<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Rachael Gosnell</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">A Divided Arctic: Is an Ice Curtain Emerging?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Arctic</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">climate</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategic competition</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2024</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2024</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">129-142</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The era of Arctic exceptionalism has ended, bringing uncertainty to a region with tremendous strategic and economic potential. With Finland and Sweden joining the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, the Arctic faces an unprecedented division: around half of the Arctic aligns under the NATO flag, while the other half remains Russian. Climate change is a critical factor driving regional activity, and the warming trends are affecting the region’s economic development, infrastructure, and military activity. With Western sanctions blocking technological and economic cooperation with Russia, China is well-positioned to fill the gap. The “no limits” friendship between Russia and China facilitates increased Chinese investment and presence in a region historically wary of non-Arctic states. This article will examine how climate factors enable both the strengthened ties among like-minded Western Arctic nations and the growing relationship between Russia and China to assess whether a new “ice curtain” is emerging as strategic competition intensifies in the Arctic.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">129</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Victoria Vdovychenko</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Natalia Albu</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nika Chitadze</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Navigating the Trilemma of (In)security: Strategic Competition in the Black Sea Region</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Black Sea region</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">geopolitics</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">military threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategic competition</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategic trilemma</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Türkiye</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">United States</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2024</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2024</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">117-128</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article explores the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the Black Sea region within the complex dynamics of major-power competition, focusing primarily on the interests and strategies of the United States, China, Russia, and other regional players. It highlights the region’s major threats and challenges, ranging from military threats and hybrid operations to socio-economic and ecological concerns. These multifaceted challenges are leveraged by key stakeholders to advance their interests, further complicating the strategic landscape. This complex geopolitical environment, fraught with risks and competition, underscores the need for a nuanced understanding of the dynamics at play. The article introduces the concept of strategic trilemmas in the Black Sea region, involving the active participation of Türkiye, Ukraine, and pro-Western littoral states (Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia) on one side, with Russia on the opposing side. Addressing the region’s challenges requires a comprehensive approach to promote stability, security, and cooperation. While Russia’s influence remains a concern, the potential for reducing its dominance and increasing cooperation in the Black Sea region offers bilateral and multilateral collaboration opportunities in this crucial geopolitical theater.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">117</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Falk Tettweiler</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Strategic Competition and the Battle of Narratives: A Sociopsychological Perspective</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">competition</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cooperation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategic narratives</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">United States</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2024</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2024</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">173-190</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Strategic competition and the concept of being in a struggle currently shape the mindsets and the construction of the social reality of policymakers, academics, and the public. This article analyzes how U.S. policymakers and analysts, the Russian leadership, and the Chinese Communist Party perceive the current security situation. It also explores the often-underestimated role of strategic narratives. By summarizing the key points of the strategic narratives of the United States, Russia, and China, the article discusses the implications of the competitive mindset on humanity’s ability to address essential global security challenges</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">173</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Matthew Neumeyer</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Strategic Competition and U.S. National Strategies</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">National Security Strategy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategic competition</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Thucydides Trap</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2024</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2024</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">33-45</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Strategic competition has significantly reframed American strategic thought, particularly its national security and military strategies, by defining the threats to American primacy and the rules-based international order posed mainly by China and Russia. However, the term &quot;strategic competition&quot; is not universally understood within the U.S. government, leading to varying perspectives on how to proceed. Additionally, it does not adequately address how competitors approach international competition, creating a risk of miscalculation and an increased chance of conflict. Finally, for the United States, strategic competition establishes a framework that perpetuates challenges for American strategy and the use of elements of national power. While &quot;strategic competition&quot; is necessary to focus and drive American strategy and strategic calculus, it is also a vague and imperfect construct that could lead decision-makers down consequential paths.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">33</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Elikem Fiamavle</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Aida Marie Stéphanie Naoule</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Martin Schuster</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Unfolding Geopolitical Events Suggest a New Order in Strategic Competition - Perspectives from West Africa</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Africa</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Europe</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategic competition</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">United States</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2024</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2024</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">143-158</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The world is witnessing a fundamental change in the international system. The international politics will likely evolve into a competition of systems in a multipolar world. This shift has significantly influenced how African countries interact with the rest of the world. African states have entered an era of choice. The narrative of Africa being the &quot;Dark Continent&quot; is transforming into one of a &quot;rising continent,&quot; with interactions increasingly involving a growing number of &quot;non-traditional actors.&quot; Some African governments have increasingly embraced economic, diplomatic, and security ties with Russia. Africa’s abundance of strategic resources, favorable demographics, and attractive growth prospects give its leaders leverage in global affairs. 
Africa's relationship with the West has been complex, producing both positive and negative impacts. Neither capitalist-oriented nor socialist African governments have been able to transform the continent. A general sense of disappointment and frustration prevails among Africans toward Western powers, stemming from unfulfilled promises that democracy would lead to development and economic growth. Building trust and credibility will require greater European transparency regarding their interests, minimizing policy incoherencies, and addressing the gaps between European offerings and African needs.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">143</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Andrew Borene</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dinos Kerigan-Kyrou</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Balkans at a Crossroads: Security, Integration, and the Future of Europe</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Balkans</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">European Union</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security sector reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">transatlantic institutions</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2023</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2023</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-7</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Balkan Peninsula has long been shaped by shifting borders, competing nationalisms, and complex geopolitical dynamics. But while the region is often discussed as a singular geopolitical entity, the reality is far more nuanced. Like all of Europe, the Balkan Peninsula is an intricate patchwork of proud nations, cultures, languages, and histories - each with its own distinct trajectory toward political and economic development. This diversity means that there is no universal formula for integration into European and transatlantic institutions. Instead, tailored engagement--one that accounts for local histories, security needs, and economic disparities--is essential to building a stable and prosperous future. While the conflicts of the 1990s left an enduring imprint of war and humanitarian crisis, today’s focus is on the role of NATO and the European Union in fostering stability, economic growth, and security cooperation.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mikael Weissmann</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Chinese and Other Foreign Influence in Serbia and the Western Balkans: A Tale of Cooperation, Competition, and Distrust?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">BRI</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EU</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign influence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign interference</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">psychological defense</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Serbia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Turkey</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Western Balkans</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2023</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2023</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9-26</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Adopting a storytelling approach, this article unravels the intricate narratives of cooperation, competition, and distrust that define the interactions between Serbia, China, and the European Union. Using on-site observations and personal narratives, the article vividly portrays the complexities and nuances of Serbia’s multifaceted relationships with key global actors. It provides stakeholders with a nuanced understanding, enabling informed and conscientious decision-making. The contrasting approaches of China and the European Union toward Serbia highlight a strategic opportunity for the country, which can--and does--exploit the rivalry to its own advantage by balancing the two against each other.
As the largest country in the Western Balkans, Serbia has a long and complex historical relationship with its neighbors and the European Union. It is a critical actor for major powers seeking to engage in the region and is occasionally described as Europe’s “inner courtyard” due to its pivotal geographical and strategic role. Serbia’s significance in this geopolitical puzzle cannot be underestimated. It is not merely a result of its status as the largest country in the Western Balkans; rather, its importance transcends geographic considerations.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">4</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">9</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">James K. Wither</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Warfare Revisited: A Battle of ‘Buzzwords’</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategic competition</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">United States</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Warfare</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2023</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">22</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">7-28</style></pages><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid warfare is the most common term used by commentators to describe the complexity and multifaceted character of contemporary warfare. Hybrid warfare refers to coercive methods of strategic competition that take place below the threshold of conventional military conflict and is usually applied to the blend of military and non-military methods of warfare employed by the West’s principal adversaries, Russia and China. The term hybrid warfare has evolved from an essentially military concept to one that potentially embraces all the instruments of state power. Hybrid warfare remains an ill-defined and contested term, and there are many other buzzwords, such as irregular warfare, hybrid threats, and gray zone aggression, that are used to describe the same phenomenon. This article examines the evolution of thinking on hybrid warfare and these related concepts. It highlights the challenges that scholars and practitioners have faced in trying to define and apply these terms in the policy environment in a manner that promotes common understanding and strategic coherence.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ron Matthews</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The Case for an Economic NATO</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">economic coercion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">economic diplomacy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">economic NATO</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">geoeconomic threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">geoeconomics</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25-39</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article examines the need for liberal democracies to respond to the growth of economic bullying, coercion, gunboat diplomacy, and geoeconomic pressure undertaken by Russia and China. The political call for an economic NATO-type international organization is growing louder following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resultant constraints imposed on food and energy supply, and China’s bullying of the tiny NATO and EU state, Lithuania. This article chronicles examples of Russian and Chinese economic sanctions and the impact of China’s geoeconomic diplomacy before identifying and explaining actual and potential western policy responses, especially the establishment of an Economic NATO.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ho Ting (Bosco) Hung</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Distorting Your Perception of Russia’s Aggression: How Can We Combat Information Warfare?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">digital citizenship</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disinformation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">propaganda</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia-Ukraine war</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">77-101</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Despite the brutality of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, support or sympathy toward Russia is shown by some actors on the international stage. This could be attributed to the multi-facet information warfare conducted by Russia and its strategic partner China. However, the analysis of information warfare during the current war remains scattered. This article, therefore, adopts a documentary analysis of relevant documents and media sources to conceptualize the forms of information warfare used by these two countries to contribute to future studies. It then proceeds to discuss that the Russia-Ukraine war implies a growing use of information warfare in present and future wars under digitalization. Facing a growing threat posed to people’s cognitive understanding, the democratic community has to be aware of this increasingly dangerous military strategy and develop corresponding solutions. This article suggests that different societal stakeholders must collaborate to develop comprehensive education and thus strengthen digital citizenship. This is vital to nurturing people into critical and responsible citizens, thus equipping themselves with the resilience needed to combat information warfare.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">37</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Andras Hugyik</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Leadership Theories and Defense Reform in the People’s Republic of China</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">army</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">combined operation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">development</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">intelligence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">leadership theories</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">mission-oriented leadership</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">reform</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">socialism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategic deterrence</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Winter 2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25-44</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is currently a hybrid social system that ideologically has retained the core values of the Marxist doctrine, which, unlike its predecessors, can adapt and innovate in response to changing circumstances. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and public administration underwent a series of deep reforms that enabled them to become a facilitator rather than a hindrance to development. The meritocratic leader selection system known as “selection and election,” consistent with the Confucian tradition and adopting some western leadership principles, played a significant role.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is also considering the application of Western leadership principles not typically associated with the military. However, no evidence exists that the PLA systematically seeks to apply these concepts. The PLA is likely to complete defense reform and enhance the combat capabilities of its strategic and new types of forces, establishing a high level of strategic deterrence and complex systems for conducting joint combined operations. Towards that end, PLA applies Western non-military leadership principles and a mission-oriented leadership model, considering Chinese specificity.
Based on indirect Chinese, Russian, American, and Hungarian sources, the article presents contemporary Chinese socialism, analyzes the impact of political, social, economic, and defense reforms and the significance of leadership on China’s development, describes Western and Chinese leadership theories, and outlines China’s development prospects.
On the future of the PRC, the author states that, unlike other communist parties that gained power with foreign help, the CCP is indigenous and has national roots. Therefore, it is unlikely to collapse due to mass discontent. More likely, the Party will continue to transform the country and itself in the coming years and continue its rule. It is conceivable, however, that this transformation will eventually lead to a top-down revolution that will gradually break down the foundations of socialism.
</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">25</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Anna Kovalenko</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Neo-Authoritarianism and Leadership: Outcomes for Modern Ukraine</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">authoritarianism</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defense</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">democracy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">EU</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">ideology</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">mentality</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">mobilization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">political regimes</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">politicization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Putin</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">105-120</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article examines the notions of authoritarianism and neo-authoritarianism as well as their features in terms of ideology, mentality, mobilization, and politicization of a population, state control, level of political pluralism, and leadership style. Incorporating evidence from reviews, surveys, and scientific research, the study identifies the main difference between the regimes and opposition to democracy, providing samples throughout history with different characteristics, causes, and backgrounds. It presents a vision of authoritarianism as an intermediate stop on the path of a particular state to democracy or totalitarianism. Finally, this article reflects upon Ukraine’s future in the European paradigm and contrasts it with Russia. Ukraine is at a crossroads and must continue to carefully navigate toward the institutionalized democracy it has begun to establish.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">105</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hilton L. Root</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">How Networks of Social Cooperation Scale  into Civilizations</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">comparative development</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Europe</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Networks</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">political economy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">structural transformation</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-29</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article analyzes structure and function in the network design of historical regimes of China and Western Europe to build a theory for the development of societies and states from endogenous mechanisms of social change. It shows how their respective network structures evolved independently but share a global property: both are small worlds, meaning that any node in the network can reach any other node by a small number of steps. Probing the variations in network topologies and their role in diffusion and scaling, the author accounts for differences in formal institutions, interpersonal trust, cultural norms, and moral protocols. Network structure as an independent variable moves the discussion of the divergence of East and West beyond the conventional, centralized China versus decentralized Europe debate. It allows us to identify an overlooked driver of structural change in the polity, helping to discern better what sets the development of world civilizations apart.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Flemming Splidsboel Hansen</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China, Russia, and the Foreign Policy of the SCO</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cohesion</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign policy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">India</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Iran</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kazakhstan</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Kyrgyzstan</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">modalities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Mongolia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">observer status</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pakistan</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Shanghai Cooperation Organization</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tajikistan</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Uzbekistan</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2012</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2012</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">95-102</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue></record></records></xml>