorism on the one hand and fighting Chechen separatists on the other.

Finally, Russian leaders would like to see changes made to the rules governing Russian military movements across Lithuanian territory. In particular, they would like to conclude a formal bilateral transit agreement governing traffic to and from the Kaliningrad Oblast, on the Baltic coast. Lithuania, in contrast, believes that the regulations and procedures currently in place are well established and functional.

To repeat, then, the above concerns are large ones for the Russian Federation; they ultimately have to be addressed properly, either in memorandums of understanding or other additional protocols. If left unattended, they could potentially derail future NATO-Russia cooperation, both within and outside the NRC. Such a development would be unfortunate since, as the next section shows, feasible and mutually beneficial “next-step” actions are waiting to be accomplished.
Possible “Next Step” Options for NATO-Russia Cooperation

The NRC has led the way in promoting NATO-Russia cooperation, but there is added room for practical, near-term cooperation, both within the Council and with its partners. In fact, forty-three types of such “next-step” cooperation might be possible, loosely organized under thirteen general areas: military contacts and cooperation; structural integration; combined joint tactical forces; terrorism and its attendant threats; WMD non-proliferation, air defense and missile defense; crisis management and peacekeeping; arms control; defense sector cooperation; regional cooperation; environmental issues and emergencies; military education and training; economic cooperation; and general cooperation.

In the field of *military contacts and cooperation*, NATO and Russia could pursue the following options:

- Formulate specific principles and criteria for the use of force in the fight against terrorism, and for peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations;
- Increase mutual participation in each other’s exercises and in the formulation of NATO training scenarios;
- Activate a joint NATO-Russia brigade and use it in antiterrorism and peacekeeping operations;
- Activate a joint NATO-Russia naval task force (see Chapter Three);
- Establish closer cooperation between Russian troops located in the Kaliningrad Oblast and the multinational Danish-German-Polish corps headquartered in Szczecin, Poland, including joining of some Russian units with this Corps (see Chapter Three).

In the field of *structural integration*, NATO and Russia might consider the following options:

- Gradually increase mutual representation in each other’s organizations (with staff officers, liaison officers, etc.);
• Possibly integrate Russian personnel within the NATO Research and Technology Agency;
• Increase Russian participation in the activities of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE);
• Activate and rely upon a Euro-Atlantic regional security strategy group.

In the field of combined joint tactical forces (CJTFs), the following options might be appropriate:
• Develop principles for the joint use of CJTFs (e.g., organization; command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I));
• Consider integrating PfP members within CJTFs;
• Increase NATO’s reliance on Russian cargo transport aircraft for its troop and equipment airlifts.

In the field of fighting against terrorism and its attendant threats, NATO and Russia could pursue the following options:
• Activate an antiterrorism information center under the aegis of the NRC;
• Mutually train anti-terrorism personnel and cooperate in extraditing persons suspected of participating in terrorist activities;
• Cooperate further in the field of cyber security.

In the fields of WMD non-proliferation, air defense, and missile defense, NATO and Russia might consider the following areas of potential cooperation:
• Activate a joint U.S.-Russia early warning center, with possible NATO “spin-offs” at a later time;
• Better coordinate air defenses, including over the territory and space of European NATO member states;
• Form and operate a Transatlantic Missile Defense System that covers the territories of NATO member states and Russia;
• Jointly develop a tactical missile defense (TMD) system;
• Exchange more relevant information about possible WMD proliferation.

In the fields of crisis management and peacekeeping, the following options might be considered:
• Form joint peacekeeping headquarters and develop the conditions needed for the successful planning, command and control, and logistical support of joint peacekeeping operations;
• Pursue joint training of NATO and Russian peacekeeping forces.

In the field of arms control, NATO and Russia could consider such options as:
• Develop measures within the NATO-Russia Council to support and strengthen existing arms control regimes;
• Explore the possibility of Russian debt relief as part of a broad package of chemical disarmament programs (including the robust, U.S.-sponsored Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program).

In the fields of defense sector cooperation and the research and development of new armaments, NATO and Russia might consider the following options:
• Explore the possibility of Russian participation in the modernization of Soviet-made weapons used by NATO members;
• Include Russia in the research and development of new armaments for NATO;
• Increase NATO’s procurement of Russian armaments;
• Increase NATO-Russia cooperation in the military-technical sphere.

In the field of regional cooperation, NATO and Russia might consider such potential options as:
• Increase NATO-Russia cooperation in Central Asia, including efforts to maintain peace, peacefully settle conflicts, and act jointly in emergency situations;
• Explore possible plans for withdrawing Russian troops from Moldova (with possible financial assistance from NATO);
• Explore the possibility of working with the European Union (EU) to transform the Kaliningrad Oblast district into an “economic window” that will promote Russian economic development (this would also involve addressing difficult political, social, economic, and transport problems).

In the fields of environmental issues and emergencies, NATO and Russia could pursue the following options:
• Explore the possibilities of joint NATO-Russia actions in the event of nuclear, chemical, or biological disasters;
• Decommission Russian nuclear-powered submarines (to be discussed further in Chapter Three);
• Cooperate further in all forms of search and rescue operations;
• Cooperate in preventing the use of antipersonnel mines and chemical-biological ammunition (despite the misgivings of some NATO members on this point);
• Perform joint clean-ups of German chemical weapons dumped by the Allies into the Baltic Sea after World War II (see Chapter Three).

In the fields of military education and training, the options listed below might be potentially beneficial:
• Increase Russian participation in the Marshall Center, the NATO School, and the NATO Defense College (the involvement would include participating in the development of curricula and in the education and training of students);
• Activate a Russian training center not unlike the Marshall Center.
In the field of *economic cooperation*, the following options are worthy of consideration:

- Begin to envision what a NATO-Russia budget system might look like;
- Better coordinate the NATO-Russia relationship with the NATO-EU and Russia-EU relationships, with the aim of fully integrating Russia within the Euro-Atlantic political, economic, and military structures.

Finally, in the field of *general cooperation*, NATO and Russia could pursue the following options:

- Explore the possibility of assigning a leading security role to Russia in a multinational activity;
- Activate a joint European military and civilian air traffic control system;
- Further develop a new “culture of cooperation”—characterized by flexibility, compromise, understanding, etc.—among countries with different views and priorities in security matters.

If the NRC, its partners, or NATO and Russia in general act on at least some of the suggestions made above, general security cooperation will indeed progress to a new level.

**Summary**

Following the overall context provided by Chapter One, the purpose of this chapter was threefold: to identify areas where NRC cooperation has either occurred or is in variable states of progress; to highlight four “big picture” problems that might hinder future NRC cooperation if left unresolved; and most importantly, to identify possible “next-step” options for future cooperation that NRC members and their partners might want to pursue, in thirteen general areas. As has already been noted, however, a prime area of NATO-Russia cooperation has been the naval domain. Previous success in this area hardly precludes additional cooperation in this vitally important area in the future, as the following chapter will show.
Naval cooperation between NATO and Russia is one of the major success stories within the NRC. This does not mean, however, that further cooperation is not possible in this regard. In fact, it is both necessary and possible in nine functional areas:

1. Preventing the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems;
2. Combating terrorism, piracy, and other illicit activities at sea;
3. Decommissioning Soviet and Russian nuclear-powered submarines;
4. Mitigating the effects of chemical weapons released into the Baltic Sea after World War II;
5. Performing joint peace support missions;
6. Pursuing mine countermeasure cooperation;
7. Integrating logistics and sealift activities;
8. Joining Russian Baltic Fleet marine units with the Danish-German-Polish Multinational Corps;
9. Performing joint submarine rescue and escape operations.

However, if new forms of cooperation are going to succeed in the above areas, at least five new navy-centered framework documents will be necessary, as will organizational reforms on three levels. This chapter therefore examines these three key areas—documents, organizational reforms, and functional cooperation—in order to show how NATO-Russia naval collaboration could graduate to new levels of effectiveness in the future.
Necessary Framework Documents

Whatever common decisions or joint actions NATO and Russia take at sea in the future, they should occur within the general frameworks of the UN Charter, commonly accepted international law, the decisions of the NATO-Russia Council, as well as any relevant multilateral and bilateral agreements. The following naval agreements should remain in effect: the NATO-Russia Framework Document on Submarine Crew Rescue, the Framework Agreement on Submarine Emergency Crew Escape and Rescue, the Work Program for NATO-Russia Cooperation in Search and Rescue at Sea, and the Procedural Framework Document for Port Visits. However, if NATO and Russia intend to maximize their level of cooperation at sea, they should prepare and sign five additional documents as soon as possible.

The first is a *Political-Military Framework (PMF) for NATO-Russia Navy Operations*, which would set out the broad principles needed for political consultations and decision-making, close operational planning, and command arrangements in the maritime sector. In addition, by establishing these principles, the document would positively contribute to the ultimate decision-making authority of the NATO-Russia Council.

The second is a *NATO-Russian Navies Action Plan*, which would function as an issue-specific, results-oriented vehicle for practical cooperation in the following areas: WMD proliferation, international terrorism, peacekeeping and peace enforcement functions, and the management of environmental issues and civil emergencies. (These problems, incidentally, could also be dealt with on a region-by-region basis.)

Third is an overarching, day-to-day *Support Agreement*, which could include a cluster of accords on status of forces, host nation support, and security. A status-of-forces agreement, given that it would define the legal status of naval personnel present in the territory and waters of another state, would be particularly important here.

The fourth is a *NATO-Russia Navies Funding Agreement*, which would set out the general principles for funding NATO-Russia naval
cooperation. In particular, the agreement should clarify which costs would be eligible for NATO common funding, how these common funds would be administered, and which activities would have priority over others.

Last is a clearly defined set of *Maritime Maneuvering and Tactical Procedures*, which would provide naval maneuvering and signaling instructions for navy units that have not historically worked together and do not have any prior agreement on procedures. Some technical documents on Standard Agreements on Operating Procedures (STANEX) should also be made available.

**Necessary Organizational Reforms**

With the above five documents providing an expanded conceptual framework for NATO-Russia naval cooperation (along with pre-existing agreements), the Alliance and Russia need to create new organizations—in three tiers—if they hope to enhance their cooperation, joint decision-making, and joint actions at sea.

*Required First-Tier Organizational Changes to the NATO-Russia Council*

Russia is a PfP nation, but it also has a unique working relationship with NATO through the NATO-Russia Council. If this unique relationship is to flourish and expand in the naval sphere, three organizational adjustments need to be made within the NRC itself.

First, NATO and Russia need to establish a body of chief naval representatives (CNR) to the Council. This NRC-CNR group could be activated in the same way that military representatives were first introduced to the Council, and its primary duty should be to identify specific next steps for NRC-level naval cooperation.

Second, NATO and Russia need to establish a Naval Preparatory Committee (NPC) to serve as the main subordinate body to the chief naval representatives. The NPC’s job would be primarily to prepare and follow up on NRC-CNR meetings, although “reinforced” meetings at the committee level should occur on specific issues with the added involvement of subject matter experts.
Third, NATO and Russia need to establish a Naval Staff Support Group (NSSG) as an administrative center that would sustain the above organizations. More specifically, the support group could carry out exploratory staff contacts on specific issues and draft proposals, or collate agenda items for consideration by the Naval Preparatory Committee, which would then decide by consensus what the agenda of the CNR meeting should be. The chief naval representatives would then inform the NATO-Russia Council and its own subordinate organizations on the results of their meetings, and specify the cooperative naval endeavors the NRC might want to pursue.

**Required Second-Tier Organizational Changes: Establish a Joint NATO-Russia Naval Task Force Command**

If enhanced naval cooperation depends on three organizational improvements to the NRC structure, it also requires the creation of a joint NATO-Russia naval task force command (JNRNTFC), which would be attached to the Council and commanded on a rotational basis by NATO members and Russia. What Peter Zwack wrote about a potential NATO-Russia contingency command (NRCC) could also apply to the JNRNTFC:

> [T]he NRCC could comprise anything its designers and force planners design it to be and the forces and capabilities its members are willing to provide. A key determinant for its early establishment should be the envisioned purpose of the headquarters and whether it should be focused on aggressive and highly mobile conventional military [and naval] operations or more heavily on supporting sustained, civil-focused humanitarian and peace support missions. The best balance is probably somewhere in between.\(^{37}\)

The JNRNTFC headquarters’ structure, location(s), and funding should probably be as follows.

*Headquarters structure.* The JNRNTFC should have a “light and lean” headquarters that could be rapidly expanded (with pre-selected personnel) to command and control joint task force deployments and exercises. In addition to the usual sections found within any head-
quarters—personnel, intelligence, operations, planning, communications, logistics, etc.—this particular nerve center should also include the following elements:

• A Strategic Concepts, Policy, and Interoperability Group;
• A Future Capabilities, Research, and Technology Group;
• A Joint Education and Training Group;
• A Joint Experimentation, Exercises, and Assessment Group;
• A Joint Naval Task Force Command Center;
• A Joint Naval Task Force Non-proliferation Group;
• A Joint Intelligence Center on WMD Proliferation;
• A Joint NATO-Russia Naval Surveillance Center.

Command headquarters locations. At least initially, the JNRNTFC should be divided into two parts. The JNRNTFC–Southwest and Mediterranean would be responsible for the Mediterranean Basin and Suez Canal area, and it should be headquartered in a NATO member port in the Eastern Mediterranean. In turn, the JNRNTFC–Center would be responsible for the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Oman. It should be headquartered either in a Persian Gulf port, such as Bahrain, or a Red Sea port, such as Djibouti.

Command-level funding. Finally, funding for the joint command would ideally come from NATO infrastructure funds and from all the nations involved in the command. Russia could, however, offset the bulk of its JNRNTFC contribution by providing sealift, airlift, and some refueling capabilities to the command.

By fulfilling the above requirements, the JNRNTFC would have obvious symbolic and functional value. As with the NRCC proposed by Zwack, its “slated forces and capabilities” would provide NATO-Russia planners with “a truly sustainable, flexible asset, [that would be] responsive to multiple missions across a wide range of peace and military operations. A headquarters of this scale would also provide important planning and logistical ‘legs,’ giving the NRCC [or the JNRNTFC] the ability to conduct sustained operations, if required,
though clearly the preference for such a unit would be to get in, stabilize, and get out as rapidly as possible.”

On the debit side, the obstacles to creating this Naval Task Force Command would largely be threefold. According to Zwack, the first problem “would be primarily psychological” (i.e., the participants would have to free themselves from the “Cold War and Great Power ideological baggage” that they still might be carrying). Secondly, as Zwack points out in his comments on the NRCC (which could also apply to the JNRNTFC),

There undoubtedly would be times when the political or military realities of a proposed intervention would preclude NATO or Russia from using the combined NRCC [or the JNRNTFC] for a proposed contingency operation. It would be naïve to assume otherwise, especially with Russia’s sensitivity to operations in her geographical backyard, and the reluctance by some NATO members to become involved in operations deemed politically sensitive—for example, in a country or region where there may be disagreement about whether factions represent an internal independence movement or terrorists.

One basic solution to this problem, as suggested by former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, would be to amend the NATO charter to provide that an accepted goal of the Alliance would be “the maintenance of peace and stability on the Eurasian continent,” and that the Alliance “could act with less-than-unanimous consent.”

Third, there are operational barriers that a successful JNRNTFC would have to overcome—e.g., low levels of NATO-Russia linguistic, communications, and equipment interoperability; limited intelligence-sharing options; and a scarcity of common tactical techniques and procedures.

Finally, what about the Joint NATO-Russia Naval Task Force itself? As presently conceived, it would permit different national-level naval assets, sea-based aviation units, and marine contingents to serve together under a mobile command structure. It would be a non-standing, multinational force capable of acting on its own or together with the United Nations, the European Union, or antiterrorist and
peacekeeping “coalitions of willing.” Its composition and organization would depend on the mission at hand, but organizing the task force should ideally take no longer than thirty days. For example, a large-scale sea-air-land operation against terrorists and/or pirates might include an aircraft carrier with an air component, and approximately six escort vessels, including amphibious landing ships, marine and military police units, a supply ship, and a tanker. But what tasks would they perform? Again, the task force would accomplish the duties defined by the Political-Military Framework for NATO-Russia Navy Operations, which is one of the five needed documents recommended earlier. These tasks could include the following:

- Demonstrating the readiness of Russia and NATO to work together to promote peace, security, and stability in the maritime sector all over the world;
- Preparing and executing UN-authorized multinational anti-terror, anti-crime, and anti-piracy operations, along with providing safe navigation;
- Preparing and executing UN-sanctioned anti-WMD proliferation interception operations;
- Participating in multinational crisis-management operations, including peace support operations under the guidance of the UN or the NATO-Russia Council;
- Preparing and executing humanitarian rescue missions, including disaster relief efforts, upon demand;
- Actively pursuing naval transformation and defense reform at the national level.

**Required Third-Tier Organizational Changes: Enact Five Organizational Reforms below the Task Force Command Level**

With three new navy-centric NATO-Russia Council organizations in place, and with a joint naval task force command also in place, the final reform would be to create a series of organizations that would operate under their sponsorship and protection. These third-tier or-
organizations should include, in order of size and importance, the following.

- A Joint NATO-Russia Naval Logistics Command;
- Joint NATO-Russia Submarine Escape and Rescue Forces;
- A Joint NATO-Russia Naval Auxiliary Chemical-Toxin Protection Group;
- A Joint NATO-Russia Naval Task Force Training Center;
- Military liaison missions embedded in national-level navy staffs.

Given their relative importance when compared to the other required third-tier reforms, the first two organizations—a Joint NATO-Russia Naval Logistics Command and Joint NATO-Russia Submarine Escape and Rescue Forces—deserve further attention.

As an organization subordinated to the JNRNTFC and headed by a one- or two-star NATO or Russian admiral, the Joint NATO-Russia Naval Logistics Command (JNRNLC) would manage the logistical and technical requirements of NATO-Russian naval elements. Its structure might consist of the following four parts and their subgroups:

- A logistical support section, made up of five sub-groups: an operations, plans, and policy group; an acquisition group; a fleet inventory management and fuel service group; a naval auxiliary group, and an ordnance management service group;
- A sealift and airlift section, made up of three sub-groups: a naval sealift transportation service group; a naval aviation transportation group; and a cargo handling support group;
- A combat engineering support section, made up of a navy mobile construction battalion and underwater construction teams;
- A health affairs section, made up of three sub-groups: a fleet hospital, medical and dental facilities; sanitation facilities; and a mortuary affairs group.
What would these sections collectively do, both generally and as developers of needed materiel? In general terms, they might accomplish the following tasks:

- Manage the overall support services budget;
- Develop, prepare, coordinate, and monitor overall logistic support plans, including logistics forecasts; supply schedules, priorities, or requirements; and the resolution of urgent operational needs;
- Plan and coordinate the delivery of technical, logistical, and operational services;
- Provide specialized advice on technical and logistical matters to the Joint NATO-Russia Naval Task Force and other joint NATO-Russia naval structures;
- Exercise managerial and supervisory control over all logistics support required by future operations;
- Manage and supervise an integrated civilian-military support organization.

In more specific terms, the Joint NATO-Russia Naval Logistics Command should participate—both as a customer and a provider—in developing the following types of equipment particularly needed for joint NATO-Russia naval cooperation: computer systems, communications, and data links; navigation, oceanography, and meteorology systems, instruments, and equipment; diving equipment and submersibles; pollution detection, identification, control, disposal, and dispersal equipment; security and detection equipment; and search, rescue, and survival equipment.

The Joint NATO-Russia Submarine Escape and Rescue Forces need to be created in order to provide mutually effective joint capabilities for submarine escape and rescue. In terms of its actual composition, it might consist of the following elements:

- A staff and command and control unit;
- A naval detachment, including a “Mother Ship” and a submarine escape and rescue advisory team;
• A naval aviation search and rescue squadron;
• A submarine rescue unit;
• A submarine parachute assistance group;
• A submarine escape and rescue working group;
• A submarine escape and rescue liaison office.

Having identified the five new framework documents that NATO and Russia need, as well as the three-tiered organizational reforms that they require, we will now examine the prospects for enhanced cooperation in the following nine functional areas:

1. Preventing the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems;
2. Combating terrorism, piracy, and other illicit activities at sea;
3. Decommissioning Soviet and Russian nuclear-powered submarines;
4. Mitigating the effects of chemical weapons released into the Baltic Sea after World War II;
5. Performing joint peace support missions;
6. Pursuing mine countermeasure cooperation;
7. Integrating logistics and sealift activities;
8. Joining Russian Baltic Fleet marine units with the Danish-German-Polish Multinational Corps;
9. Performing joint submarine rescue and escape operations.

This chapter discusses each of the above functional areas in detail, and provides recommendations on how to achieve higher levels of cooperation in each area.
Stemming the Proliferation of WMD and their Delivery Systems

Nowadays one must take into consideration the fact that weapons of mass destruction are possessed not only by democratic governments but also by, to put it mildly, regimes that are less than stable. That is why we not only have to respond to new global challenges with the help of new methods and technologies, but [we] also have to act in agreement, as we did before.

Sergey Ivanov 43

Today’s greatest global security threats include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the transnational terrorist cells that might use them in mass-casualty strikes. These two phenomena are linked, as John Bolton, former U.S. Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and International Security (and current U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations), has observed. In Bolton’s words, rogue states, transnational terrorists, and WMD represent “a dangerous confluence of nefarious motives, and we must prevent … [each] one from abetting the other.” 44 Traditional arms control and non-proliferation efforts have not always proven effective in preventing the spread of WMD.

This is a troubling truth because, as U.S. Senator Richard Lugar has correctly pointed out, the next phase in the war on terrorism needs to focus on weapons of mass destruction. By forming a coalition to combat WMD-based terrorism, “Presidents Bush and Putin would be addressing arguably the most important problem in international security today. Such a coalition could provide both presidents with … the qualitatively new post-Cold War relationship they have propounded but to which they have yet to give major content. It would be a fitting replacement for the old-style bilateral arms control regimes whose era is drawing to an end.” 45 These are wise words, but just how might NATO and Russia go about pursuing effective joint actions against maritime-based WMD proliferation?
**WMD Materials and Equipment: Possible Joint NATO and Russian Restrictions on Transiting the High Seas**

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), since 1993 there have been 175 known cases of trafficking in nuclear materials and 201 instances of smuggling other radioactive sources. Of these known totals, only 18 cases involved highly enriched uranium or plutonium, although in amounts too negligible to help create a nuclear explosive device.46

How are materials like these actually moved about? According to Tamara Makarenko, a special correspondent for *Jane’s Intelligence Review* on international crime, maritime transport can play a major role in this type of illicit activity. Since over 80 percent of international trade is by sea, the sheer volume of goods entering the world’s harbors means that port or customs officials seldom inspect a cargo’s documentation in depth, let alone its actual contents.47 (The paperwork can include shipping papers or manifests; shipper’s certificates for dangerous goods; transfer manifests; invoices; letters of credit; customs entries; delivery receipts; and end-user certificates.48) Most of this documentation is presumably legitimate, but it is difficult to prevent some portion of it from being forged or altered to facilitate the spread of illicit arms, including WMD and missiles.

A potentially effective way to deal with proliferators and their bogus documentation is to “preempt” them—i.e., NATO and Russia could jointly work through the NRC to either prevent or control the seaborne transfer of WMD materials and technologies by arms traffickers. In particular, the following items might be included in a jointly developed (and much-needed) “No Transit List” for illicit materials:

- Highly enriched uranium;
- Plutonium;
- Cesium, americium, iridium, and cobalt isotopes;
- All types of nuclear weapon-related equipment and materials, including uranium hexafluoride and uranium centrifuges;
• Any kind of nuclear technology-related equipment and documentation;

• Any kind of chemical weapons, including mustard gas; phosgene; chlorine; sarin; tabun; V-type blister, blood, and choking chemical agents; and dual-use chemicals such as dimethyl methylphosphonate and ricin;

• Any kind of chemical weapons-related equipment and documentation;

• Biological agents and toxins, including those specifically linked to anthrax, cholera, smallpox, plague, botulism, typhoid, tularemia, bird flu, foot-and-mouth disease, severe acute respiratory syndrome, encephalitis, Crimea-Congo hemorrhagic fever, staphylococcal enterotoxins, and dysentery;

• Any kind of biological weapons-related equipment and documentation;

• Complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload up to 300 km away;

• Complete unmanned aerial vehicle systems (including cruise missiles, target drones, and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload up to 300 km away;

• Individual rocket stages, solid and liquid propellant rocket motors, and guidance sets;

• Weapons or weapon-safing, -arming, -fusing, and -firing mechanisms used in rocket systems and UAVs;

• Lightweight turbojet and turbofan engines;

• Liquid and slurry propellant control systems and their specially designed components;

• Liquid oxidizer substances, including dinitrogen trioxide, nitrogen dioxide, dinitrogen pentoxide, mixed nitrogen oxides, inhibited red fuming nitric acid, etc.;
• Any kind of rocket and missile-related equipment, software, and documentation.

With this “No Transit List” firmly in hand, NATO and Russia should additionally create a joint naval task force non-proliferation group within the framework of a NATO-Russian Navies Action Plan. The group would conduct UN Security Council-sanctioned maritime counter-infiltration operations to prevent WMD proliferation, primarily through sea survey and control, and by intercepting, escorting, blockading, or boarding and inspecting ships or vessels suspected of carrying the banned items catalogued above. Ideally, these activities would take place near the territorial waters of actual or suspected traffickers, including for example the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea (for North Korea); the Arabian Sea (for Pakistan); and the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and the Mediterranean (for Middle Eastern actors). Finally, while operating in these areas, the non-proliferation group could perform additional and more specific tasks, including joint surveillance; regular patrols; the coordination of surface responses; the inspection of all ships and vessels flagged under a proliferator nation or known proxy and destined for high-interest areas; and the possible seizure of illicit materials and/or documentation.

**What Additional Steps Should NATO and Russia take to Prevent WMD Proliferation, Particularly in the Maritime Sector?**

In addition to creating a joint naval task force non-proliferation group that would seek to interdict the movement of illicit materials and technologies by sea, NATO-Russia counter-proliferation efforts should additionally consider the following points.

• Everyone should recognize that intelligence agencies cannot provide a totally reliable picture of the WMD proliferation problem as it exists today (as many experts have noted, the absence of evidence may not be evidence of absence). In addition, proliferators do not require the same level of quality control as do state actors (they are “less concerned about safety and are able to meet their needs with only a few, less accurate, less
Another risk is that, whether for strategic or financial reasons, technology transfer between proliferators is now pervasive, and thereby helps accelerate the pace of development of particular programs.\textsuperscript{51}

• NATO and Russia should jointly develop guidelines and legal regimes that strengthen their counter-proliferation efforts, particularly in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).\textsuperscript{52}

• NATO and Russia should step up their joint efforts to secure and safeguard highly enriched uranium of Soviet origin, which presently exists in the nuclear fuel stocks of twenty research facilities in seventeen countries, and to secure and safeguard the spent nuclear fuel of what are now Russian decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines.\textsuperscript{53}

• NATO and Russia should cooperate in securing and safeguarding Russian nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities and storage sites. NATO could provide, for example, detector systems and security cameras to help deter the theft of WMD materials.

• NATO and Russia should create a joint containers surveillance system.

• NATO and Russian navies should be equipped with common automatic radiological, chemical, and biological agent detection and identification systems.

• Within the framework of a Joint NATO-Russia Naval Task Force Command, we should create two complementary organizations: a Joint NATO-Russia Intelligence Center on WMD Proliferation and a Joint NATO-Russia Naval Surveillance Center (NRNSC). The latter organization in particular could help plan multinational surveillance activities, coordinate multinational surveillance and response activities, and control surveillance operations. To support these activities, the NRNSC should use a range of surveillance and detection technologies, including INMARSAT, UAVs, underwater surveillance detection and monitoring systems, warships and patrol boats with
high frequency surface wave radars, high-resolution cameras, infrared sensors, and radar-equipped fixed-wing patrol aircraft and helicopters, combining surveillance and constabulary duties.

- NATO and Russia should cooperate in developing improved biological, radiological, and chemical countermeasures. For example, close cooperation between military and naval medical research institutes for infectious diseases could lead to the creation of new vaccines. Cooperation between naval engineering institutes could lead to new air systems within warships in which particle retention and high-intensity UV sterilization components would work together to remove and destroy disease-bearing pathogens before they can enter the human body. Finally, close cooperation is needed to develop pre- and post-treatment radiological and chemical countermeasures, including post-chemical attack self-administered injection systems, barrier creams to prevent liquid agents from reaching the skin, etc.

- NATO and Russia should inform each other when their strategic ballistic missile and guided missile submarines, both nuclear and diesel/electric, are either absent or present in waters where only minimal estimated missile flying times apply. Obviously, reliable information about the presence or absence of NATO or Russian submarines in these areas could help prevent misguided reactions to provocations actually caused by third parties.

- The Joint NATO-Russia Naval Task Force Non-proliferation Group should be interoperable with civil emergency planning and crisis management agencies, coast guards, and customs organizations. By the same token, the officers and staff of the Joint NATO-Russia Naval Task Force Non-proliferation Group, the Joint NATO-Russia Naval Surveillance Center, and the Joint NATO-Russia Intelligence Center on WMD Proliferation all need to be trained and prepared for joint multinational action against WMD proliferation, as decided by the UN Security Council and the NATO-Russia Council.
Combating Terrorism, Piracy, and other Illicit Activities in the Maritime Sector

The world’s oceans cover 70 percent of the planet’s surface, while more than 80 percent of international trade is conducted by sea. To support this level and scope of activity, more than 46,000 vessels and some 4,000 ports make up the world’s maritime transport system. But the sea also offers transit and access to the enemies of international peace and security, including terrorists and criminals and their lethal cargoes. At the present time, Al Qaeda and its allies are thought to pose the greatest danger to the maritime sector, whether against warships and commercial vessels, or against naval bases, ports, and related facilities. In particular, five types of direct or indirect threats deserve consideration.

First, most vessels travel either in isolation or small convoys, and many of them carry highly flammable materials such as oil or liquefied gas. Attacks against such ships when they approach a harbor could cause a large-scale maritime catastrophe, which could potentially disrupt regional trade patterns for a long period of time (Al Qaeda operatives have already flirted with a similar idea, as illustrated by their failed June 2002 plot to bomb American and British warships, as well as commercial oil tankers, in the Gibraltar Strait).

Second, mega-cruise ships carrying upwards of five thousand passengers and crew members could become “trophy targets” for ambitious terrorist groups. As one naval figure has noted, “A terrorist attack against such ships would not only lead to large numbers of casualties, but also threaten the economic viability of the entire cruise industry.” Seizing or damaging smaller ships, however, has political value as well, as illustrated by the January 1996 seizure of a Turkish passenger ferry by pro-Chechen terrorists in the Bosporus. Similar seizures could also occur in Aegean and Black Sea areas adjacent to the Straits.

Third, Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups could use nuclear or radiological dispersal devices to conduct waterborne attacks against coastal nuclear power plants. The human and economic costs of such an attack could be extreme.
Fourth, piracy has historically been an economically-driven activity, while terrorism has been a politically-driven one. However, since financial resources are essential to fund today’s terrorist operations, piracy may increasingly overlap with maritime terrorism. The piracy phenomenon is already a considerable one. There were 2,300 registered instances of piracy in the last decade, including 445 incidents in 2003 alone.\textsuperscript{59}

Fifth, terrorist groups could lease ships to smuggle or transport weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, to various ports in the world.

The above dangers provide NATO and Russia the motivation to protect the maritime sector from the interrelated threats of terrorism, piracy, and illegal trade (including drugs). Successfully defending against these threats, however, first depends on NATO and Russian leaders answering four fundamental questions: Who are their common foes? How do they operate? Where do they operate? And how might the NATO and Russian navies cooperate to combat them effectively?

**Potential (and Common) Enemies at Sea**

Before listing common foes, it is important to acknowledge that maritime terrorists do not all operate in NATO’s traditional areas of responsibility. But if NATO is increasingly going to operate outside the Euro-Atlantic area in order to thwart potential asymmetric threats, it has to clarify its possible role against maritime actors whose ties to more immediate threats are growing (either via shared operations or in sub-contracting roles). Besides, Russia’s re-ascendence as a Pacific naval power is inevitable, so any maritime anti-terror cooperation between NATO and Russia that is focused on areas closer to Europe (the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, etc.) will ultimately have to consider holistic next-step options in the Pacific as well.

With the above caveat firmly in mind, it is obvious that the Al Qaeda organization is a maritime foe common to both NATO and Russia. According to a March 2002 report released by Norwegian intelligence, Al Qaeda owned about twenty-three ships at the time,
including ocean-going merchant vessels that were being operated or chartered through front companies in Liberia, Panama, and the Isle of Man.60

Whether these ships were operational tools or mere money-making enterprises is an open question, but there is no doubt that Al Qaeda operatives have always been interested in staging maritime assaults, as illustrated by the waterline suicide attack on the USS _Cole_ in Yemen in October 2000, the attack on the French supertanker _Limburg_ in October 2002 off the coast of Yemen, and the thwarted operation to attack American and British warships while in Ceuta, in the Strait of Gibraltar. (The Al Qaeda operatives had planned to sail from Ceuta and Melilla, the two Spanish enclaves situated on Moroccan territory, and to use inflatable Zodiac speedboats loaded with explosives to launch suicide attacks on the ships patrolling the Strait.61)

The Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah has also plotted or been linked to various maritime terrorist operations, as well as to sea-borne weapons smuggling. In the late 1990s, for example, Singapore’s Internal Security Department discovered a plot by a Hezbollah cell to bomb American and Israeli ships docked in Singapore.62 Additionally, Hezbollah served as one of the “coordinators” for a sea-based smuggling operation conducted by the _Karine_, a 4000-ton freighter intercepted by Israeli naval commandos in the Red Sea in January 2002.63

In addition to Al Qaeda and Hezbollah, there are several other Middle Eastern terrorist organizations that are reportedly interested in developing operational maritime capabilities, including the Egyptian groups Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Other groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which is highly innovative in its tactics, willingly sub-contract their maritime transportation assets to those who want them.

The Free Aceh Movement (_Gerakin Acen Merdeka_, or GAM), which is based in Aceh on the northern tip of the Indonesian island of Sumatra, is an internationally recognized terrorist group that uses violent tactics to try to compel the Indonesian government into rec-
ognizing Aceh as an independent Islamic state. GAM’s attacks, particularly those against oil companies, are terrorist by design and effect. The guerrillas who attacked the Indonesian-flagged product tanker *M/V Cherry 201* in January 2004 were clearly members of the Free Aceh Movement.\(^{64}\)

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which means “Bearer of the Sword,” was formed out of the fractured Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1999, and has also been known to engage in maritime terrorism. It is engaged in a violent insurgency campaign designed to create an Islamist state on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao. The ASG finances its operations through common robbery and international contributions, but it also generates significant revenue from piracy and kidnappings, particularly of foreign nationals. Approximately 140 individuals have been kidnapped by ASG since mid-2002.\(^{65}\)

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who have been waging an on-and-off civil war in Sri Lanka for many years, covertly use their maritime fleet to import military equipment from foreign suppliers. They also board vessels without permission, attack and destroy Sri Lankan naval boats and ships, and damage or hijack foreign-owned civilian vessels in Sri Lankan waters, particularly when they are transporting equipment that the LTTE wants or needs.\(^{66}\)

Narco-terrorists and the Colombian FARC (the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejercito del Pueblo*, or the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–Army of the People) also deserve analysis here. Colombia remains at the center of the international cocaine trade, which generates enormous profits by shipping drugs by air, river, or sea to neighboring countries, the United States, and Europe. The drugs are usually concealed in containerized cargo, bulk cargo, or hidden compartments built into fishing vessels, speedboats, and commercial cargo ships.

The FARC combines terrorist and criminal activities in its operations, and is widely considered to be the world’s preeminent narco-trafficking terrorist organization. Together with its purely criminal drug-trafficking counterparts, it is part of a sophisticated worldwide
logistical infrastructure and drug supply network. The FARC employs light aircraft that parachute cocaine loads to waiting boats, ocean-going yachts, and other vessels. It uses the latest technology, including the Global Positioning System (GPS), to organize yacht-to-yacht drug transfers, and it purchases the services of foreign technical specialists. During an anti-drug sweep in September 2000, for example, the Colombian National Police found a partially built 100-foot steel-hulled miniature submarine in the Colombian jungle. The $20 million submarine, if completed, could have been used to transport up to ten metric tons of illicit drugs from Colombia to remote off-load sites in Latin America and the Caribbean, while remaining at snorkel depth the entire time.

The maritime terrorist actors discussed here may not all be of equal concern to NATO and Russia at this time. Discussions and prioritizations on how to deal with the most dangerous threats cooperatively in the near term are necessary. Yet, if NATO-Russia maritime cooperation is going to be suitably comprehensive over time, an awareness of all the possible foes is important, especially if Russia and the Alliance are going to cooperate with each other or at least sub-contract on each other’s behalf.

**High Risk Regional Waterways (Where and How our Foes Might Operate)**

Where and how might some of the above organizations actually operate? To what extent might they operate around the politically unstable coastal waters of the Middle East—Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, Egypt, Yemen, and even Somalia—and around critical straits elsewhere?

To prevent new progress in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, for example, Iranian-backed terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah, and Palestinian rejectionist groups might carry out maritime attacks against specific vessels in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Persian Gulf. Warships and commercial vessels near or in Yemen’s main port remain at great risk because the country is an undeniable crossroads for international terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda and various Egyptian groups, which might stage new attacks in the area.
Further, on the strategic routes near the Horn of Africa—along the southern approaches to Bab el-Mandeb, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal—members of Somali-based militia groups continue to employ high-speed sea craft (armed with small arms, mortars, and rockets) to seize vessels and hold those on board for ransom.\textsuperscript{70} How much of the ransom money goes into terrorist activities remains an open question.

In terms of critical choke points, no less than one-third of global trade and two-thirds of the world’s liquefied natural gas transits through the Straits of Malacca, which are situated between Malaysia and the northern tip of Sumatra. Maritime terror attacks in this area could have a profound economic impact, as could attacks in other high-risk waterways navigated by oceangoing tankers, such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb passage from the Arabian Sea to the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal. All transiting tankers in these confined areas are vulnerable to terrorist attacks and shipping “accidents.”

The sources of these “accidents,” in Middle Eastern waters or choke points farther afield, could include the following:

- Small, bomb-laden suicide craft (such as the vessel that damaged the USS Cole);
- Putting a prepared vessel’s steering mechanism on autopilot and aiming it towards a harbor or in the direction of a targeted ship;
- Using submarines in various applications, especially mini-subs and vessels with stealthy designs to reduce their detectability by radar;
- Launching WMD from ships, with potentially catastrophic consequences;
- Hijacking or using oil tankers or ships carrying liquefied gas for suicide missions;
- Hijacking passenger cruise liners, ferryboats, or other vessels carrying people;
- Using WMD or explosives-laden ultralight airplanes or electric motor-driven swimmer delivery vehicles;
• Mining shipping lanes;
• Using cyberspace and Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation in maritime applications.

**Joint NATO-Russia Naval Cooperation against the Terrorist Threat**

How might NATO and Russian naval assets work together to combat an enemy with no borders, no government, and no inhibitions about violently breaking the rule of law? There are nine possible steps that NATO and Russia collectively might take to ensure their greater safety.

1. The NATO-Russia Council should develop a joint NATO-Russia naval concept for defense against terrorism, piracy, and criminals in the maritime sector within the framework of the NATO-Russian Navies Action Plan and the Political-Military Framework for NATO-Russia Navy Operations. The key principle of the concept should be that it is preferable to deter or prevent terrorist and criminal attacks than to deal with their consequences. As British Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, British Commander-in-Chief Fleet (CINC-FLEET) and Commander [NATO] Allied Naval Forces North, rightly points out, the most effective time to deploy naval force is before engaging an enemy (at long range, if necessary), and certainly before he attacks. These anticipatory steps can include actively protecting the home base, projecting power into distant theaters, and denying sanctuaries to enemies.\(^{71}\)

Does this line of reasoning go far enough? In fact, NATO and Russian naval assets should jointly prevent, deter, and disrupt potentially hostile acts not just near home bases and coastlines, but also in high-risk regional waterways like the Eastern Mediterranean, the Strait of Gibraltar, the Red Sea (i.e., the Bab el-Mandeb passage and the Gulf of Aden), the Persian Gulf, Sri Lankan waters, Caribbean and Colombian waters, the South China Sea (including relevant areas around Indonesia and the Philippines), and in the “center of gravity” of seaborne piracy—the Bay of Bengal and Malacca Strait region.
In conducting these operations, however, NATO and Russia need to remember that their foes will almost inevitably strike suddenly and unexpectedly, and against vulnerable areas. To counter these advantages, joint NATO-Russia naval forces will require knowledge superiority, a capacity for greater interoperability with other nations and services, and higher states of readiness.

2. NATO and Russia should pursue a common three-step strategy in high-risk regional waterway areas: secure needed freedom of navigation from local actors, including those nations immediately affected by NATO-Russia operations; as required, carry out UN Security Council-sanctioned joint sea-air-land counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, and/or counter-crime operations in high-risk regional waterways; and deploy military escort and patrol ships in order to protect civilian vessels and conduct surveillance.

3. NATO and Russia should ensure that their common naval task forces are interoperable with existing civil emergency planning and crisis management agencies, coast guards, and customs organizations.

4. NATO and Russia should develop a shared and effective joint container surveillance security system (JCSSS) to inspect cargos before they leave their homeports. This system, which would feature automated exchange of information, could not prevent attacks on the high seas, but it might help reduce the risk of terrorists sneaking explosives or nuclear materials into targeted ports, along with illegal drug trading, immigration, and human trafficking.

5. NATO and Russia should create and disseminate a new international ship and port facility security code (ISPS) among the NATO states and Russia. This ISPS code should meet security-related requirements for governments, port authorities, and shipping companies. Within this system, for example, all ships of 500 gross tons and over would have to be equipped with a ship security alert system that would covertly notify shore authorities (within a Joint NATO-Russia Naval Task Force Command) about possible trouble.
6. The system described above could also provide a long-range identification and tracking procedure for merchant ships, since the code would require clear details on the ownership and origin of the vessel in question. By implementing this system, a Joint NATO-Russia Naval Task Force Command Center could not only fight piracy and prevent possible terrorist attacks, but also better control traditional smuggling, weapons-specific smuggling, and human trafficking. It would do this by having available “a comprehensive catalogue of all commercial shipping, ship movement, cargoes, destinations and hazards” that the center could use, as needed, in crisis situations. Such “fingerprinting” would also help in tracking suspicious ships.

7. NATO and Russia should pursue greater cooperation in the following key areas of interest: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; databases on terrorist and criminal activities; early warning; electronic countermeasures; cyber security; decontamination capabilities; and advanced command and control. Absent this cooperation, NATO and Russia will not know how to thwart or defend against terrorist attacks on naval assets and land-based installations at home and abroad.

8. NATO and Russia should develop a layered maritime defense system made up of surface search radars (especially high-frequency, over-the-horizon wide-area maritime radars to detect and track small surface and low-flying airborne targets); electronic support measures; thermal imaging devices; light acoustic arrays (acting as barriers through which terrorists must pass); active sonar systems (which would be critical for detecting and tracking electric motor-driven swimmer delivery vehicles); and ship-based helicopters and early warning aircraft (to patrol airspaces, naval facilities, and port infrastructures, and to intercept airborne threats such as ultralight or model aircraft attempting to penetrate protected airspace over fixed naval installations).

9. NATO and Russia should jointly train their naval components to conduct military operations against maritime terrorists and criminals, as required by the UN Security Council and/or the NATO-Rus-
sia Council. More specifically, they should use joint computer-
simulated exercises to train needed staff officers.

The above suggestions will require a major and sustained effort by
everyone involved, but the ultimate prize is worth striving for—
namely, that high-risk waterways and ports will be as safe and secure
as possible, and will therefore not be used as points of origin for un-
expected terrorist attacks.

Decommissioning Soviet and Russian Nuclear-Powered
Submarines

One of the most successful areas of naval cooperation between
NATO members and Russia thus far has involved the decommission-
ing of the latter’s nuclear-powered submarines. According to the
Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (FAEA), formerly known as
the Atomic Energy Ministry, Western financial aid has helped Russia
scrap 118 of its nuclear submarines up through 2004. (On average, it
takes approximately two-and-a-half years to scrap a nuclear subma-
rine’s hull and three months to unload its fuel.) This is certainly
heartening news, as are plans to recycle an additional forty to forty-
five submarines by 2007;75 the construction (begun in July 2004) of
the first land-based storage facility for discarded nuclear submarine
reactor units in Russia (fifty retired Northern Fleet reactor units will
eventually populate the facility, some as early as the end of 2005);
and the installation of the PICASSO automated radiation monitoring
system in a shipyard in Murmansk Oblast.

However, as praiseworthy and necessary as the above activities
are, demand continues to outpace the supply of assistance. Foreign
investments in the decommissioning program are expected to top
over 2.1 billion rubles, but FAEA experts claim that the funds needed
for just “primary work” amount to US$4 billion.76 To cite one exam-
ple, fifty-six nuclear submarines await decommissioning in the Bar-
ents Sea region, but there is only enough money to dismantle a por-
tion of them. (Canada has bravely committed to disposing of fifteen
submarines in the near term.) Lack of funds also translates to a pau-
city of spent-fuel storage facilities available in Russia today. Due to the large number of submarines awaiting dismantlement, it will take years before technicians remove all the fuel from retired submarines that have simply been left to rust along the Arctic and Pacific coasts. Therefore, even more help from NATO member states would be welcome for the following purposes:

- Additional decommissioning activities for the Russian Northern and Pacific Fleets;
- Added and improved coastal infrastructure to support the above programs;
- Further training and technologies to support the above programs (ideally from Germany, Norway, the U.K., and the U.S. for shipyard workers);
- Improved environmental monitoring and the capacity for joint NATO-Russia action in the event of an emergency.

Protecting Against Chemical Weapons Released into the Baltic Sea after World War II

After World War II, the victorious Allies simply dumped Nazi chemical weapons into the ocean. In particular, they dumped them in six places: in Norwegian waters near the town of Arendal; in Skager-rak, near the Swedish port of Lysekil; in waters near the Danish islands of Fyn and Bornholn; in waters near the Swedish island of Gotland; and near the extreme northern part of Denmark-Skagen. As a result, approximately 302,875 tons of chemical weapons (one-fifth of wartime Germany’s total stock) remain at the bottom of the Baltic Sea. This amount includes the following:

- 71,469 aerial bombs (250 kg) loaded with mustard gas (yperite, so named after its extensive use at Ypres in World War I);
- 14,259 aerial bombs (250 kg and 500 kg) packed with chloracetophenone (a form of mace), diphenylchlorarsine (known as “sneezing gas”), and arsine (a gas derived from arse-
nic), and 50 kg bombs containing Adamsite (diphenylaminearsine, a vomiting agent);

- 408,565 artillery shells (75, 105, and 155 mm) loaded with mustard gas;
- 34,592 chemical landmines (20 kg and 50 kg) packed with mustard gas;
- 10,420 smoke mines (100 mm) containing mustard gas;
- 1,004 holding tanks loaded with 1,506 tons of mustard gas;
- 8,429 barrels packed with 1,030 tons of Adamsite and diphenylchlorarsine;
- 169 tons of materials containing poison gases (sodium cyanide, chlorarsine, etc.);
- 7,860 cans of Zyklon B, which was most infamously used in Nazi death camps.\(^79\)

At present, 5–6 mm shell casings represent the thin metal line between safety and danger, but they corrode in seawater at a rate of .1 to .15 mm per year. The problem, therefore, is obvious: the large-scale poisoning of European coastal waters by mustard gas and other chemical agents is about to begin. Shell casings will burst “under the pressure of overlying shells,” and “salvo” emissions are a distinct possibility. Sea currents might then carry these chemicals over huge distances.\(^80\) Since mustard gas mixes well with water, the poisoning of Baltic and North Sea fish stocks is a real danger. Given such a threat, what role might the navies of NATO members and Russia play in dealing with it?

First, the navies must share any and all information about the status of these dumping grounds. Second, they should work to jointly model where and when “salvo” emissions might occur. Third, they should develop and apply common preventive measures. The best solution here may be to build “chemical weapon warehouses” at the bottom of the Baltic Sea (by using hermetic casings, sarcophagi, hardened concrete or polymer-concrete structures, or a form of “poisonous stuffing” that would prevent the toxins from being carried
away by sea currents). The alternative method—using liquid nitrogen or other cryogenic technologies to raise the bombs and shells onto special vessels, which would then carry them to more remote burial or disposal sites—is too dangerous and expensive to consider. Fourth, the respective navies should establish a joint NATO-Russia naval auxiliary chemical-toxin protection group, which could include Danish, Estonian, German, Latvian, Lithuanian, Norwegian, Polish, and Russian auxiliary vessels capable of monitoring suspect sites, conducting decontamination operations, and building underwater “warehouses.” PfP navies from Sweden and Finland could also participate in these vital activities.

Performing Joint Peace Support Missions

UN peacekeeping activities normally involve operations authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VI of the UN Charter (“Pacific Settlements of Disputes”). Because of their mobility and flexibility, naval forces often participate in these activities. They can position themselves close to areas where ethnic and civil conflicts are taking place; they can control coastal waters, the coast itself, and the airspace above it; they can loiter offshore for long periods of time and provide support and/or reserves in case of emergencies; and, perhaps most importantly, they can perform all these functions at a time when “red carpet entry” on land becomes a rarity. What peace support functions might NATO-Russia naval assets perform? They could, for example:

- Enhance diplomatic efforts to prevent or end armed conflicts between (or within) littoral states;
- Support UN resolutions to secure or maintain ceasefires;
- Provide safe navigation;
- Deliver humanitarian aid;
- Conduct maritime embargos;
- Perform a myriad number of operational tasks—e.g., enforce no-fly zones; provide sea-based close air support for UN troops and
UN-declared safe areas; perform mine detection and clearance tasks; evacuate foreign citizens and refugees; stage amphibious operations; and conduct intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance-oriented patrols.

However, if NATO and Russian naval forces are going to accomplish the above tasks effectively, their leaders have several tasks ahead of them. First, they must work to develop a joint naval peace support concept to support peacekeeping and/or peace enforcement operations within the Political-Military Framework for NATO-Russia Navy Operations and the NATO-Russia Navies Action Plan. As part of this concept, there should be general agreement on when and where joint NATO-Russia naval forces might respond to a UN Security Council request, but not necessarily as a UN force *per se*.

Second, naval leaders must understand clearly that UN peace support operations should be conducted in a joint forces context—i.e., they should involve land, air, and naval forces. “Sea power alone cannot secure or maintain the peace,” especially in conflict areas where “combatants do not depend heavily on sea-borne supply.”83

Third, NATO and Russian navies must develop operational plans specifically designed to activate tailored NATO-Russia naval task forces, deploy them into areas of conflict, and accomplish the operational tasks listed above. Fourth, they must train and exercise the maximum number of NATO-Russia naval formations, commands, and authorities possible for peace support missions. Finally, all parties must cooperate and coordinate with other interested actors, including NGOs, the EU, the OSCE, the Economic Community of West African States, etc.

**Mine Countermeasures**

Mine warfare is an essential element of naval warfare, especially in littoral zones. Over fifty nations today have the ability to acquire or manufacture sea mines. The latter are not only relatively inexpensive and easy to deploy; they now include (or are about to include) new camouflage coatings, advanced propulsion systems, potent warheads
(with delayed arming mechanisms), and sophisticated search modes (including magnetic, acoustic, seismic, “underwater electrical potential,” and pressure-dependent modes). With such capabilities, sea mines are ideal tools for campaigns of mass disruption. If NATO and Russia want to work together to localize and/or neutralize this threat, they might want to take some of the following steps:

- Develop a joint NATO-Russia mine countermeasures concept and a follow-on concept of operations.
- Work together to stop or impede the export of sea mines and/or their production technologies to unstable regimes.
- Establish NATO-Russia surface mine countermeasures forces (JNRSMCMCF) within the Joint NATO-Russia Naval Task Force structure. These forces should be able to identify the locations of sea mines and clear them out of high priority sea lanes of communication and areas of operations. The JNRSMCMCF might consist of a mine countermeasures command and control ship, mine countermeasures surface vessels, heavy-lift helicopters, marine reconnaissance divers, explosive ordnance experts and divers, and an unmanned underwater vehicle detachment.
- Conduct well-publicized combat mine-hunting, minesweeping and mine-clearance operations during joint naval exercises. These operations should occur in high-traffic areas (the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Suez, the Straits of Gibraltar, the Straits of Dover, Bab al-Mandeb, the Bosporus/Dardanelles, Skagerrak, Kattegat, etc.) in order to demonstrate the futility of sowing mines within them.
- Pursue joint research and development to reduce the mine-igniting “magnetic signature” of ships, including R&D on onboard degaussing systems and stationary magnetic measuring systems.
Integrating Logistics and Sealift Activities

To combat maritime terrorists, criminals, and WMD proliferators effectively, NATO and Russia should create a multinational naval logistics system of a new type. The policies and principles behind this system should be as follows:

- **Responsibility.** In all circumstances, NATO members and Russia should share the responsibility of provisioning joint NATO-Russia naval task forces, and thereby exploit the benefits of bilateral and multinational economies of scale.

- **Authority.** At the same time, local NATO and Russian commanders should be able to establish logistics plans and requirements within their areas of responsibility. A smaller number of commanders (at agreed upon levels) should then have the temporary authority to redistribute specific logistic assets to overcome unanticipated deficiencies during actual operations.

- **Cooperation and coordination.** Cooperation between NATO and Russian logistical authorities is essential for effective interoperability, as is cooperation with other multinational or regional organizations. This cooperation should extend to the design and common production of logistic systems and equipment.

With the above principles firmly in place, practical NATO-Russia naval logistics cooperation could focus on the following steps. First, the naval forces should develop a procedural framework document for joint naval logistics actions and a joint NATO-Russia naval logistic action plan for peace, crisis, and combat maritime operations within the Political-Military Framework for NATO-Russia Navy Operations and the NATO-Russia Navies Action Plan.

Second, the navies should establish a joint NATO-Russia naval logistic command with a sealift coordination center. By maintaining a database that mixes and matches assets and requirements, the center would coordinate the chartered and indigenous sealift capabilities of NATO states and Russia, and offer the same services to other interested bodies (the UN, the EU, antiterrorist coalitions, etc.). To re-
duce costs and compound effectiveness, the center could also be co-located with a NATO-Russia airlift coordination cell.

Third, the parties should develop a future joint naval logistic technologies concept (FJNLTC) that stresses the importance of direct heavy equipment transfers by commercial container ships at sea, seabased joint command and control, intra-theater high-speed sealift, and heavy airlift delivery (by doubling helicopter baseline capabilities, for example). 86

Fourth, the respective navies should conduct team visits, staff talks, seminars, and workshops in order to promote information exchanges, harmonize and standardize logistics concepts, policies, and procedures, and improve the interoperability of logistics equipment, especially tanker and pipeline systems.

Finally, working together, the navies should promote materiel readiness through consolidated procurement.

Joining Russian Baltic Fleet Marine Units with the Danish-German-Polish Multinational Corps

The Danish-German-Polish Multinational Corps began operations on 18 September 1999, reaching full readiness in the fall of 2000. It is stationed in Szczecin, Poland, near the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, and is made up of three divisions: Denmark’s Jutland Mechanized Division from Fredericia (18,000 troops), Germany’s 14th Division of Armored Grenadiers from Neubrandenburg (19,000 troops), and Poland’s 12th Szczecin Prince Boleslaw the Wrymouth Mechanized Division (12,000 troops). In peacetime, the only active part of the corps is its staff, which is capable of performing crisis management and peacekeeping functions (by commanding all or part of an assigned mission), or conducting humanitarian operations, including providing emergency aid in the event of natural disasters in Central Europe. 87

The close proximity of at least part of the above corps and its staff to Kaliningrad raises a tantalizing possibility. In order to both normalize and improve relations between this Russian enclave and its NATO neighbors, would it not be worthwhile to intensify coopera-
tion between Russian units and the Danish-German-Polish Corps? This unit could act as an “ambassador” to promote mutual good will; it could provide a bridgehead for follow-on Russian military integration into NATO structures; and it could be used in humanitarian actions, disaster relief operations, and in missions mandated by the UN Security Council or other organizations responsible for maintaining international peace and security (in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter).

But what would (or should) a Russian contribution to the Multinational Corps look like? In the first couple of years, it could be the equivalent of a Baltic Fleet Marine combined company, consisting of a headquarters section, a Marine scout platoon, a Marine CBRN reconnaissance and protection platoon, and a Marine mine clearing engineer platoon. This structure would be ideal for combating terrorism and piracy, preventing WMD proliferation, and supporting UN peacekeeping operations. After two years, however, the combined company could be expanded into a Baltic Fleet Marine assault battalion, which could then be transformed into the equivalent of a fully supported regiment. In all cases, the location of this professionally manned unit and its liaison officers should be near the Danish-German-Polish Corps staff in Szczecin, Poland. The liaison officers would provide communications and coordination between NATO and the Russian Ministry of Defense, and between the corps’ staff and the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet headquarters. The unit’s day-to-day tasks could include guarding and protecting the staff; helping prepare for joint combat and combat support actions; participating in tactical exercises; and studying English.

Performing Joint Submarine Rescue and Escape Operations
After the Kursk tragedy of August 2000, in which 118 Russian submariners died, NATO and Russia made a concerted effort to cooperate in submarine rescue and escape operations. They signed the NATO-Russia Framework Document on Submarine Crew Rescue and the Framework Agreement on Submarine Emergency Crew Es-
cape and Rescue. They also developed the work program for NATO-Russia cooperation in search and rescue at sea.

These documents specify that NATO and Russia will work together to standardize search and rescue procedures, collaborate in developing the necessary equipment, exchange relevant information, and conduct joint exercises. But what do these aspirations mean in real terms? Successful collaboration may well depend on the following steps being taken.

First, everyone should understand that escaping from a distressed submarine without outside assistance is not unprecedented, but it is hazardous. The maximum possible depth for a controlled free ascent is just 180 meters—notwithstanding the risks of embolisms, the “bends” (caused by nitrogen absorption into the bloodstream), hypothermia, and being washed away by tides. Given all these potential problems, the consensus within the submarine community is that, in most scenarios, the safest option is to await rescue.89

Everyone should also understand that an improved capacity to rescue personnel from submarines depends on improved standardization—e.g., compatible communications (whether VLF radios, underwater telephones or simple banging-on-the-hull “tap codes”); common command-and-control message formats; and standardized escape hatches, rescue vehicle skirts, ventilation points, and hose arrangements.90

Another step is that the navies involved should establish a NATO-Russia Submarine Escape and Rescue Working Group to improve standardization. An annual meeting, for example, could be chaired by a serving NATO (or Russian) submariner, and it could explore ways to standardize NATO-Russian equipment and procedures.

The navies should also work to develop and field a new standard NATO-Russia submarine rescue system (NRSRS). According to Philip Sen, the key user requirements for the system should be as follows:91

- *Availability*. The NRSRS should have at least a 98 percent availability rate for emergency rescues.
• **Location.** It should be capable of deploying and operating worldwide, except for ice-covered areas.

• **Environment.** It should take into account the likely environmental conditions to be found in intervention and rescue operations.

• **Evacuation.** The time-to-first-rescue standard should be under seventy-two hours for primary areas of operation.

• **Rescue numbers.** The NRSRS should be capable of rescuing up to 150 personnel from a distressed submarine.

• **Depth.** The maximum rescue depth should be no less than 600–700 meters.

• **Rescue pressure.** The NRSRS should be able to rescue trapped personnel under a range of internal submarine pressures.

• **Angle.** It should be able to operate at rescue angles of up to 45–60 degrees from the horizontal.

• **Trapped personnel.** The NRSRS should be capable of operating without assistance from trapped submarine personnel.

In addition, the Russian and NATO navies should collaborate to design and produce a new RESUS system (REscue system for SUBmarineS) that permits a submarine to surface rapidly in emergency situations. More precisely, the system should be designed to empty the main ballast tanks of a submarine at all diving depths and within a very short time; it should work independently from other on-board systems in emergency situations; and it should be able to stabilize a submarine’s attitude immediately, and thereby permit the boat to rise safely to the surface.92

Other steps include developing a comprehensive set of rescue scenarios for a wide variety of conditions, developing and procuring a new submarine escape and immersion equipment suit capable of keeping survivors alive for at least seventy-two hours on the surface, even in harsh weather conditions, and periodically training NATO and Russian submarine crews under difficult physical and psychological conditions—e.g., in darkness, without ventilation, and/or living
on a restricted diet. Finally, all navies involved must promote human and materiel readiness to improve the efficiency of joint submarine escape and rescue operations.
NATO continues to develop its relationship with Russia, a former adversary that now finds common cause with the Alliance in the post-9/11 world. The common threats they face include:

- International terrorism;
- The proliferation of WMD and their delivery vehicles;
- Growing demographic problems and ethnic instability;
- The illicit activities of radical religious communities and groups;
- Illegal drug trafficking;
- Organized crime;
- The “centrifugal disorder” associated with failed states (i.e., political oppression, economic distress, and absent institutions);
- The transnational migration of thousands of violent and well-trained religious-political militants who have refused to adapt to the conditions of peaceful life.

All of the above threats could lead to crises or armed conflicts affecting Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian stability. To deal with them properly, NATO and Russia should continue to take joint action to strengthen security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.

Of course, this working relationship has not always been smooth. In fact, since 1991 the NATO-Russia march towards partnership can be divided into six phases:

- **Phase 1**: December 1991 to late 1993 – An idealistic honeymoon;
- **Phase 2**: 1994 to early 1997 – Cooperation and a new realism;
- **Phase 3**: Spring 1997 to spring 1999 – A new “special relationship”;

...
• **Phase 4**: Spring 1999 to summer 1999 – Kosovo and its aftermath;

• **Phase 5**: Summer 1999 to fall 2001 – A cautious return to normalcy;

• **Phase 6**: Fall 2001 to the present – 9/11 and its aftermath.

In the current phase, the need to engage Russia in the struggle against the new breed of security threats is obvious. Its intelligence capabilities, political influence in relevant regions of the world, heightened sensitivity to threats, and geography make it an indispensable partner for NATO in its efforts to establish peace and security. The Alliance fully understands the value of this partnership, which is why the NATO-Russia Council was created as a principal venue to advance it. Progress has already occurred in twelve working areas, but a meeting of the minds needs to occur in four others if the NRC is to achieve a higher level of strategic cooperation. These lingering stress points cluster around the unilateral use of force, NATO activities in geographical zones which Russia considers vitally important to its national interests, an ambivalent policy on the part of some NATO states towards Russia’s fight against Chechen separatists and terrorists, and bilaterally agreed upon transit rights through Lithuania to and from Kaliningrad.

Despite the above areas of disagreement, many types of “next step” cooperation are possible between NATO and Russia, in thirteen general areas: military contacts and cooperation; structural integration; combined joint tactical forces; the fight against terrorism and its attendant threats; WMD non-proliferation, air defense and missile defense; crisis management and peacekeeping; arms control; defense sector cooperation; regional cooperation; environmental issues and emergencies; military education and training; economic cooperation; and general cooperation.

In particular, however, NATO and Russia have the opportunity to build upon an area that is already a success story—naval cooperation. Improved cooperation will depend on the following:
• **New framework documents**, including a Political-Military Framework for NATO-Russia Navy Operations; a NATO-Russian Navies Action Plan; an overarching, day-to-day support agreement, which could include a cluster of accords on status-of-forces, host nation support, and security; a NATO-Russia Navies Funding Agreement; and clearly defined maritime maneuvering and tactical procedures.

• **Organizational reforms**, including attaching a body of chief naval representatives to the NATO-Russia Council; implementing a joint NATO-Russia naval task force command that directs joint NATO-Russia naval task forces; embedding military liaison missions in national-level navy staffs; and establishing a joint NATO-Russia naval logistics command, joint NATO-Russia submarine escape and rescue forces, a joint NATO-Russia naval auxiliary chemical-toxin protection group, and a joint NATO-Russia naval task force training center.

• **Enhanced cooperation in nine functional areas**, including the prevention of WMD proliferation (along with their delivery systems); combating terrorism, piracy, and other illicit activities at sea; decommissioning Soviet and Russian nuclear-powered submarines; mitigating the effects of chemical weapons released into the Baltic Sea after World War II; performing joint peace support missions; pursuing mine countermeasure cooperation; integrating logistics and sealift activities; joining Russian Baltic Fleet marine units with the Danish-German-Polish Multinational Corps; and performing joint submarine rescue and escape operations.

By pursuing these adaptations and reforms, NATO-Russia security cooperation can indeed be raised to the next level. Some of these suggestions are immediately actionable, given the political will, while others might be achieved over time. In all cases, however, it is imperative to reinforce the notion that such discussions depend upon “art of the possible” when it comes to creating a shared security space that is both peaceful and prosperous.
NOTES


4 Ivanov, “The Armed Forces of Russia and Its Geopolitical Priorities.”


7 Smith, “A Bumpy Road to an Unknown Destination,” 60.

8 Vladislav Chernov highlighted some of the major Russian concerns regarding PfP in an article in Nezavisimaya Gazeta on 23 February 1994. He argued that PfP was primarily a repository for “the anti-Russia sentiments of our former friends,” that the program was a subterfuge to
“ensure a U.S. military presence in Poland and Hungary,” and that by focusing on bringing former Soviet and Central European armed forces up to NATO standards, the program would work to the detriment of Russian arms manufacturers, who had traditionally dominated the market in these areas.


11 Ibid. See also www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/fndact-a.htm for the full text.

12 Smith, “A Bumpy Road to an Unknown Destination,” 65.


14 Smith, “A Bumpy Road to an Unknown Destination,” 70.

15 Putin quoted in Smith, ibid., 72.

16 Ibid.


19 Fritch, “Building Hope on Experience.”


21 Ibid.

23 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ivanov, “Russia-NATO: Strategic Partners in Response to Emergent Threats.”
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
36 See NATO-Russia Council-Military Representatives Organizational and Administrative Arrangements, NRC-MRSM-001-02, 9 December 2002, 1.
Zwack states that “few standing assets should be permanently assigned to the organization, though a wide mix of national dual-hatted and multi-function military and peace support units and detachments could be designated” for the command. 

Ibid., 92.

Ibid., 99–100.

James A. Baker III, “Russia in NATO?” The Washington Quarterly 25:1 (Winter 2002): 102. (See also http://www.twq.com/02winter/baker.pdf) According to Zwack, a revised consensus rule would mean that, “If specific NATO countries and Russia were to disagree over the appropriateness of a proposed deployment, conceivably national components of the NRCC [or the JNRNTFC] could still act as a ‘coalition of the willing’ as long as Russia was involved and the mission supported general UN principles.” See Zwack, “A NATO-Russia Contingency Command,” 101.

Zwack, “A NATO-Russia Contingency Command,” 100.


Sergey Ivanov, “Russia-NATO: Strategic Partners in Response to Emergent Threats.”


Robert Hutchinson, “The Struggle for Control of Radioactive Sources,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (1 April 2003): 34.

Ibid.


Newman, “Arms Control, Proliferation and Terrorism,” 70.

Ibid.

Among other things, the PSI is an “international partnership” created by the United States and other nations to stop and seize shipments of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and related missile technology. (See http://www.state.gov/t/np/c10390.htm for a further explanation of the initiative.) The well-known MTCR is an informal non-treaty-based association of governments that share common interests in the non-proliferation of missile, UAV, and related technologies.

On 26 May 2004, the U.S. Secretary of Energy, Spencer Abraham, launched the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, a program designed to remove and/or secure high-risk nuclear and radiological materials and equipment around the world that pose a threat to the United States and to the international community. As part of this program, the U.S. hopes to repatriate all “fresh” highly enriched uranium fuel from former Soviet territories to Russia by the end of 2005. The initiative also calls for the return of all spent fuel by 2010. See www.energy.gov/engine/doe/files/dynamic/264200491138_Vienna_GTR_Fact%20Sheet_FINAL1_052604%20.pdf#search='Global%20Threat%20Reduction%20Initiative.


Ibid., 31.


Ibid., 52.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid., 11–12.

Ibid., 12.
