<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Todor Tagarev</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Twenty-Five Years of Excellence in Collaborative Research and Education</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">advanced distributed learning</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">armed forces</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">conflict studies</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">defense</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Emerging Security Challenges</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">governance</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">irregular warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Partnership for Peace</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">PfP</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">security sector</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">South Caucasus</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">South-East Europe</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2025</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2025</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">24</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5-9</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Twenty-five years after its creation, the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes continues to serve its stakeholders by adapting to new challenges and providing timely policy recommendations and relevant education and training solutions. This article briefly summarizes the origins of the Consortium, its working modalities, and future opportunities. </style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">5</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Heather S. Gregg</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid Threats and Strategic Competition</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">great power competition</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">grey zone activities</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">hybrid warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">irregular warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">political warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">strategic competition</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">unrestricted warfare</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2024</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2024</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">23</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">159-171</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Strategic competition is not new, nor is the use of activities short of warfare by governments to shape the international system in their favor. However, the ability of state and non-state actors to directly influence populations through a range of rapid and non-attributable actions is different from previous iterations of strategic competition. These activities, referred to in this article as hybrid threats, directly challenge state sovereignty and represent the key distinguishing feature of contemporary strategic competition. To clarify this argument, the article aims to provide working definitions of strategic competition and its distinction from great power competition; to explain what hybrid threats and hybrid warfare are and their roles in the broader strategic objectives of state and non-state actors; to describe how strategic competitors and adversaries perceive these activities; and to emphasize the importance of building resilience within populations to counter hybrid threats.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><section><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">159</style></section></record><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jim Derleth</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Jeff Pickler</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Twenty-first Century Threats Require Twenty-first Century Deterrence</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Connections: The Quarterly Journal</style></secondary-title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Deterrence</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">grey zone</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Hybrid threats</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">irregular warfare</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">National security</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2022</style></date></pub-dates></dates><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">21</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">11-23</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">During the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR) after World War II, deterrence emerged as the primary U.S. security strategy. Historically, the USA focused on deterring conventional and nuclear threats. While this helped prevent a direct military conflict between the two superpowers, it did not end their political rivalry, simply pushing it into areas that decreased the risk of open military conflict. During the Cold War, both the USA and USSR used irregular tactics to try and achieve their strategic objectives in the grey zone, the area below the threshold for “use of force” or “armed attack” as described in the United Nations Charter. Technology limited the effectiveness of irregular tactics, not considered significant national security threats. Today, a globalized, interconnected, and ubiquitous information environment provides numerous opportunities for adversaries to achieve strategic objectives without crossing the strategic threshold that would have historically provoked a military response.
      An increase in irregular attacks shows that while deterrence has continued to prevent large-scale military conflict between the major powers, it has failed to prevent aggression in the grey zone. From the Baltics to the Caucuses, Russia has repeatedly demonstrated how irregular tactics can achieve strategic objectives without fear of an unacceptable counteraction. Trends in national power, interdependence, and technology suggest Russia and other adversaries will continue to increase their ability to exploit the grey zone vulnerabilities. A deterrence policy focused solely on conventional and nuclear forces is no longer sufficient. To deter irregular tactics, the United States must develop a 21st-century deterrence strategy. This need will only grow as Russia tries to offset its military failures in Ukraine. With Russian conventional forces weakened, Russia will increasingly rely on irregular tactics to attack its adversaries. This paper examines the declining relevance of traditional conventional and nuclear-focused deterrence strategies and argues that deterrence should be modified to remain relevant against 21st-century threats.
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