<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Nika Chitadze</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Warfare in the Black Sea Region: Russian Information-Psychological Operations in Georgia</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Black Sea</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disinformation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">fake news</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Georgia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">information-psychological operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">manipulation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">South Caucasus</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2024</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2024</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23</style></volume><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This research analyzes the information-psychological operations employed in the hybrid war conducted by the Russian Federation in the Black Sea and South Caucasus regions, with a specific focus on Georgia. The article presents concrete examples of these operations in Georgia, examining their tactics, methodology, key features, target audiences, and effects. It also evaluates Georgia's position and the outcomes of its responses. The relevance of the issue has increased significantly after Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and the onset of the large-scale war.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>13</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Isabel Lettner</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Propaganda in Armed Conflict: Exploring Legal Ambiguities and Civilian Engagement</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">armed conflict</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">civilians</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">direct participation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disinformation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">distinction</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">propaganda</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia-Ukraine war</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">social media</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ukraine</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2024</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2024</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23</style></volume><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This article addresses the question of whether civilians engaged in disseminating propaganda can be construed as direct participants in hostilities. It focuses on the gaps created by a lack of international law provisions governing the use of propaganda during armed conflicts. The research contends that the categorization and classification of propaganda are vital, given the increasing employment of harmful digital information. An example of Ukrainian strategic communication campaigns illustrates the slippery slope created by easily accessible social media platforms and the danger posed by civilians spreading these so-called “strategic communication campaigns.” The research explores how the principle of distinction and the notion of direct participation apply to Ukrainian civilians. This article finds that multiple gray areas exist when analyzing the applicable legal frameworks surrounding the dissemination of propaganda. The study concludes that civilians spreading propaganda do not qualify as directly participating in hostilities, as the three-prong test of the International Committee of the Red Cross is not met.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ho Ting (Bosco) Hung</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Distorting Your Perception of Russia’s Aggression: How Can We Combat Information Warfare?</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">China</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">digital citizenship</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disinformation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">propaganda</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia-Ukraine war</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">77-101</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Despite the brutality of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, support or sympathy toward Russia is shown by some actors on the international stage. This could be attributed to the multi-facet information warfare conducted by Russia and its strategic partner China. However, the analysis of information warfare during the current war remains scattered. This article, therefore, adopts a documentary analysis of relevant documents and media sources to conceptualize the forms of information warfare used by these two countries to contribute to future studies. It then proceeds to discuss that the Russia-Ukraine war implies a growing use of information warfare in present and future wars under digitalization. Facing a growing threat posed to people’s cognitive understanding, the democratic community has to be aware of this increasingly dangerous military strategy and develop corresponding solutions. This article suggests that different societal stakeholders must collaborate to develop comprehensive education and thus strengthen digital citizenship. This is vital to nurturing people into critical and responsible citizens, thus equipping themselves with the resilience needed to combat information warfare.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">37</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Lada Roslycky</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Philipp Fluri</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Putin’s Last War: Narratives, Counternarratives, and Early Lessons Learned</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disinformation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Forecasting</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Global Health Engagement</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Information warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Interoperability</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">narrative</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Professional Military Education</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">propaganda</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-8</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">In the early hours of February 24, 2022, the armed forces of the Russian Federation and armed formations of the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics attacked Ukraine from the north, east, and south. In parallel, Russia conducted massive cyberattacks and propaganda campaigns. To the surprise of many analysts, Ukraine demonstrated exceptional cohesion, resilience, and will to fight. The raging war is already influencing the international security environment and the thinking on societal preparedness, military capabilities and operations, and will continue to do so in the coming decades. This editorial article presents the early lessons learned from the war, with a focus on Russia’s propaganda narratives and information warfare and ways to counter them, the role of professional military education, and combat medical support.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Inez Miyamoto</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Disinformation: Policy Responses to Building Citizen Resiliency</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">citizen resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">digital literacy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disinformation</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2021</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spring 2021</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">20</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47-55</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Maligned actors use fake social media accounts and automated tools, also called computational propaganda, to launch disinformation operations. While technology companies and researchers continue to advance computational propaganda detection, they also know that eradicating social bots and disinformation is impossible. Since computational propaganda continues to increase, governments need to focus their efforts on developing policies that decrease citizen demand for disinformation. The purpose of this article is to explore disinformation at the intersection between technology and citizen resiliency. First, the current landscape will be explored to understand the impact of disinformation on society and its citizens. Second, the effect of technology on the supply of disinformation will be examined. Third, methods to decrease the demand for disinformation will be considered to increase citizen resiliency.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">47</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Stanislav Atanasov</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity Risks and Challenges in the Covid-19 Pandemic</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CSDM Views</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">COVID-19</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">cyberattack</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Cybersecurity</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disinformation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">distant work</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">propaganda</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">social isolation</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year></dates><number><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">38</style></number><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">&lt;p&gt;The COVID-19 pandemic caused a worldwide crisis with health, social, psychological, economic and political consequences. The imposed social isolation has leа to an exceptionally intensive use of Internet and revolutionary digitalization of human life in its interactive professional, academic and entertainment aspects. The cybersecurity risks also increased, which made cyber risk reduction, protection and response more challenging. This analysis reviews the typical risks and vectors of cyberattacks in a situation of increased digitalisation, as well as main countermeasures. Special attention is paid to propaganda and disinformation as specific cybercrimes critical to the social systems.&lt;/p&gt;</style></abstract></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Pascu, Ioan Mircea</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Vintila, Nicolae-Sergiu</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Strengthening the Resilience of Political Institutions and Processes: A Framework of Analysis</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">computational propaganda</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">democracy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">democratic resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disinformation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">foreign influence operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">post-truth</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">resilience</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">sharp power</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2020</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Summer 2020</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">19</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">55-66</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Conventional as well as atypical threats and vulnerabilities tend to undermine the core principles and functioning mechanisms of democratic societies. This article examines internal weaknesses and foreign intervention operations seeking the manipulation of the electorate and thus diminishing legitimate political participation and questioning the very essence of democracy. The analytical focus is on manipulation and disinformation mainly through mass media and social network platforms. This is increasing the risk of undermining public confidence and trust in democratic institutions and processes. The main argument is that democratic institutions and processes can and must be made more resilient. The article provides a framework of analysis for the resilience of political institutions and processes and investigates current initiatives, including of EU and NATO, to strengthen resilience.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">3</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">55</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Steve Abrams</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin’s Russia</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">active measures</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">agent of influence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">deception operations</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">disinformation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">KGB</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Siloviki</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">subversion</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2016</style></year></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">15</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-31</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">This paper investigates the role of Soviet-style “active measures” as an element of modern Russian “political warfare.” These techniques were commonly used during the Soviet-era, encompassing a broad range of influence activities, including: covert media placement, forgery, agents of influence, “friendship” societies, front organizations, and more. Today, in Putin’s Russia, these active measures are once again in use, updated for digitally interconnected “global information space.” The paper begins with an introduction to active measures, then discusses their role in Soviet foreign policy and the attempts by the American “Active Measures Working Group” to counter them. The paper then describes how the Soviet active measures playbook has been updated for the modern era, using three case studies as examples. The paper concludes with a discussion on strategy, reproducing a number of recommendations from key publications.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue></record></records></xml>